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This dissertation investigates the patterns of belief change that people have while 
processing persuasive messages.  Individuals face a number of persuasive messages via 
various channels.  Some of those messages are persuasive enough so that people change 
their thoughts or beliefs based on those messages.  What kinds of messages result in those 
changes?  How do those changes occur?  Communication scholars have paid a 
considerable amount of attention to those questions and there are many theories and 
empirical findings on the effect of persuasive messages on beliefs.
In the early history of study of persuasion (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; 
see review by McGuire, 1969), researchers focused on the listing of variables that bring 
about different outcomes in the message recipient’s beliefs.  Laswell’s (1948, p. 37) 
comprehensive question, “Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?”, 
had guided the selection of the variables examined as relevant to persuasion. 
Communication studies did not stop with merely listing these variables but 
attempted to develop process models that could explain how persuasion variables result 
in belief change.  McGuire (1968, 1969, 1972) proposed the reception-yielding model, 
which posits that the process of belief change due to persuasive messages basically 
consists of two information-processing stages, reception and yielding, and the effect of 
variables on beliefs can be explained by their effects on reception and yielding.   
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) proposed a theoretical framework for the process of 
belief change by messages, the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), based on the 
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cognitive-response model of persuasion (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 
1981).  According to the ELM, a message recipient utilizes one of two different processes 
or routes of belief change, the systematic or the peripheral, based on the individual’s level 
of cognitive ability and the level of motivation for cognitive processing.  For the two 
different routes of belief change, different kinds of variables have effects on beliefs.  For 
the systematic route, variables related to message argument (e.g., message quality) are 
effective, but for the peripheral route, source-related variables (e.g., source credibility) 
are effective.  The ELM specifies the process of belief change that explains how certain 
persuasion variables may have different effects in different situations.  
Eagly and Chaiken proposed another dual-process model of belief change, the 
heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 
1999), which shares a fundamental commonality with the ELM, belief change via two 
qualitatively different processes, even though some differences in these models exist (see 
Chaiken, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  
The reception-yielding model, the ELM, and the HSM identify some features of 
the process of belief change by persuasive messages.  However, most communication 
studies do not address an important feature of the process of belief change, the time 
course of belief change during judgment.  The time course of belief change during 
judgment refers to the recipient’s positions over time during judgment.  The time course 
of belief change shows how the recipient’s position on an issue moves from his or her 
initial position to a new stable position as a message is being processed. 
The time course of belief change during judgment provides vital information 
about the cognitive system and the process of belief change by persuasive messages.  
3
First, the time course of belief change provides information about the cognitive system. 
Several studies have found that belief change takes place during judgment after message 
receipt without additional information (Brehm, & Wicklund, 1970; Fink, Kaplowitz, & 
Hubbard, 2002; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Kaplowitz, Fink, & Bauer, 1983; 
McGreevy [now Hubbard], 1996; Poole & Hunter, 1979; Tesser, 1978; Vallacher, Nowak, 
& Kaufman, 1994; Walster, 1964; Wang, 1993).  The findings of these studies suggest 
that the cognitive system is dynamic rather than static.  However, these studies examined 
not the whole course of belief change over time but belief change at only some points 
during judgment. The time course of belief change during judgment provides information 
about the dynamics of the cognitive system in some  detail.
Second, the time course of belief change provides information about structural 
properties of the cognitive system.  There are different models of how concepts are 
structured in the cognitive system.  One model of the cognitive system assumes that there 
are associative linkages between concepts and that these linkages are spring-like (the 
spatial-spring model of attitude change; see Fink & Kaplowitz, 1993; Fink, Monahan, & 
Kaplowitz, 1989; Kaplowitz et al., 1983; Woelfel & Fink, 1980), whereas other models 
of cognitive structure do not have the same assumption.  Different models of cognitive 
structure have different implications for the time course of belief change during judgment.  
For example, a spatial-spring model of attitude change predicts oscillatory patterns of 
belief change during judgment.  By testing patterns of belief change implied by different 
cognitive structures, the time course of belief change will provide information about the 
structural properties of the cognitive system.
Third, the time course of belief change during judgment provides information 
4
about cognitive responses during judgment.  Cognitive responses are the recipients’
generated issue-relevant thoughts during judgment.  According to the cognitive response 
model of attitude change (Greenwald, 1968; Petty et al., 1981) and the ELM (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999), the amount and the valence of cognitive 
responses are two primary aspects of thinking that affect processes and outcomes of 
belief change.  The time course of belief change during judgment may reflect cognitive 
responses during judgment. 
Fourth, the time course of belief change during judgment provides information 
about the effects of distal variables on beliefs.  Distal persuasion variables may have 
effects not only on the final outcome of the belief change but also on the time course of 
belief change.  Dynamic effects of distal variables on the belief system may provide 
information on how those variables influence the belief system.
This dissertation investigates the time course of belief change during judgment.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to deepen our understanding on the process of belief 
change and the cognitive system by analyzing the time course of belief change during 
judgment.
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, models are proposed for the patterns of belief 
change over time, the relationship between cognitive responses and the time course of 
belief change, and the dynamic effect of some distal persuasion variables on belief 
change.  These models are tested with four existing data sets from three different studies 
(Fink et al., 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993). Kaplowitz et al.’s (1983) spatial-
spring model of cognitive forces is explicitly aimed at describing and explaining belief 
change during judgment.  The theoretical rationale of the model and the results of studies 
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based on the model are discussed.  Also, characteristics of belief trajectories obtained by 
those studies are examined.  Based on observed characteristics of belief trajectories, a 
new framework for the measurement of belief change during judgment is introduced. 
Based on the spatial-spring model of cognitive forces and the new framework for 
the measurement of belief change during judgment, patterns of belief change are 
predicted for different types of messages: univalent messages and mixed-valence 
messages.  The patterns of belief change in response to different types of messages are 
also predicted for different belief change phases: the message-receipt phase and the post-
message phase.  
Second, a theory of the role of cognitive responses on belief change and 
techniques to measure cognitive responses are discussed.  Based on this discussion, some 
relationships between cognitive responses and aspects of belief trajectories are 
hypothesized.  
Third, the dynamic effects of message discrepancy and source credibility on 
beliefs are investigated in order to explore how these variables influence the belief 
system.  Message discrepancy and source credibility are known as key factors for belief 
change (Anderson, 1971).  Message discrepancy refers to the difference between one’s 
initial position and the position advocated in a message.  Two mathematical models on 
the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Bauer, 1983, a 
nonlinear model of positional and psychological discrepancy; Laroche, 1977, a nonlinear 
model of message discrepancy) are discussed.  Based on these two mathematical models 
and other relevant studies, the effects of message discrepancy on beliefs at different time 
points during judgment are predicted. 
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Source credibility is one of the oldest concepts in persuasion research (Perloff, 
1993) and has been extensively studied from the beginning of modern attitude change 
research (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951).  Research has shown that a 
high credibility source is more persuasive than a low credibility source if attitudes are 
measured immediately after a message (Hovland & Weiss, 1951), but the effect of source 
credibility on attitude change is moderated by issue involvement (see Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  Based on results from those studies and other relevant research, the effects of 
message discrepancy on beliefs at different time points during judgment are modeled.  
This dissertation analyzes belief trajectories that were obtained from three 
different studies (Fink et al., 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993).  Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation describes how the belief trajectories used in this dissertation were obtained, 
the independent variables that were manipulated, and the dependent variables were that 
measured in those studies. The techniques used in those studies to obtain belief 
trajectories are discussed.  In addition, the use of a new framework for measurement of 
belief change during judgment is explained. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of tests of proposed hypotheses.  Finally, Chapter 5 
summarizes the results of the study, and addresses implications of the results, limitations 
of the study, and questions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II
Theoretical Rationale and Hypotheses
Theoretical Rationale
Definition of Belief, Judgment, Attitude, and Belief Change
Belief.  In this chapter, models of belief change during judgment are proposed.  To 
make theoretical arguments clearer, how the terms of belief and judgment are used in this 
study is specified.  In this dissertation, a belief is defined as subjective knowledge 
(Kruglanski, 1989).  Knowledge is a proposition or propositions (or bodies of interrelated 
propositions) in which a person has a given degree of confidence (Kruglanski, 1989).
When a proposition is believed as true or right by a person, the proposition is a belief to 
the person.  A proposition is a statement about the relationship between an object and 
attributes.  Therefore, beliefs can be understood as associations that people establish 
between an object and attributes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  
Judgment. Acquisition of knowledge or beliefs is accomplished by bestowing some 
degree of confidence to a given proposition, which is the process of validation
(Kruglanski, 1989).  Judgment is the behavior of validating a proposition. Knowledge or 
beliefs are acquired by judgment.
Attitude. Some beliefs have affective or evaluative content (e.g., “the candy is 
good”).  For those beliefs, the belief object is associated with an evaluate attribute.  
Beliefs with content that is evaluative are classified as attitudes (Kruglanski, 1989).  In 
this dissertation, attitudes are treated as a subclass of beliefs.  Kruglanski (1989) stated, 
“when a person makes an attitudinal statement whereby he or she feels positive about a 
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given object, or considers it to have positive qualities, he or she actually is expressing an 
opinion or belief of an affective or evaluative type” (p. 112).  Evaluative beliefs, that is, 
attitudes, and non-evaluative beliefs (e.g., “the candy is red”) may have different 
implications but both exhibit the generic properties of beliefs (Dinauer, 2003; Kruglanski, 
1989).  Both are acquired by judgment. 
The notion that attitudes are a subtype of opinions and beliefs is found in spatial 
theories of cognitive system.  According to the Galileo spatial model (Foldy & Woelfel, 
1990; Woelfel & Fink 1980), a belief can be represented as the distance between any two 
cognitive objects and an attitude can be represented as the distance between any concept 
and the self-concept (Neuendorf, Kaplowitz, Fink, & Armstrong, 1987; Woelfel & Fink, 
1980). 
Belief change. In this dissertation, belief change refers to the motion of the 
recipient’s position on a certain issue from the recipient’s prior position.  The recipient’s 
prior  position may be neutral.  When a belief object does not exist in the recipient’s 
cognitive system, the recipient’s initial position is assumed to be neutral.  With this 
definition, belief change in this dissertation encompasses both changes from the neutral 
position to a new position, belief formation, and changes from a certain position to a new 
position. 
A Spatial-Spring Model of Cognitive Forces
Kaplowitz et al.’s (1983) spatial-spring model of cognitive forces is explicitly 
aimed at describing and explaining belief change during judgment.  Kaplowitz et al. used 
a mechanistic metaphor for belief change, and mathematically derived trajectories of 
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belief change during judgment.  The model predicts several dynamic patterns of belief 
change during judgment, including an oscillatory pattern of belief change (see below).  
The model was built on two mechanical metaphors for belief systems.  Like an 
object in a physical system, a concept in a cognitive system is considered to have both a 
location and a mass in a cognitive space. Belief change is equivalent to motion of a 
concept in the cognitive space (Fink et al., 2002; Kaplowitz et al., 1983; Woelfel & Fink, 
1980).  The model assumes that “the amount of acceleration of a concept will be equal to 
the amount of force acting upon the concept divided by the mass of that concept as in 
Newtonian mechanics” (Kaplowitz et al., 1983, p. 234). 
The model also assumes that concepts in a cognitive space may be linked with 
each other and that the linkages are spring-like rather than brace-like (see Fink & 
Kaplowitz, 1993; Fink et al., 1989; Fink et al., 2002; Kaplowitz & Fink, 1982, 1988, 
1992, 1996; Kaplowitz et al., 1983).  Like the operation of a mechanical spring, the 
model assumes that when a concept is moving, two opposing forces operate: a force 
moving the concept away from the initial location and a force restoring the initial position.  
The existence of restoring forces has been supported to a limited extent by cognitive 
oscillations found empirically (Fink et al., 2002; Foldy & Woelfel, 1990; Kaplowitz et al., 
1983; McGreevy, 1996; Vallacher et al., 1994; Wang, 1993; Woelfel, Newton, Holmes, 
Kincaid, & Lee, 1986).  The spring-like linkage model suggests a parameter for the 
damping of cognitive motion.  Just as the motion of a spring dies out, when beliefs 
oscillate, it appears that such oscillations usually die out.  The model assumes a cognitive 
damping process, in which the patterns of oscillation of the cognitive system depend on 
the size of the damping forces as compared to the restoring forces.  
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Based on the above assumptions, the force created by a spring-like linkage 
between two concepts is modeled by the following equation: 
( ) ( )[ ]BAdBAdKF EqBABA ,,,, −= ,                                                                   (1.1)
where FA,B is the force created by the linkage between concept A and concept B, dEq(A,B) 
is the equilibrium distance of the linkage, which is the dissimilarity between A and B
specified in the message, d(A,B) is the distance between those concepts in the recipient’s 
cognitive space before the recipient receives the message and KA,B is the restoring 
coefficient of the linkage.  
Restoring coefficients represent the strength of the spring (Ingard & Kraushaar, 
1960). According to Kaplowitz and Fink (1982, 1988, 1992), the restoring coefficient of 
a message is an increasing function of source credibility of the message, the strength of 
arguments in the message, and the recency of the message.
With Newton’s laws of force and motion and the assumption of a cognitive 
damping process, Equation 1.1 leads to the following differential equation (Kaplowitz & 
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where x* is the distance of  a concept from its equilibrium location, t is time, K is the net 
restoring coefficient on the concept, m is the mass of the concept and C is a damping 
coefficient. 
If C2 > 4Km, the system is overdamped, and if C2 = 4Km, the system is critically 
damped. On the other hand, if C2 < 4Km, the system generates an underdamped 
oscillatory trajectory” (Kaplowitz & Fink, 1982).  We solve the differential equation for 
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The solution [for Equation 1.2] can be written as 
)cossin( 21 tataex
rt ωω += ,”      (1.5)
(Kaplowitz & Fink, 1982, p. 376) where e is the exponential function, and a1 and a2
reflect initial conditions.  Equation 1.5 describes belief change trajectories with a period 
= ω
π2
.  If we assume that cognitive systems have a damping force as mechanical systems 
have friction, then C > 0 and r < 0.  In this case, the cognitive motion will be oscillation 
with damping.  In the process of oscillation with damping, the direction of belief change 
alternates repeatedly, and the amount of belief change in each direction decreases as the 
belief approaches equilibrium. Figure 1 represents Equation 1.5 when C > 0; it shows 
oscillation with damping.  
The model also predicts that average amplitudes of belief trajectories are a 
positive function of the force created by the message.  Equation 1.1 indicates that the 
force of the message is a function of the difference between the message position and the 
recipient’s initial position (message discrepancy) and the restoring coefficient.  Therefore, 
the amplitude of belief trajectories increases as message discrepancy increases.  Restoring 
coefficients are assumed to be functions of source credibility, the strength of the message, 
and the strength of initial attitudes.  Therefore, the more credible a source is, the greater 
the amplitude of the belief trajectory.
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Frequency of oscillation is predicted to be a function of the restoring coefficients. 
The model predicts that higher frequency oscillations should occur with messages from 
more credible sources, with stronger arguments, and on topics on which the recipient has 
a stronger initial view (Fink & Kaplowitz, 1993; Fink et al., 2002).    
Studies of Cognitive Dynamics
Kaplowitz, Fink, and Bauer (1983). Kaplowitz et al. (1983) tested oscillatory 
patterns of belief change with multiple time lags over 10 minutes in a between-
participants design, in which participants provided their belief position only once.  Using 
a general nonlinear structural model, they found evidence of belief oscillation but no 
evidence for damping of belief trajectories.  They reported that the period of cognitive 
oscillation was about 13.5 seconds, which corresponds to a frequency of .07 Hz.  
The patterns of belief change predicted by the oscillation model can be best 
observed with trajectories of individual belief change during judgment rather than with 
cross-sectional data.  Fink and Kaplowitz (1993) developed a computer mouse technique 
to measure belief change during judgment.  The technique requires participants to use a 
computer mouse to indicate their instantaneous beliefs about an issue on a 
unidimensional continuum while participants are thinking about the message.  In the 
1993 study, participants’ beliefs were measured at least every 18 milliseconds through 
the mouse position, which provided trajectories of individual beliefs.  This technique was 
used in Fink and Kaplowitz (1993), Wang (1993), McGreevy (1996), and Fink et al. 
(2002).
Fink, Kaplowitz, and Hubbard (2002). Examining belief trajectories for two 
separate issues, the appropriate sentence for a convicted armed robber and the appropriate 
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increase in tuition, Fink et al. (2002) found that belief reversals during judgment were
quite common (belief reversal percentages were 73% for the criminal-sentencing issue 
with N = 99, and 59% for the tuition increase issue with N = 91).  However, the observed 
oscillatory trajectories were very different from the sinusoidal pattern of belief 
trajectories predicted by the spatial-spring model.  Trajectories did not show constant 
periods or gradual damping.  Many trajectories showed irregular oscillatory movements.  
Figure 2 shows one example of belief trajectories for one participant in the criminal-
sentence scenario. 
Because of the irregularities of the trajectories, Fink et al. (2002) measured 
pseudo-amplitudes and pseudo-frequencies to capture the amplitude and frequency found 
in these trajectories.  The pseudo-amplitude was defined as half of the difference between 
the maximum and the minimum values of a belief trajectory, and the pseudo-frequency 
was defined as the total number of changes of direction divided by the decision time. The 
total number of changes of direction was evaluated based on the number of waves 
indicated by the graph of the trajectory.  Only waves that moved at least 4% of the range 
of the scale were counted as true changes because small changes in direction could 
“reflect random motion rather than cognitive changes” (Kaplowitz & Fink, 1996, p. 296).
Fink et al. found, as predicted, that the pseudo-amplitude was correlated with the amount 
of belief change for the issues employed: The greater the pseudo-amplitude, the greater 
the amount of belief change.  However, pseudo-frequency and the number of changes in 
direction did not differ between messages from high and low credible sources, which was
contrary to the model’s predictions.  Furthermore, message discrepancy did not seem to 
have effects on pseudo-frequency.  
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One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the patterns predicted by 
the model and those found in the data was suggested by the researchers themselves. As 
people process an external message, they often generate new thoughts and process them 
(see, e.g., Greenwald, 1968; Petty et al., 1981; Tesser, 1978).  These self-generated 
messages may create new linkages and make trajectories far more complex than those 
implied by the simple model that assumes that the restoring force of other linkages except 
the target linkage are constant. 
Belief Trajectories and Belief Change during Judgment
Individuals process self-generated information as well as information given in a 
message.  Belief trajectories are likely to be affected by the self-generated information, 
which makes it difficult to find a simple effect of external messages on belief trajectories.  
On the other hand, belief trajectories provide an opportunity to trace the processing self-
generated information and its effect on beliefs.  Data from McGreevy (1996) give a clue 
about the local movement in a belief trajectory.  McGreevy collected data using the same 
computer mouse technique as did Fink et al. (2002).  McGreevy collected belief 
trajectories both while participants were reading messages (the message-receipt phase) 
and while they were thinking after message receipt (the post-message phase).  
Trajectories obtained in the message-receipt phase show systematic patterns and reveal 
some relationship between belief trajectories and the information participants were 
reading. 
McGreevy (1996). In the study, participants who were undergraduate students in a 
large university were presented with information about two candidates for admission to a 
university.  Each participant indicated his or her instantaneous beliefs about two 
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candidates on a line on a computer screen.  On the computer screen, there was a 
horizontal line.  “Candidate 1” appeared with “0” at the left end of the line, and 
“Candidate 2” appeared with “100” at the right end of the line.  Participants indicated 
their evaluations about candidates by the distance between the computer cursor (as 
moved by a computer mouse) and the lower or upper ends of the line. Because 100 
indicates that perfect suitability of Candidate 2, the higher number indicates the more 
favorability about Candidate 2.  Two variables were manipulated, the degree of similarity 
in quality between two candidates (similar versus different) and distraction (distraction 
versus no distraction). 
Figure 3 shows part of a belief trajectory found for one participant in the similar-
candidate and no distraction condition of the McGreevy study.  At 139.08 seconds, the 
participant indicated completion of reading. Figure 3 is a belief trajectory during the 
message-receipt phase. The trajectory in Figure 3 shows a couple of interesting patterns. 
First, the trajectory consists of repetitions of a stay and a move.  Second, it shows a 
downward step-like shape up to 90.41 seconds and then an upward step-like shape.
The position movement up to 90.41 seconds shows seven downward steps, each 
of which consists of a stay and a move.  For example, the first step consists of a stay at 
position 50.00 for 10.34 seconds and a move down to 49.00 with 13.89 points/s speed 
(see Table 1.1 for the details for all seven movements).1  There are correspondences 
found between those seven downward step-like movements and information in the 
message given to participants in the condition (the similar-candidate condition). The 
correspondence provides a clue about what local movements of belief trajectories reflect.
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Information provided to participants in the similar-candidate condition consists of 
two paragraphs: One is about Candidate 1 and the other is about Candidate 2.  
Information about Candidate 1 is as follows (McGreevy, 1996, p. 361, sentence numbers 
in brackets added):
Candidate 1 is a high school senior from New England [1].  He has an impressive 
academic record and SAT scores [2].  In addition to his academic achievements, 
he enjoys many activities [3].  He is captain of the schools’ debate team, and has 
won several debate and public speaking competitions [4].  Candidate 1 is also 
active in school politics [5].  He is currently President of the student government 
association (SGA) [6].  His junior year he served as Vice President of SBA and 
his freshman and sophomore he sat on his class council [7]  Candidate 1 is co-
captain of his high school’s varsity soccer team [8].  Candidate 1 claims that 
debate and student government have helped him develop his leadership and 
analytical reasoning skills [9].  He credits sports with teaching him the value of 
hard work and determination [10].  Outside of school, Candidate 1 is active in 
the community [11].  Each year he volunteers for his state’s Special Olympics 
program [12].  Through the special Olympics, he serves as an assistant soccer 
coach for a team of mentally retarded children [13].  Candidate 1 is also active in 
his church’s youth group [14]. This group serves the community by getting 
involved in projects such as feeding the homeless, visiting nursing homes, and 
cleaning up the environment [15].  Candidate 1 considers himself a well rounded 
individual who manages his time will [16].  He is extremely excited about starting 
college and meeting the challenges that await him [17].  
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Information about Candidate 1 can be grouped into seven parts in terms of 
content: Introduction: [1]; Academic Achievement: [2]; Extra-curricular Activity: [3], 
[4]; School Politics: [5], [6], [7]; Sports: [8],  [9],  [10]; Community Service: [11], [12], 
[13]; Religious Activity: [14], [15]; and Personality: [16], [17].  Except for the 
introduction, all information was created to be characteristics that are indicative of 
success in college (McGreevy, 1996, p. 45).  Therefore, the first paragraph has seven 
pieces of information that are indicative of Candidate 1’s success in college.   
All seven movements in the trajectory show a repetition of a stay and a move. All 
seven stays in the trajectory took more significant amounts of time (M = 10.04 s; the 
minimum time = 2.18 s) than moves.  All seven moves were done with a significant 
speed (M = 3.44 points/s; the minimum speed is 1.30 points/s; the first move took place 
with a very high speed, 13.89 points/s; the mean speed for moves other than the first one 
is 1.69 points/s).  The belief change by a move ranges from -1.00 to - 4.17 (M = -2.52).  
All seven moves showed negative belief change, indicating increased favorability toward 
Candidate 1, which is consistent with the valence of the given message (i.e., the message 
had positive statements for Candidate 1).   
Repetition of a stay and a move suggests that the participant read or thought about 
a piece of information while holding the computer mouse and then changed his or her 
belief by moving the computer mouse.  Also, the correspondence between the direction 
suggested by the message and the direction of movements of the trajectory suggests that 
local movements represent belief change due to processing information at the moment.  
It may be assumed that the participant who provided the trajectory in Figure 3 was 
processing information (i.e., reading and judging) for 10.34 seconds (time for the first 
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stay) and indicated his or her new position by moving the mouse from 50.00 to 49.00 at 
time point 10.34 seconds.  Moving from 50.00 to 49.00 took 0.07 seconds, with a speed 
of 13.89 points/s. The speed for the move was calculated by dividing the distance on the 
y-axis of the move by the time taken for the move.  The participant processed the second 
piece of information for 3.41 seconds and indicated his or her position by moving the 
mouse 2.67 units, from 49.00 to 46.33, with a speed of 1.66 points/s.
Sequential repetition of a stay and a move and correspondence between the 
trajectory and information given to the participants suggest that movements can be 
analyzed as measures of belief change due to information processed immediately prior 
mouse movement.  The whole belief trajectory can be thought as a series of local belief 
changes, which are represented in local movements of the trajectory.  
Movements in the second part of the trajectory (the message-receipt phase, for 
this participant from 90.41 to 139.08 seconds) should suggest the same process as 
movements found in the first part of the trajectory (from the beginning to 90.41 seconds).  
Position movements in the second part of the message-receipt phase in Figure 3 show the 
same direction of belief change as suggested by information in the second paragraph of 
the similar-candidate condition.  Information about Candidate 2 in the similar-candidate 
condition is as follows (McGreevy, 1996, p. 362; sentence numbers in brackets added):
Candidate 2 is also a high school senior from New England [1].  He, too, has an 
impressive academic record and SAT scores [2].  In addition to excelling in his 
studies, Candidate 2 is involved in many activities both within and outside of 
school [3].  In school, he is captain of his high school lacrosse team and member 
of the debate team [4].  He has served on student government boards all four years 
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of high school [5].  This year his classmates voted him Vice President of SGA 
(student government association) for the second year in a row [6].  His freshman 
year he served on the class council, and his sophomore year he was his class 
treasurer [7].  Candidate 2 enjoys combining sports, debate and student 
government [8].  He claims that these three activities have helped him with his 
critical thinking, arguing, and leadership skills [9].  Outside of school, Candidate 
2 volunteers for his community’s Big Brother/Big Sister program [10].  In 
addition to serving as a mentor to a child in the community, Candidate 2 also 
volunteers as a peer tutor at the local middle school [11].  Candidate 2 enjoys 
students of all ages and is looking forward to returning to his summer job as a 
camp counselor [12].  This will be his third year working for the camp (his 
freshman year he was a counselor in training) [13].  Candidate 2 describes 
himself as confident, motivated, and responsible [14].  He is eager to start college 
and meet the challenges that lay ahead [15]. 
Information about Candidate 2 can be partitioned into seven parts in terms of 
content: Introduction [1]; Academic Achievement [2]; Extra-curricular Activity [3, 4]; 
School Politics [5,6,7]; Debate Team Activity [8, 9]; Community Service [10, 11,12,13]; 
and Personality [14,15].  Except for the introduction, all information was selected and 
tested as characteristics that are indicative of success in college (McGreevy, 1996, p. 45).  
It is expect that the position would be closer to Candidate 2 as each part of the message is 
processed.   
Position movements in the second half of the message-receipt phase show a 
gradual increase in favorability toward Candidate 2.  The position movements show 
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upward step-like movements. However, the shape of movements for the second part of 
the message-receipt phase is not as step-like as that found in the first part of message-
receipt phase.  The trajectory for the second part of message-receipt may be partitioned 
into several local movements.
These are ten stays of more than 1.00 second.  When movements with less than 
one unit are excluded, there are seven movements (see Table 1.2 for detailed information 
about the movements for the second part of the message-receipt phase). The directions of 
all seven movements are the same as the corresponding parts of the messages suggest.
The upward step-like movements in the second part of the message-receipt phase 
suggest the same process as the movements in the first part of the message-receipt phase 
do: A stay and a move in the trajectory can be interpreted as an indicator of belief change 
due to processing information at the moment.  
The U-shaped movement found in Figure 3 was also found in other cases in the 
same condition. Among 26 trajectories in the similar-candidate no-distraction condition, 
19 trajectories show a U-shaped step-like movement (73%).  Four of them show no 
movement during reading (15%).  Three trajectories (12%) show other shapes of 
movements (early quick W-shaped, only downward, and N-shaped movement). 
These results strongly suggest that a local movement, a stay followed by a move, 
indicates belief change due to processing information immediately prior mouse 
movement.  It can be assumed that local movements during thinking (the post-message 
phase) represent belief change due to processing information generated by the 
participants themselves at a given time.  In the present study, local movements will be 
measured and analyzed to find patterns of belief change during judgment.  
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Vallacher, Nowak, and Kaufman (1994).  Step-like movements in the attitude 
trajectory were found in Vallacher et al. (1994). Vallacher et al. measured attitudes 
toward a target person 10 times per second over a 2-minute period with a computer 
mouse, which provides attitude trajectories.  Vallacher et al. examined differences in 
attitude trajectories between messages that had only positive or only negative information 
(univalent messages) and messages that had both positive and negative information 
(mixed-valence messages). Vallacher et al. presented three trajectories, one for each 
participant for each condition: the positive univalent message condition, the negative 
univalent message condition, and the mixed-valence message condition.  Trajectories for 
all three cases show oscillatory patterns, but the individual trajectory in the mixed-
valence condition showed a greater oscillatory pattern than the univalent conditions did.  
Individual trajectories provided by Vallacher et al. also show repetition of a stay 
and a move throughout the trajectory or in part of the trajectory.  The positively univalent 
trajectory (Vallacher et al., 1994, p. 25) shows “stay-move” movements throughout the 
trajectory (see Figure 4).  The negative univalent and mixed-valence trajectories are more 
complicated than the positive one, but they also show the step-like movement in many 
places in the trajectories. 
Summary of Studies Using the Computer Mouse Technique
 Two different research groups (Fink & Kaplowitz; Vallacher, Nowark & 
Kaufman) developed a computer mouse technique.  Belief changes during judgment were 
analyzed with belief trajectories obtained by the computer mouse technique.  In both 
groups’ studies, systematic patterns of belief change were found.  Fink and Kaplowitz 
and their colleagues (Fink et al., 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993) found that belief 
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reversals during judgment were quite common (see Table 1.3 for the summary of results 
from those studies).  Vallacher et al. (1994) found that the average position and the 
average speed of position movement were different between the first 40 seconds and the 
last 40 seconds; however, in that study the analyses of belief trajectories were limited to 
some overall aspects of the trajectories.  
Belief trajectories found in previous studies show distinctive local movements. 
The position for each local movement can be identified. With those positions, belief 
trajectories can be simplified and the effects of distal variables at different time points 
can be examined. 
Notation for Belief Change during Judgment
The following notation and definitions will be used for belief change and local 
movements:
0P = the recipient’s initial position on a given belief scale;
1P = the recipient’s position after the first local movement on the same belief scale 
as 0P ;
iP = the recipient’s position after the i-th local movement, where i is a non-
negative integer;
NP = the recipient’s final position (the number of local movements = N); 
)0(1P∆ = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the first local movement 
from the initial position (i.e.,
01)0(1 PPP −=∆ );
)0(iP∆ = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the i-th local movement 
from the initial position (i.e., 
0)0( PPP ii −=∆ );
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)1( −∆ iiP = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the i-th local movement 
from the position for the previous local movement (i.e., 
1−−=∆ iii PPP ).
Hypotheses
Patterns of Belief Change during Judgment
Patterns of Belief Change during the Message-Receipt Phase
When multiple pieces of information are given, the pattern of belief change 
should be different when messages are received (the message-receipt phase) and when 
thinking about the message after its receipt (the post-message phase).  In the message-
receipt phase, each piece of message information can have effects on beliefs.  The effects 
of pieces of information on beliefs should depend on the valence and the strength of the 
pieces of information (Anderson, 1971; Kaplowitz & Fink, 1992; also see Equation 1.1).  
The order and valence of the information presented determines the belief trajectory.  
Therefore, when instantaneous belief change is measured during message receipt, a 
correspondence between the structure of information in the message and belief trajectory
is expected.  
Local movements of belief trajectories can be used to test the correspondence 
between the structure of the message and belief change during the message-receipt phase.  
First, in the message-receipt phase, it is expected that the sequence of local movements in 
terms of the direction is affected by the sequence of information presented in the message. 
If a series of pieces of negative information is presented and followed by a series of
pieces of positive information in the message (a sequential mixed-valence message), local 
movements of belief trajectories are more likely to appear as a series of negative 
movements followed by a series of positive movements, resulting a U-shaped pattern.  
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However, when only a series of pieces of positive information is presented in the 
message (a univalent message), unidirectional local movement is expected.  The 
following hypotheses are proposed:  
H1.1 (Sequence of information and sequence of local movements during the 
message-receipt phase): For a sequential mixed-valence messages, a U-shaped or 
inverted U-shaped pattern of local movements (or a series of such patterns) 
occurs; for a univalent message, a unidirectional (monotonic) pattern of local 
movement occurs.
During the message-receipt phase, the number of positive belief changes is 
affected by the number of pieces of positive information in the message, and the number 
of negative belief changes is affected by the number of pieces of negative information.  
Therefore, it is expected that the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the 
number of negative local movements will be greater for (positive) univalent messages 
than for mixed-valence messages.  The following hypothesis is proposed:  
H1.2 (Message type and the ratio of the number of positive local movements to 
the number of negative local movements during the message-receipt phase): 
During the message-receipt phase, the ratio of the number of positive local 
movements to the number of negative local movements in belief trajectories is
greater for positively univalent messages than for mixed-valence messages.
The amount of belief change while receiving messages can be thought of as a 
function of the sum of the effect of each piece of information.  The value or message 
position and the weight or importance of the information in the message can be thought 
of as basic factors constituting the effect of the information (Anderson, 1971).  The effect 
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where )0(NP∆  is the amount of belief change in the message-receipt phase, iw is the 
weight of the i-th piece of information in the message, and 
iM
P  is the message position of 
the i-th piece of information in the message.  The amount of belief change after 










If belief trajectories obtained by the computer mouse technique represent belief 
change while processing information in the message, belief trajectories are expected to 
show patterns predicted by Equation 1.7.  Belief trajectories in the message-receipt phase 
are expected to consist of belief positions that reflect the weights of pieces of information 
in the message. 
H1.3 (Weights of information in the message and belief trajectories): Belief 
trajectories in the message-receipt phase will reflect the weights of the pieces of 
information in the message.  
Patterns of Belief Change during the Post-Message Phase
Unlike the message-receipt phase, belief change during the post-message phase 
depends on memory, self-generated thoughts, and the intrinsic dynamics of information 
processing.  A spatial-spring model of cognitive forces (Kaplowitz et al., 1983) predicts 
belief change during judgment.  If we assume that the concepts in a cognitive system 
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have spring-like linkages, the pattern of belief change is most likely to be oscillation with 
damping.  Oscillation with a damping pattern has two key aspects. One is the oscillatory 
pattern, that is, the direction of belief change during judgment alternates repeatedly.  The 
other aspect is a damping pattern, that is, the absolute amount of belief change in each 
direction decreases as the belief approaches equilibrium. 
The oscillatory pattern and the damping pattern of belief change can be expressed 
in terms of local movements of belief trajectories.  If there is the oscillatory pattern of 
belief change during judgment, a belief trajectory will be a sequence of local movements 
whose directions alternate.  If there is a damping pattern of belief change during 
judgment, the absolute amount of belief change by local movements will decrease. 
To test the oscillatory and damping pattern of belief change during judgment, the 
following hypotheses are proposed in terms of local movements: 
H2.1.1 (The oscillatory pattern for local movements): During judgment, a local 
movement is more likely to be followed by a local movement whose direction is 
opposite to the direction of the preceding one.
H2.1.2 (The damping pattern for local movements): During judgment, the 
absolute amount of belief change by a local movement is smaller than the 
absolute amount of belief change of the proceeding local movement.
H2.1.1 and H2.1.2 can be summarized in the following model:
,2;01-;)2)(1()1( ≥<<∆=∆ −−− ilPlP iiiiii                                       (1.8) 
where il  is a constant for the i-th local movement. H2.1.1 predicts that li should be 
negative.  H2.1.2 predicts that the absolute value of il should be less than 1.00.  When 
the absolute value of  il  is less than 1.00, the absolute amount of belief change by a local 
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movement will be smaller than the absolute amount of belief change of the proceeding 
local movement. 
A damping oscillatory trajectory can be divided into multiple parts in terms of the 
direction of belief movement.  When the local movement framework is applied to test 
oscillatory patterns of a belief trajectory, there are two possibilities about the relationship 
between local movements and belief change in one direction.  A single local movement 
may constitute one movement for belief change. On the other hand, a set of local 
movements that have the same direction may constitute one movement for belief change.  
To differentiate the two situations, the former is named a micro local movement (or just a 
local movement) and the latter is a macro movement.   
To describe macro movements, the following notation is needed.
1
~
P = the recipient’s position after the first macro movement, which is a set of the 
micro local movements that are consecutive and have the same direction.  That is,
[ ] [ ] [ ])1(1)1(21)0(1101 ...
~
−∆++∆+∆+= nnPPPPP , (1.9) 
where n is the number of consecutive micro local movements that have the same 
direction. [ ])0(11P∆  indicates the difference between belief position of the first micro local 
movement of the first macro movement and the starting position of the first macro local 
movement.  The general form of [ ])0(11P∆  is [ ])1( −∆ jjiP , which indicates the difference 
between the belief position of the j-th micro local movement of the i-th macro local 
movement and belief position of the (j - 1)st micro local movement of the i-th macro 
local movement.  The position by i-th macro local movement can be expressed as 
follows: 
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ])1()1(2)0(10 ...
~
−∆++∆+∆+= nniiiii PPPPP . (1.10) 
The following notation will be used for belief change by a macro local movement.
1
~
P∆ = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the first macro local 
movements from the initial position (i.e., 01
~
PP − ). 
)0(
~
iP∆ = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the i-th macro local 





−∆ iiP = the amount of the recipient’s belief change after the i-th macro local 
movements from the position for the previous set of local movements (i.e., 1
~~
−− ii PP ).
For a macro local movement, the alternation of direction (the oscillatory pattern) 
is always true by definition.  However, the hypotheses about the damping pattern can be 
proposed for macro local movements. 
H2.2 (The damping pattern for macro local movements): During judgment, the 
amount of belief change of a macro local movement will be smaller than the 
amount of belief change of the proceeding macro of local movement.





)2)(1()1( ≥<<∆=∆ −−− ilPlP iiiiii ,                                               (1.11) 
where il
~
is a constant for i-th macro local movement. H2.2 indicates that the absolute 
value of il
~
should be less than 1. 
Cognitive Responses and Local Movements during the Post-Message Phase
According to the cognitive response approach, beliefs are a function of the 
valence and the number of thoughts that individuals generate in response to messages 
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(Petty et al., 1981).  Most studies guided by the cognitive response approach have used 
the thought-listing technique to assess the valence and the number of thoughts generated 
by message recipients (Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 1981).  The thought-listing task aims 
at obtaining the thoughts that took place during judgment before the final judgment is 
formed.  Thoughts during judgment are assumed to have effects on beliefs.  However, 
because the thought-listing technique is a memory-based measurement (Mackie & 
Asuncion, 1990), and is administered after the final judgment is made, the final judgment 
may influence the reporting of thoughts, which could threaten the validity of the thought-
listing task (Greenwald, 1981; Miller & Baron, 1973; Miller & Colman, 1981).  
Assuming that the message recipient updates his or her beliefs with positive or 
negative self-generated thoughts (i.e., on-line modification of beliefs), and that those 
belief changes are reflected in belief trajectories, belief trajectories can be an alternative 
method to assess recipient-generated thoughts during judgment.  Moreover, because 
belief trajectories obtained by the computer mouse technique are relatively instantaneous, 
belief trajectories and local movements provide observations that are free from the 
influence of the final judgment that may affect in the thought-listing technique.  Thus, the 
thought-listing technique and the computer mouse technique may both be validated by 
their correlation.
Message type, cognitive responses, and local movements.  Different types of 
messages (e.g., univalent versus mixed-valence messages) are assumed to cause different 
cognitive responses.  Specifically, the ratio of the number of positive cognitive responses 
to the number of negative cognitive responses is expected to be greater for positively 
univalent messages than for mixed-valence messages.  If local movements in belief 
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trajectories reflect belief changes due to cognitive responses, it is expected that the ratio 
of the number of positive local movements to the number of negative local movements 
will be greater for positively univalent messages than for mixed-valence messages, which 
leads to the following hypothesis:
H3.1.1 (Message type and the number of local movements): During the post-
message phase, the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the number 
of negative local movements is greater for positively univalent messages than for
mixed-valence messages. 
It is expected that a decision maker will have more thoughts in difficult decision 
situations than in easy decision situations, especially when the decision is dichotomous.  
When mixed-valence messages are given, the decision is more difficult than when 
univalent messages are given.  Mixed-valence messages are expected to generate more 
cognitive responses than univalent messages.  This difference in the number of thoughts 
will be reflected in belief trajectories in which the number of total local movement will 
be greater for mixed-valence messages than for univalent messages:    
H3.1.2 (Message type and the total number of local movements): During the post-
message phase, the number of local movements is greater for mixed-valence 
messages than for univalent messages.
The cognitive response approach argues that a message exerts its effect on beliefs 
through recipient-generated cognitive responses during judgments (Greenwald, 1968; 
Petty et al., 1981).  Assuming local movements reflect cognitive responses during 
judgment, the following hypothesis is proposed:   
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H3.1.3 (Mediating role of the number of local movements between message type 
and the final decision): The effect of message type (univalent versus mixed-
valence) on the final decision is mediated by the number of positive and the 
number of negative local movements.
Cognitive responses and local movements. The thought-listing technique attempts 
to measure cognitive responses during judgment based on participants’ recall.  Local 
movements in belief trajectories measure belief changes during judgment. If belief 
changes during judgment result from cognitive responses during judgment, a positive 
relationship is expected between local movements in belief trajectories and cognitive 
responses collected by the thought-listing task.2
H3.2.1 (Cognitive responses and the number of local movements): There will be a 
positive relationship between the number of positive local movements and the 
number of positive thoughts, and between the number of negative local 
movements and the number of negative thoughts.
The cognitive response approach argues that the numbers of positive and negative 
cognitive responses have effects on beliefs.  This argument has been supported by studies 
that used the thought-listing technique to measure cognitive responses during judgment 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Greenwald, 1968; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1977, 1979). If local movements in belief trajectories represent belief change 
resulting from cognitive responses, the numbers of positive and negative local 
movements have effects on beliefs.  Furthermore, similarities are expected between the 
effect of the numbers of positive and negative thoughts on beliefs and the effect of the 
numbers of positive and negative local movements on beliefs. Because of the scale 
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difference between these two kinds of measures, the effect sizes may not comparable.  
But it is expected that the ratio of the effect of the number of positive thoughts on beliefs
to the effect of the number of negative thoughts on beliefs will not be different from the 
ratio of the effect of the number of positive local movements on beliefs to the effect of 
the number of negative local movements on beliefs.
H3.2.2 (Effects of cognitive responses and local movements on beliefs): The ratio 
of the effect of the number of positive thoughts on beliefs to the effect of the 
number of negative thoughts on beliefs will be the same as the ratio of the effect 
of the number of positive local movements on beliefs to the effect of the number 
of negative local movements on beliefs. 
Dynamic Effect of Distal Variables on Beliefs
The Effect of Message Discrepancy on Beliefs during Judgment
Brock (1967) found that as message discrepancy increases, the number of 
counterarguments to the message increases and the degree of acceptance of the message 
position decreases. These results suggest that message discrepancy exerts a negative 
effect on the acceptance of a message.  However, before the recipient begins to generate 
counterarguments, message discrepancy may exert a positive effect on beliefs. Gilbert et 
al. (1990) found that people first entertain an assertion as true before they reject it
(“Spinozan procedure model”).  Hence, an extremely discrepant message can be thought 
of as an appropriate assertion at the beginning of its consideration and therefore has a
positive effect on beliefs.  After recipients generate counterarguments, an extremely 
discrepant message is expected to exert a negative effect on beliefs. 
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Even though there has been no systemic investigation of the dynamic effect of 
message discrepancy on beliefs during judgment, the static effect of message discrepancy 
on the beliefs has been modeled and tested.  Two mathematical models of message 
discrepancy on belief change are worthy of note: Fink, Kaplowitz, and Bauer's model 
(1983) and Laroche’s model (1977). Let 
0P = the recipient’s initial position on a given belief scale;
MP = the position of a message on the same belief scale as 0P ;
PD = the positional discrepancy between the message and the recipient’s initial 
position (i.e., 0PPM − ); 
0ψ = the recipient’s subjective rating of his or her initial position on a given belief 
scale ( 0ψ  usually assumed to be 0);
Mψ = the recipient’s subjective rating of the position advocated by the message on 
the same attitude scale;
ψD = the psychological discrepancy between the subjective rating of the position 
advocated by the message and the subjective rating of the recipient’s initial position (i.e., 
0ψψ −M ). 
Fink et al.’s (1983) message discrepancy model of the final judgment after 
















where 0w is a weight for the initial position,
*
Mw is a weight for the message after 
removing the discounting effect of psychological discrepancy, and ∆(ψ) is the 
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discounting function of psychological discrepancy.  The model suggest that the weight 
for new information, Mw , may be decomposed into two parts as indicated in the following 
equation:
( )ψ∆= *MM ww . (2.2)
The equation for belief change between the initial judgment and the final judgment can 















Fink et al. (1983) suggested that psychological discrepancy should be 
distinguished from positional discrepancy.  Fink et al. defined positional discrepancy as 
discrepancy that is “expressed in units that have a widely shared meaning in a given 
culture (e.g., dollars, hours, or miles in American culture)” (p. 415).  Psychological 
discrepancy is “the level of discrepancy between two positions as experienced by an 
individual” (p. 415).  They claimed that whereas the amount of belief change increases as 
a function of positional message discrepancy, the weight of the positional message 
discrepancy on attitude change is discounted by psychological discrepancy (Equation 2.2).  
They assumed that the effect of psychological discrepancy diminishes exponentially as 
psychological discrepancy increases.  That is,
( ) ψψ kDe−=∆ , (2.4)
where k is a positive constant and ψD is the psychological discrepancy.  Psychological 
discrepancy is a linear function of the ratio of the message discrepancy with the personal 
range of the scale of the issue (Fink et al., 1983).  For the individuals who have the same 




















The above equation predicts that the weight of positional discrepancy diminishes 
exponentially as the positional message discrepancy increases; as a result, as positional 
discrepancy increases, the amount of belief change increases up to a certain point and 
then decreases, resulting in a nonmonotonic function of message discrepancy on beliefs.  
Figure 5 represents this model.
Laroche’s mathematical model (1977) also suggests a nonmonotonic function of 
message discrepancy on beliefs. Laroche’s (1977) model is built on the following 
assumptions: (1) “The recipient is in a stable cognitive equilibrium before the 
communication” (p. 247); (2) “This equilibrium is altered by the message as long as there 
is a discrepancy between the recipients’ position and the communication” (p. 247);  (3)
“The source must have some credibility to the recipient” (p. 247); (4) “The content of the 
communication must not be perfectly ego involving to the recipient” (p. 247); (5) “If the 
source is perfectly credible and the content of the communication perfectly non-ego-
involving, the amount of change is identical to the discrepancy” (p. 247); (6) “For the 
same discrepancy and the same ego involvement, the greater the credibility of the source, 
the greater the change in attitude” (p. 248); and (7) “For the same discrepancy and the 
same source credibility, the lower the ego involvement of the recipient with the contents 
of the communication, the greater the attitude change” (p. 248).
Laroche’s mathematical message discrepancy model is as follows:
PD
PN eDP
γ−=∆ )0( , (2.6)
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where ( ) ( ) 0;lnln >′−−= γγ NIkCk ; DP is message discrepancy; C is credibility; 
and NI is noninvolvement.
Figure 6 represents Laroche’s model, which shows that as message discrepancy 
increases, the amount of belief change increases up to a point and then decreases.
The nonmonotonic change in belief by message discrepancy has been found by several 
studies (Aronson, Turner, & Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner & Insko, 1966; Freedman, 1964).  
However, an increasing pattern without nonmonotonicity was found in Fink et al. (1983), 
Kaplowitz et al. (1986), and in Kaplowitz and Fink, with Mulcrone, Atkin, and Dabil, 
(1991). 
Both Fink et al.’s (1983) model and Laroche’s model incorporate the effect of 
source credibility.  Like Anderson’s information integration model (1971), source 
credibility moderates the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs in these two models 
(see Figures 5 and 6).  Specifically, both models suggest that the greater the source 
credibility, the greater the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs.   
Kaplowitz et al. (1983) and Fink et al. (2003) investigated some aspects of the 
dynamic effect of message discrepancy on beliefs during judgment, employing three 
levels of discrepancy.  Kaplowitz et al. (1983) estimated the amplitudes of the belief 
trajectory using a between-participants design.  They found that the amplitude of 
oscillation is greatest for the most discrepant of the messages. This result suggests that 
the message with the greater discrepancy corresponds to the one with the greatest 
impulsive force.  Kaplowitz et al. also found that as discrepancies increase, the estimated 
equilibrium increases, which suggests that message discrepancy has a positive effect on 
final belief.  Fink et al. (2002) found a significant relationship between the final judgment 
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and pseudo-amplitude for only one of the two issues used (the criminal-sentencing 
scenario). However, there was no significant effect of message discrepancy and source 
credibility on the number of changes in belief trajectories and the pseudo-frequency of 
belief trajectories. 
The effect of message discrepancy on beliefs during judgment can be more 
thoroughly investigated by examining local movements of belief trajectories.  Using local 
movements, we can identify the effect of message discrepancy on the first local 
movement, on the second movement, and so on up to the final local movement.  In this 
way, we may identify how the effect of message discrepancy changes throughout the 
belief change process.  Because cognitive responses play an important role in belief 
change during judgment, the relationship between message discrepancy, cognitive 
responses and local movements is examined.  
Message discrepancy, cognitive responses and local movements. Brock (1967) 
investigated the relationship between message discrepancy and counterarguing.  In his 
experiment, participants were told that they were going to evaluate a statement regarding 
an increase in tuition in their university; the proposed increase would represent a small, 
moderate or large discrepancy.  Then they were asked to list their thoughts before reading 
the statement.  Brock (1967) found that as message discrepancy increased, the number of 
counterarguments increased while individuals anticipated messages.  Toy (1982) found 
that as message discrepancy increased, the number of counterarguments linearly 
increased and the number of supportive arguments linearly decreased.  Counterarguments 
are negative thoughts about the message position or the message source, which are 
assumed to cause negative belief change.  Negative belief change during judgment should 
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appear as a local movement whose direction is opposite to the advocated message 
position.  Therefore, the findings of Brock (1967) and Toy (1982) suggest that message 
discrepancy should increase the number of local movements in the opposite direction to 
the advocated message position.  If message discrepancy (i.e., 0PPM − ) is positive, 
greater message discrepancy should increase the ratio of the number of positive local 
movements to the number of negative local movements.  
H4.1.1 (Message discrepancy and local movements): Assuming the message 
discrepancy is positive, as message discrepancy increases, the ratio of the number 
of positive local movements to the number of negative local movements will 
decrease. 
Message discrepancy and initial belief change. Recall that Gilbert et al. (1990) 
found that people initially accept both true and false information as true before they 
assess the truth value of the information, which suggests that messages with different 
positions are all entertained as true at the beginning of judgment.  Accepting the 
advocated message position at the beginning of judgment is consistent with a positive 
linear relationship between message discrepancy and belief change at the beginning of 
judgment.  Assuming the maximum amount of belief change is the position advocated by 
the message, the relationship between message discrepancy and belief change by the first 
local movement in the belief trajectory can be modeled as follows:
PmDP =∆ )0(1 ; 0 < m ≤ 1. (2.7) 
The relationship between message discrepancy and initial belief change is hypothesized 
to be as follows:
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H4.1.2. (Message discrepancy and initial belief change): The greater the message 
discrepancy, the greater the belief change of the first micro local movement in the 
direction advocated by the message.
Message discrepancy and final belief change. In most studies of the effect of 
message discrepancy on beliefs, beliefs were measured only once, at the end of judgment.  
Existing models of message discrepancy, including Fink et al.’s model and Laroche’s 
model, were created to explain the relationship between levels of message discrepancy 
and final judgment.  Therefore, the two models are applied to predict the final judgment.
Both Fink et al.’s model and Laroche’s model predict a curvilinear relationship 
between message discrepancy and final judgment, which can be expressed as follows: 
H4.1.3 (Message discrepancy and final belief change): As message discrepancy 
increases, the amount of final belief change will increase up to a certain point and 
then decrease. 
Change of effect of message discrepancy on beliefs over time. H4.1.2 proposes a 
positive linear relationship between message discrepancy and belief change at the 
beginning of the judgment, whereas H4.1.3 proposes a curvilinear relationship between 
message discrepancy and belief change at the end of the judgment.  The difference in the 
effect of message discrepancy on beliefs at the beginning versus the end of the judgment 
may be explained by the effect of message discrepancy on counterarguments and local 
movements during judgment (H4.1.1).  H4.1.1 predicts that the greater message 
discrepancy, the greater number of counterarguments and local movements in the 
opposite direction to the position advocated by the message.  H4.1.1 suggests that both 
the amount of belief change generated by highly discrepant messages and the amount of 
40
belief change generated by moderately discrepant message decrease over time but the 
amount of decrease in belief change due to counterarguments is greater for highly 
discrepant messages than for moderately discrepant message.  
If the difference in the amount of decrease in belief change during judgment 
between highly discrepant messages versus moderately discrepant message exceeds the 
initial difference in belief change between highly discrepant messages versus moderately 
discrepant message at the beginning of judgment, a nonmonotonic relationship between 
message discrepancy and belief change at the end of the judgment will be found.  This 
idea may explain why extremely discrepant messages sometimes result in smaller belief 
change than moderately discrepant messages (Aronson et al., 1963; Bochner & Insko, 
1966; Freedman, 1964). Extending H 4.1.1 and H4.1.2, H4.1.4 is proposed:
H4.1.4 (Change of effect of message discrepancy on beliefs): Assuming message 
discrepancy is positive, the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs decreases 
over time during judgment in the direction advocated by the message.
The Effect of Source Credibility on Beliefs during Judgment
Source credibility, cognitive responses and local movements.  Cook (1969) 
investigated the relationship between source credibility, counterarguing, and attitude 
change.  Cook asked participants to write down counterarguments during the reading of a 
written message, in which either a university professor, a highly credible source, or a 
high school student, a low credible source, recommended the frequency with which 
people should brush their teeth.  Cook found that the high credibility source was more 
persuasive and that a significantly greater number of counterarguments was written when 
the message was attributed to the less credible source than when the same message was 
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attributed to a highly credibility source.  These findings suggest greater negative belief 
change during judgment in response to messages from a low credibility source than 
messages from a highly credibility source.  Assuming message discrepancy is positive, 
the ratio of positive local movements to negative local movements in the belief 
trajectories is expected to be greater for messages from a highly credibility source than 
for messages from a low credibility source. 
Hass (1972, 1981) proposed and found that the effect of source credibility on the 
number of supportive arguments and counterarguments depends on the level of 
involvement with the message issue. Hass (1981) argued that when an individual is 
uncommitted on an issue and open to new information, a highly credible source induces 
fewer counterarguments than a low credibility source because people are more likely to 
anticipate erroneous statements from a low credibility source than from a highly credible
source.  However, when the issue is highly involving and the message position has 
negative implications for recipients, a process of resistance occurs. For resistance to 
persuasion to be successful, Hass (1981) argued that resistance must be “in proportion to 
the force of the persuasive attack” (p. 164).  As a result, high involvement and negative 
consequences result in more counterarguing for a message from a highly credible source, 
who is perceived as able to present a stronger attack.   
Hass (1972) found that when the level of involvement was low, more 
counterarguments were generated in anticipation of a message from a low credibility 
source than a highly credible source. In the high involvement condition, the number of 
counterarguments was not significantly different between high and low source credibility 
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conditions.  These results showed that the effect of source credibility on cognitive 
response depends on the level of involvement with the message issue.
According to the elaboration-likelihood model of attitude change (ELM; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981), when issues are highly involving and recipients have the ability to 
process messages, the quality of message arguments is the main factor that determines
cognitive responses and attitude change.  Petty and Cacioppo (1981) stated that, 
“Favorable cognitive response will be elicited only if the message recipient finds the 
message arguments to be compelling” (p. 266).  The ELM suggests that when an issue is 
highly involving, message arguments rather than source credibility will affect cognitive 
responses because recipients are likely to scrutinize message arguments.  Therefore, for 
highly involving issues, no significant difference is expected in the ratio of positive local 
movements to negative local movements between messages from a high credibility 
source and messages from a low credibility source.  
H4.2.1 (Source credibility and the ratio of local movements):  Assuming that 
message discrepancy is positive, for less involving issues, the ratio of positive 
local movements to the number of negative local movements will be greater in a 
message from a high than a low credibility source.  However, for highly involving 
issues, the ratio of positive local movements to the number of negative local 
movements will not differ between messages from a high and a low credibility 
source.  
Source credibility and initial belief change.  If an assertion is entertained as true 
before it is rejected (Gilbert et al., 1990), a message position is more likely to be thought 
of as a reasonable position at the beginning of judgment regardless of the level of source 
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credibility.  Therefore, it is expected that there is no difference in the amount of belief 
change at the beginning of judgment between high and low credibility sources.  Applying 
the local movement framework, the relationship between source credibility and the first 
local movement is hypothesized as follows:
H4.2.2 (Source credibility and initial belief change): Controlling for message 
discrepancy, the amount of belief change by the first local movement from a 
message with a high credibility source will not differ from the same message from 
a low credibility source. 
Source credibility and final belief change. As in message discrepancy research, in 
most studies of source credibility beliefs were measured only once, at the end of 
judgment.  Therefore, findings from existing studies on source credibility can be applied 
to the final judgment.  Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) found that source credibility 
has an effect on beliefs for less involving issues but no effect for highly involving issues.  
When recipients are highly involved and have the cognitive ability to process message 
arguments, they are more likely to scrutinize message arguments, in which case message 
arguments have an effect on beliefs but the effect of source credibility on beliefs will be 
weak. 
H4.2.3 (Source credibility and final belief change):  For less involving issues, the 
amount of final belief change will be greater for a message from a high than a low 
credibility source.  However, for highly involving issues, there will be no 
difference in the amount of final belief change between messages from a high and 
a low credibility source.
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Regarding the effect of source credibility on beliefs, both Fink et al.’s model and 
Laroche’s model predict that as source credibility increases, the effect of message 
discrepancy on the amount of belief change increases. 
H4.2.4 (The moderating role of source credibility on the effect of message 
discrepancy on final beliefs): As source credibility increases, the effect of 
message discrepancy on final beliefs increases.
Change of effect of source credibility on beliefs over time. H4.2.3 and H4.2.4
provide important information about the changing effect of source credibility on beliefs
during judgment.  These hypotheses suggest that for less involving issues, the effect of 
source credibility may be absent at the beginning of judgment but increases over time 
during judgment due to positive cognitive responses to a message from a high credibility 
source and negative cognitive responses to a message from a low credibility source. 
However, for highly involving issues, no significant effect is expected in both at the 
beginning of judgment and at the end of judgment.  No significant change in the effect of 
source credibility is expected for highly involving issues.  The following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H4.2.5 (Change of effect of source credibility on beliefs): For less involving 
issues, the effect of source credibility on beliefs increases over time during 
judgment. However, for highly involving issues, no significant change in the 




The present study analyzes data from three different previous studies (Fink et al., 
2002; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993).  These three studies investigated patterns of belief 
change during decision making employing the computer mouse technique (to be 
described below). Decision topics and manipulated independent variables were different, 
but in all three studies the same method, the computer mouse technique, was used to 
measure belief change during decision making.  Using the computer mouse technique, the 
three studies provided four sets of belief trajectories (two sets from Fink et al., one set 
from McGreevy, and one set from Wang).   
McGreevy Study (1996)
McGreevy’s study employed a decision to choose one of two candidates for 
admission to a university.  One hundred and two undergraduate students were given 
information about the two candidates. Then participants were asked to think about the 
admission decision and indicate their instantaneous beliefs about which applicants should 
be admitted. McGreevy measured belief change both while participants were reading 
messages (the message-receipt phase) and after participants finished reading (the post-
message phase) (see Appendix E for the decision scenario used in McGreevy’s study). 
Independent Variables
In McGreevy’s study, two independent variables were manipulated: candidate 
similarity (similar versus different), and distraction (distraction versus no distraction).
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Candidate similarity.  Candidate similarity was manipulated by varying the 
degree of difference in suitability for college between two candidates (similar versus 
different). In the similar-candidate condition, positive information about Candidate 1 (i.e., 
characteristics that are indicative of success in college) was followed by positive 
information about Candidate 2. Suitability of the two candidates was expected to be 
similar in the similar-candidate condition.  On the other hand, in the different-candidate 
condition, negative information about Candidate 1 (i.e., characteristics that do not fit with 
success in college) was followed by positive information about Candidate 2.  Suitability 
of Candidate 1 was expected to be less than Candidate 2 in the different-candidate 
condition.  A manipulation check showed that candidate similarity was successfully 
manipulated, F(1, 97) = 46.14, r2 = .32,  p < .01 (see McGreevy, 1996, pp. 157-158). 
In the McGreevy study, because the decision was dichotomous, positive 
information about one candidate can be assumed to have negative implications on the 
evaluation of the other candidate.  Focusing on Candidate 2, in the similar-candidate 
condition, a series of negative pieces of information is followed by a series of positive 
pieces of information.  Again, focusing on Candidate 2, in the different-candidate 
condition, a series of positive pieces of information is followed by another series of 
positive pieces of information.  The message in the similar-candidate condition can be 
considered mixed-valence information and the message in the different-candidate 
condition can be considered univalent information. 
Distraction. Distraction was manipulated by varying environmental noise. In the 
distraction condition, participants were placed in a room in which feedback sound from a 
camera and VCR hookup were constantly heard (see McGreevy, 1996, p. 116). In the no 
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distraction condition, there was no noise.  A manipulation check indicated that 
participants who received the noise distraction reported being more distracted than 
participants who did not received the noise distraction, F(1, 96) = 66.04, p < .01; r2 = .41 
(see McGreevy, 1996, p. 159).
Dependent Variables
In McGreevy, positions about suitability of applicants were measured on a scale 
in which zero indicated complete favorability for Candidate 1 and 100 indicated complete
favorability for Candidate 2. Higher values on the scale indicated greater favorability 
about Candidate 2. This scale assumed that the variable was unidimensional.  In other 
words, favorability about Candidate 1 and favorability about Candidate 2 were assumed 
to be related to perfectly negatively linearly related.  This was a reasonable assumption 
because the decision was dichotomous. 
Positions were measured over time during judgment using the computer mouse 
technique. From belief trajectories, the following dependent variables were obtained to 
test proposed hypotheses: belief positions of local movements, the number of positive 
and negative local movements, and the number of changes in direction.   
Belief positions of local movements.  Belief trajectories provided thousands of 
belief positions for each individual.  Among these thousands of belief positions, the 
present study focuses on local movements.  A local movement consists of a stay and a 
move.  A stay is defined as a set of consecutive belief positions that do not have a 
significant change in a certain period time (see below for coding procedures). A move is 
defined as a set of consecutive positions between two stays. Moves represent belief 
change during judgment. Stays represents temporarily stable belief positions during 
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judgment.  Belief positions of local movements are belief positions of stays. Among the 
thousands of belief positions, positions for micro local movements, 1P , 2P , . . . , NP , and 
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, were extracted as key positions of belief 
trajectories. 
From 1P , 2P , . . . , NP , the amount of belief change by the i-th micro local 
movements will be derived, that is, )0(1P∆ , )1(2P∆ , . . . , )1( −∆ NNP .  Also, the amount of 
belief change by  the i-th macro local movements, )0(1
~
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, will be used as a measure to reflect an overall aspect of belief movement, 
which is analogous to oscillation amplitude.
The number of positive and negative movements.  Local movements are either 
upward or downward. Because higher numbers indicate greater favorability about 
Candidate 2, upward movements are positive belief changes toward Candidate 2 (or 
negative belief changes toward Candidate 1) and downward movements are negative 
belief changes toward Candidate 2.  The number of positive and negative movements will 
be analyzed.
The number of changes of direction.  The number of changes of direction in belief 





P ,  . . . , NP
~
.  Therefore, the total number of changes of direction will be N - 1.   
Final decision. The final position, NP , was expected to be either 0 indicating 
preference of Candidate 1, or 100, indicating preference of Candidate 2.  The 
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participants’ final decision was obtained form the final position, which is a dichotomous 
variable.3
Distinctiveness of Two Phases in Belief Trajectories
In McGreevy’s study, participants’ instantaneous positions on the issue were 
measured both during the message-receipt phase and the post-message phase.  
Participants were asked to indicate the end of each phase by clicking the computer mouse 
button.  When participants followed the instructions correctly, two phases in the 
trajectories should be distinguishable.  However, some participants did not follow the 
instructions correctly, which resulted in providing belief trajectories in which the two 
phases cannot be distinguished. When participants followed the instructions correctly, 
two distinctive mouse-clicks were expected, one to indicate the end of the message-
receipt phase and one to indicate the end of the decision.
The results showed that the number of clicks varied.  Out of 102 cases, one case 
had no clicks (1.0 %); 11 cases had only one click (10.8 %); 71 cases had two clicks 
(69.6 %); 14 cases had three clicks (13.7%); 3 cases had 4 clicks (2.9 %); one case had 14 
clicks (1.0 %); and one case had 17 clicks (1.0 %).    
The no-click case was excluded because the two phases (the message-receipt 
phase and the post-message phase) could not be distinguished in this case.  For the one-
click cases, the click appeared either in the middle of the trajectories (4 cases) or the end 
of the trajectories (7 cases).  When the click appeared at the end of the trajectories, the 
two phases could not be distinguished.  On the other hand, when the click appeared at the 
middle of the trajectories, the trajectories showed up and down movement after the click 
and then showed a long stay at the end of the trajectories, which is assumed to indicate 
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the end of the decision.  In the latter cases, the two phases can be identified and 
distinguished.  Therefore, four one-click cases in which the click appeared in the middle 
of the trajectories were included for the further analysis.  
Out of 71 two-click cases, 13 cases showed less than one-second intervals 
between the two clicks.  In one case, the interval between two clicks was approximately 
72 milliseconds; in another cases, it was approximately 92 milliseconds. When two 
mouse clicks occur in quick succession, it is difficult to judge whether the two clicks are 
two distinctive clicks or a single double-click.  All 13 cases with less than one-second 
intervals between clicks had the two clicks at the end of the mouse movement.  As the 
three-click cases showed (see below), some participants might have made an additional 
click at the end of the decision to provide a definite indication of the end of their decision.  
Therefore, 13 two-click cases with less than a 1 second interval between two clicks were 
not included for the analysis.4
The three-click cases showed two patterns.  Eleven out of 14 cases showed one 
click in the middle of the trajectory and two clicks at the end of the decision (Pattern 1).  
On the other hand, three cases showed two clicks in the middle of the decision trajectory 
and one click at the end of the decision (Pattern 2).  In all cases of Pattern 1, the last two
clicks showed the same position and appeared at the end of the trajectory.  Positions for 
last two clicks were either at or near 100 or at or near 0, which indicated the end of the 
decision.  This pattern suggests that participants added a click at the end of the decision.  
One reason that participants might have added a click at the end of the decision would be 
found in the computer program.  The computer program continues to run after the two 
clicks.  Participants might add an additional click to assure that the end of the decision 
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was clearly indicated.  All cases of Pattern 1 showed two distinctive phases by two 
distinctive groups of clicks. 
Cases of Pattern 2 also showed two distinctive phases by two distinctive groups of 
clicks.  Two cases of Pattern 2 had very short intervals, 114 ms and 696 ms 
(approximately), which was likely to be an indication of the end of one phase.  The other 
case in Pattern 2 has the interval of 3.60 second (approximately), but the difference in 
position between the two clicks was small (1.60 points) and the trajectory clearly showed 
two distinctive phases.  Therefore, all three-click cases were included for the analysis. 
There are three cases with 4 clicks.  Two cases showed two distinctive phases.  
The last two clicks of those two cases had the same position, which was either at or near 
100 or at or near 0.  However, the other case did not show two distinctive phases, so this 
case was dropped.  Also, the 14 and 17 click cases were dropped.  In summary, one no-
click case, 7 one-click cases, 13 two-click cases, one four-click case, one 14-click case, 
and one 17-click case were not included in the analysis. In total, 24 cases out of 102 were 
dropped, making the valid number of cases used from McGreevy (1996) 78.
Data Coding
In the McGreevy data, the computer program recorded the mouse movement 
approximately every 24 milliseconds. From each trajectory, positions for local 
movements were extracted using another computer program that was written for this 
specific purpose (see Appendix A for the flow chart of the algorithm of the computer 
program and Appendix B for codes of the computer program).5 The duration of a stay in 
a trajectory varies depending on two constraints: (1) the amount of position difference 
that indicates a significant change, the maximum position difference; (2) the minimum 
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amount of time that constitutes a stay, which will differentiate a stay from temporary 
stops during a move. 
Two kinds of tasks, graphical examination and hypothesis testing, were conducted 
to find the most appropriate values for the maximum position difference and the 
minimum stay length. Then, positions of local movements were extracted using these 
values. 
Graphical examination.  Graphical examination was conducted for a belief 
trajectory that had relatively complicated movements.  Using different maximum position 
differences and different minimum stay lengths, several sets of key points were extracted.  
Then, extracted key points were compared with the original belief trajectory (see Figure 
8).  Graphical examination suggests that key points with a 1 or a 2 point maximum 
position difference reflect the original trajectory better than other values.  Also, graphical 
examination suggests that key points with approximately 1 s or 2 s minimum stay length 
reflect the original trajectory better than other time lengths.
Hypothesis testing.  In addition to graphical examination, hypothesis testing was 
used to find the best values for the maximum position difference and the different 
minimum stay length. Hypothesis 3.1.2 was tested with different sets of data that were 
created with different values for constraints (see the Results chapter for a detailed 
analysis of Hypothesis 3.1.1).  The results showed that using a minimum stay length of 2 
s and a maximum position difference of 1 point provided the highest R2 (0.18, Adjusted 
R2 = 0.14) (see Table 2.1 for R2s for other data sets) for the proposed model. Using those 
values (the minimum stay length = 2 s and the maximum position difference = 1 point), 
key points were extracted. 
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Reliability and Validity of the Computer Mouse Technique
The computer mouse technique requires participants to indicate their beliefs while
their beliefs change.  The uniqueness of measurement using the computer mouse 
technique lies in that (1) the time at which a belief is reported is not forced but left to the 
participant, and (2) participants indicate their beliefs multiple times.  Because participants 
are not forced to indicate their beliefs at a certain time, there could be disagreement 
between belief change and the motion of the computer mouse.  There are four possible 
cases when participants measure their positions instantaneously using a computer mouse: 
(1) no computer mouse movement when a belief has not changed; (2) no computer mouse 
movement when a belief has changed; (3) computer mouse movement when a belief has
not changed; (4) computer mouse movement when a belief has changed.  Whereas the 
first and the fourth cases indicate agreement between the computer mouse motion and 
belief change, the second and third cases indicate disagreement between the computer 
mouse motion and belief change, which indicate errors in measurement.  The second case 
is an error of non-reporting, which can be found when the participant fails to indicate his 
or her belief change.  The third case is an error of false reporting, which can occur when 
the participant does not control the computer mouse movement effectively.  
Fink et al. found spike-like changes in belief trajectories, with immediate 
movement in the opposite direction after reaching a position. The frequency of these 
spike-like changes was not reported.  Fink et al. assumed that the spike-like movement 
resulted from a hasty correction when a participant had overshot an intended position.  
They did not consider spike-like movements as valid changes of direction.  Also, Fink et 
al. found small movements (“vibrations”) in belief trajectories; they did not treat such 
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movements (i.e., those movements of less then 4% of the scale) as intended movements.  
These vibrations and spikes-like movements can be said to be errors of false reporting.  
The stricter the criterion for the valid measurement employed, the less the probability of 
the error of false reporting, but the greater the probability of non-reporting error.  
In order to minimize the error of non-reporting, participants were trained in how 
to use the computer mouse to indicate their instantaneous belief change.  McGreevy 
(1996) trained participants with real decisions that the participants reported having had 
made recently.  McGreevy instructed participants to talk aloud the sequence of thoughts 
they went through to reach their final decision.  Participants were also asked to move a 
computer mouse to indicate their beliefs about the alternatives while talking and thinking.  
After having completed this process, participants went through the same process with a 
different decision without talking aloud.  The training and the main experiment were 
individually administrated by the experimenter.  This training should minimize non-
reporting error.6
Wang Study (1993)
Similar to McGreevy (1995), Wang’s study (N = 66) employed a decision to 
choose one of two candidates for admission to a university. Participants, all Caucasian 
undergraduate students, were asked to listen to a message that described two college 
applicants, an African American high senior and a Caucasian high school senior. After 
participants listened to a recorded message on a tape recorder, they were asked to indicate 
their decision on a computer screen by moving a computer mouse between the two 
alternatives over time (see Appendix F for the decision scenario used in Wang’s study).
Independent Variables
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In Wang’s study, one message variable, whether the target was described in an 
individuated way or stereotypically, and one situational variable, whether participants 
were distracted or not, were manipulated.  
Individuation.  In Wang’s study, participants were given information about an
African American applicant followed by information about a Caucasian applicant. In the 
message, the African American candidate was described in a stereotypical way in one 
condition (the no-individuation condition) or described against stereotypes of the African 
American applicants in another condition (i.e., in an individuated way, the individuation 
condition). The Caucasian applicant was described stereotypically.  Information about the 
Caucasian applicant was the same in both conditions.  Only traits that were not 
significantly related to success or failure in college were selected to describe applicants.  
Individuation was found to be successfully manipulated, F(1, 62) = 46.44, p < .01 (see 
Wang, 1993, pp. 116 - 117). 
Based on the literature on racial attitudes (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1991; Jackman 
& Senter, 1983) and on individuation (see, e.g., Wilder, 1978, 1981), Wang (1993) 
predicted that Caucasian participants could have a more positive attitude toward the 
African American applicant when the applicant was described in an individuated way 
than stereotypically, because individuation modifies ingroup favoritism and creates 
uncertainty in one’s preference for ingroup members.  
Remember that all traits used to describe applicants were neutral in terms of
probability of success in college.  Therefore, for participants, who were all Caucasians, 
stereotypical information about the Caucasian applicant was expected to have positive 
implications due to ingroup favoritism whereas stereotypical information about the 
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African American applicant was expected to have negative implications due to ingroup 
favoritism.  However, individuated information about the African American applicant 
was expected to have less negative and more positive implications than stereotypical 
information because of decreased ingroup favoritism. 
The message in the no-individuation condition contained stereotypical 
information about the Caucasian applicant and stereotypical information about the 
African American applicant, which means that the message in the no-individuation 
condition is univalent.  The message in the individuation condition contained 
stereotypical information about the Caucasian applicant and individuated information 
about the African American applicant, which means that the message in the individuation 
condition is more mixed-valence than the message in the no-individuation condition.  
Distraction. Participants were situated either in a quiet room (no distraction 
condition) or in a room in which there were distracting noises due to tape recording, 
rustling papers and crunching food (distraction condition).  Distraction was successfully 
manipulated, F(1, 62) = 64.04, p < .01 (see Wang, 1993, p. 117).
Dependent Variables
Belief position. In Wang’s study, participants were asked to indicate their 
probability of choosing candidates by moving a computer mouse on a scale.  Participants 
were given unlimited time for judgment.  The name of the African American applicant 
was appended on the left end of the scale and the name of the Caucasian applicant was 
appended on the right end of the scale.  Mouse locations on the scale were converted into 
numbers, which represented the probability of choosing the Caucasian applicant. 
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From belief trajectories, key points were extracted and the following dependent 
variables were obtained: belief positions of local movement, the number of positive and 
negative local movements, and the number of changes in direction. 
Final decision. The final position, NP , was expected to be either 0 indicating 
preference of the African American applicant, or 100, indicating preference of the 
Caucasian applicant.  Final decision is a dichotomous variable that was obtained from the 
final position, NP .
7
Data Coding
In the Wang data, positions were measured approximately every 33 millisecond.  
Because the same measurement scale was used in both McGreevy study and Wang study, 
the same values for constraints (the minimum stay length = 2 s and the maximum 
position difference = 1 point) were applied to the Wang data for coding.  
Fink, Kaplowitz, and Hubbard Study (2002): 1. Criminal-Sentencing Issue
Ninety-nine undergraduate students participated in Fink et al.’s (2002) study. 
Using the computer mouse technique, each participant indicated his or her beliefs on two 
issues that were presented with scenarios. One of the two issues was criminal sentencing
(the other issue was tuition increase issue; see below). 
The scenario used for criminal sentencing in the study was the same scenario in 
Kaplowitz and Fink (1991).  In the criminal-sentencing scenario, participants were asked 
to read sentencing guidelines for the crime of armed robbery.  The sentencing guidelines 
stated that ten years is the appropriate sentence for armed robbery.  Then participants 
were asked to indicate their opinion about the proper sentence for armed robbery.  Next, 
participants received a message about a judge’s sentence to a defendant who allegedly 
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committed armed robbery. The participants also received the text of the speech the judge 
supposedly delivered in sentencing the defendant (see Appendix G for the decision 
scenario used for the criminal-sentencing issue). 
After reading the message, participants were asked to think about the issue and 
indicate their position about the appropriate sentence for the defendant over time using a
computer mouse. They were told to indicate when they made their final judgment. After 
completing their judgment, participants were asked to list all thoughts they had about the 
issue. 
Independent Variables
Two independent variables, message discrepancy and source credibility, were 
manipulated in the criminal-sentencing scenario. 
Message discrepancy.  Three levels of message discrepancy were manipulated by 
varying the judge’s sentence for the defendant: 17 years (small discrepancy), 30 years 
(moderate discrepancy), or 50 years (extreme discrepancy). This criminal-sentencing 
scenario was created by Kaplowitz et al. (1991).  Kaplowitz et al. found the median 
sentence that participants proposed for armed robbery to be ten years in pilot studies with 
students at the same university at which their experiment was conducted.  According to 
Kaplowitz et al., different levels of message discrepancy were created by keeping the 
ratio of successive steps to be approximately constant (see Lodge, 1981). (The ratio of the 
small discrepancy position to the initial position is 1.70, the ratio of the moderate to the 
small discrepancy position is 1.76, and the ratio of the extreme to the moderate 
discrepancy position is 1.67.)
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In Fink et al.’s (2002) study, initial positions for each participant on the issue 
were also measured after participants had read the sentencing guidelines but before they 
were presented with the judge’s sentencing message in which message discrepancy was 
manipulated.  The mean initial position was 10.12 year (SD = 4.95), which was close to 
the one suggested by the fictitious sentencing guidelines.  Using individual initial 
positions and message discrepancy, individual message discrepancies for each participant 
were obtained.  In this study, individually measured message discrepancy was used as an 
explanatory variable rather than manipulated message discrepancy. In four cases out of 
ninety-seven, individual discrepancy was found to be less than zero (-13 years and -3.60 
years in the low source credibility and 17 years message discrepancy condition; -3.60 
years and -1.10 years in the high source credibility and 17 years message discrepancy 
condition). Theses cases were dropped for the analysis because the proposed models were 
restricted to the condition in which the discrepancy between message position and the 
recipient’s initial position is positive; the valid number of cases used from the criminal-
sentencing data was 93. 
Some hypothesis testing required using a grouped variable rather than a 
continuous variable.  For those analyses, three groups were created based on individual 
message discrepancy. The first group had discrepancies of 0.00 to 14.60 years (M = 7.51, 
n = 31); the second group had discrepancies of 14.80 to 30.00 years (M = 21.16; n = 31); 
the third group had discrepancies of 34.40 to 48.00 years (M = 41.04; n = 31). 
Source credibility. To manipulate different levels of source credibility, the judge 
was described as either not respected in the state (low source credibility) or as one of the 
most respected judges in the state (high source credibility). Manipulation checks showed 
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that credibility was successfully manipulated (Fink et al., 2002, p. 22). (No quantitative 
assessment of the manipulation check of the source was provided.)  Messages were the 
same in all conditions except for message positions (sentences) and descriptions of the 
source.
Dependent Variables
In the present study, the following variables were used as dependent variables 
for the criminal-sentencing data: the belief positions of local movement, the number 
of positive and negative local movements, the number of changes in direction, the 
number of positive and negative thoughts about the message position.    
Belief positions of local movements. In Fink et al.’s (2002) the criminal-
sentencing scenario, the appropriate sentence for an armed robbery was measured with 
the computer mouse technique. The operationalization for micro and macro local 
movements that was used in McGreevy’s study was applied for the criminal-sentencing 
scenario study.  
The number of positive and negative local movements. Local movements are 
either upward or downward.  Upward movements are positive belief changes toward 
more severe sentencing.  
The number of changes in direction. The same operationalization as McGreevy’s 
study was applied for the criminal-sentencing scenario study.
The number of positive and negative thoughts about the message position. After 
completing their judgment, participants were asked to list all thoughts they had about the 
issue when they were deciding the issue.  Participants self-reported thoughts were 
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classified into positive and negative thoughts about severe sentencing.  The coding 
procedure and inter-coder reliabilities were not reported. 
Data Coding
In the criminal-sentencing data, positions were measured approximately every 77 
milliseconds. For the time constraint, the minimum stay length, the value found in 
McGreevy data, 2 s, was used.  However, for the position constraint, the maximum Belief 
Change, a new value was needed because the range of the scale used in the criminal-
sentencing scenario was different from the McGreevy study; the average range in belief 
change was 8.90 in the criminal-sentencing data whereas the average range in position in 
the McGreevy data was 71.51. 
To find the best values for the maximum position difference, Hypothesis 4.1.2 
was tested with different sets of data that were created with different values for 
constraints (see the Results chapter for a detailed analysis of Hypothesis 4.1.2).  To 
evaluate performance of the different values for the constraint, three criteria were used: 
R2, the sample size, and the number of statistically significant predictors.  The results 
showed that 2.7 years as the maximum position difference provided the relatively high R2
(0.23, Adjusted R2 = 0.18), a relatively large sample size (N = 81), and the highest 
number of statistically significant predictors (see Table 2.2 for results for other data sets) 
for the proposed model. Using those values (the minimum stay length = 2 s and the 
maximum position difference = 2.7 years), key points were extracted.
Fink, Kaplowitz, and Hubbard Study (2002): 2. Tuition-Increase Issue
For the tuition-increase issue, the scenario used in Fink et al. (1983) was used in 
Fink et al.’s study (2002).  In the tuition-increase scenario, the message was a statement 
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in which various tuition increases were advocated.  Participants were told that the 
statement was written by a state legislator.  After reading the statement, participants were 
asked to think about the issue and indicate their position about the appropriate amount of 
tuition increase using the computer mouse technique (see Appendix H for the decision 
scenario used for the tuition-increase issue). 
The Level of Issue Involvement
Compared to the criminal-sentencing issue, the tuition-increase issue was more 
likely to be perceived to have important consequences to participants, who were college 
students.  In the introduction of the message for the tuition increase, participants were 
told that the Board of Trustees of their university recently voted to increase 
undergraduate tuition, which would be effective the following fiscal year.  However, 
there was further discussion within the university about the appropriate tuition for the 
following year (Fink et al., 2002).  In the present study, the tuition-increase issue is 
considered as a highly involving issue whereas the criminal-sentencing issue is less 
involving issue. However, because two issues differ in ways other than the level of 
involvement, differences in belief change between two issues cannot be exclusively 
attributed to the level of involvement (Jackson, 1992).    
Independent Variables
Like the criminal-sentencing scenario, message discrepancy and source credibility 
were manipulated in the tuition-increase scenario.
Message discrepancy. Message discrepancy was manipulated by varying the 
advocated tuition increase as a 9% increase (small discrepancy), a 15% increase 
(moderate discrepancy), or a 22% increase (extreme discrepancy).  Participants’ initial 
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positions on the tuition increase were measured before they were presented with the 
message.  The initial position mean on the tuition increase was 0.00 % (SD = 0.02).  For 
the tuition-increase issue, individual message discrepancies were virtually equal to the 
manipulated message discrepancies. 
Source credibility. To manipulate different levels of source credibility, the 
legislator, the hypothetical writer of the statement about the tuition increase, was 
described as one whose knowledge of the issues and willingness to be fair to students 
were often questioned (low source credibility) or as one who was praised by student 
groups (high source credibility).  Manipulation checks showed that credibility was 
successfully manipulated (see Fink et al., 2002, p. 22).  (No quantitative assessment of 
the source of the manipulation check was provided.).  Messages were the same in all 
conditions except for message positions (proposed tuition increase) and descriptions of 
the source. 
Dependent Variables
In the present study, the following variables were used as dependent variables 
for the tuition-increase data: the belief positions of local movement, the number of 
positive and negative local movements, the number of changes in direction, and the 
number of positive and negative thoughts about the message position.    
Belief positions of local movements. In Fink et al.’s (2002) tuition-increase 
scenario, the appropriate amount of tuition increase was measured with the computer 
mouse technique. The operationalization for micro and macro local movements that was 
used in McGreevy’s study was applied for the tuition-increase study.  
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The number of positive and negative local movements. Local movements are 
either upward or downward.  Upward movements are positive belief changes toward a 
tuition increase. 
The number of changes in direction. The same operationalization as in 
McGreevy’s study was applied for the tuition-increase scenario study.
The number of positive and negative thoughts about the message position. After 
completing their judgment, participants were asked to list all thoughts they had about the 
issue.  Participants self-reported thoughts were classified by Fink et al. into positive and 
negative thoughts about tuition increase. 
Data Coding
Positions were measured approximately every 77 milliseconds for the tuition-
increase issue.  Like the criminal-sentencing data, Hypothesis 4.1.2 was tested with 
different sets of data that were created with different values for constraints to find the 
best values for the maximum position difference (see the Results chapter for a detailed 
analysis of Hypothesis 4.1.2).  The same criteria used for the criminal-sentencing data, R2, 
the sample size, and the number of statistically significant predictors, were used to 
evaluate performance of the different values for the constraint. The results showed that 
using the maximum position difference of 3.0% provided the highest R2 (0.14, Adjusted 
R2 = 0.08), and relatively large sample size (N = 90), and the highest number of 
statistically significant predictors (see Table 2.3 for results for other data sets) for the 
proposed model. Using those values (the minimum stay length = 2 s and the maximum 




This chapter presents the hypothesis testing results.  In total, twenty hypotheses 
were tested with various analyses. Different data sets were used to test the hypotheses
(see Table 3.1).  In all the present analyses, the alpha level was set as equal or less 
than .05.  For the testing of directional hypotheses, one-tailed significance testing was 
used. Otherwise, two-tailed significance testing was used. 
Patterns of Belief Change during the Message-Receipt Phase
Message Structure and Patterns of Belief Change
Regarding the relationship between the sequence of information and the sequence 
of local movements, H1.1 was proposed:
H1.1: For a sequential mixed-valence messages, a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped 
pattern of local movements (or a series of such patterns) occurs; for a univalent 
message, a unidirectional (monotonic) pattern of local movement occurs.
The McGreevy data set was used to test H1.1.  To analyze patterns of belief 
trajectories, five ordinal time points for each trajectory were selected.  First, the time 
point after the first micro local movement, the starting point of the second stay, was 
selected.  Second, for each participant’s trajectory, the starting point of the 25-percentile 
rank of the stays, the 1st quartile point, was selected.  For example, if a trajectory has 12 
stays in total, the starting point of 4th stay is the 1st quartile point.  Third, the starting point 
of the 50-percentile rank of the stays, the mid-point, was selected.  Fourth, the starting 
point of the 75-percentile rank of the stays, the 3rd quartile point, was selected.  Lastly, 
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the time point for the final stay was selected.  Positions in those six time points, which
include the starting point, can show overall patterns of belief change for each trajectory: 
whether patterns of trajectories are U-shape or unidirectional. 
In McGreevy’s study, a series of pieces of positive information about Candidate 1 
was presented first and next a series of pieces of positive information about Candidate 2 
was presented (a sequential mixed-valence message) in the similar-candidate condition.  
Because higher numbers indicate more favorability toward Candidate 2 on the scale, a U-
shaped pattern of local movements is expected in the similar-candidate condition.  On the 
other hand, in the different-candidate condition, a series of pieces of negative information 
about Candidate 1 was followed by a series of pieces of positive information about 
Candidate 2 (a univalent message), in which a positive unidirectional pattern is expected.
For this test, cases with at least five micro local movements were used (N = 62). 
Positions were subtracted by the initial position (50.00); therefore, the dependent variable 
was the amount of belief change from the initial position, )0(iP∆ .  Table 3.2 shows the 
means and standard deviations of the amount of belief change by ordinal time of local 
movements, candidate similarity, and distraction.  Figure 9 represents the amount of 
belief change by ordinal time and candidate similarity.
Figure 9 shows a U-shaped pattern of beliefs over time for the similar-candidate 
condition, as expected. On the other hand, belief change for the different-candidate 
condition is somewhat different from the expected unidirectional pattern.  In the first half 
of the trajectory in Figure 9, the amount of belief change does not increase toward 
Candidate 2 but stays around the neural (initial) position.  Negative information about 
Candidate 1 did not increase favorability toward Candidate 2.  After the midpoint, two 
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conditions basically show the same pattern, which was expected because the second half 
of pieces of information was exactly same in both conditions.    
A repeated-measures analysis of variance was conducted to test Hypothesis 1.1. 
The dependent variable was the amount of belief change from the initial position.  
Results showed that the amount of belief change was greater in the different- than the 
similar-candidate condition, F(1, 58) = 23.21, p < .01, and partial η2 = .29. The amount 
of belief change as a function of ordinal time showed statistically significant linear (F[1, 
58] = 58.96, p < .01, partial η2 = .50), quadratic (F[1, 58] = 31.25, p < .01, partial η2
= .35), and cubic (F[1, 58] = 26.85, p < .01, partial η2 = .32) effects.  Also, there was a 
statistically significant interaction effect between the quadratic function of ordinal time 
and candidate similarity, F(1, 58) = 4.40, p = .03, and partial η2 = .07, which indicates 
that the quadratic effect of ordinal time on belief change is different between the similar-
and the different-candidate conditions (see Table 3.3 for ANOVA results).   
To examine different effects of ordinal time between the similar- and the 
different-candidate conditions, a repeated-measures analysis of variance was conducted 
separately.  The dependent variable was the amount of belief change from the initial 
position.  In the similar-candidate condition, ordinal time showed statistically significant 
linear (F[1, 28] = 19.97, p < .01, partial η2 = .42), quadratic (F[1, 28] = 32.95, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .54) and cubic (F[1, 28] = 13.62, p < .01, partial η2 = .33) effects.  Of these 
three effects, the quadratic effect showed the highest partial η2.  On the other hand, in the 
different-candidate condition, ordinal time showed a statistically significant linear (F[1, 
32) = 45.83, p < .01, partial η2 = .59), quadratic (F[1, 32] = 6.40, p = .02, partial η2 = .16) 
and cubic (F[1, 32] = 14.07, p < .01, partial η2 = .38) effects.  Among three effects, the 
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linear effect showed the highest partial η2, which indicates that the pattern of beliefs in 
the different-candidate condition (univalent message) is mainly linear (see Table 3.4 for 
ANOVA results).
Both graphical and statistical results showed that belief trajectories were shaped 
according to the information in the message.  As hypothesized, correspondences between 
messages and patterns of belief trajectories were found.  These correspondences between 
messages and belief patterns measured by the computer mouse technique provide 
evidence about validity of the computer mouse technique to measure belief change during 
judgment.  The structures of the message and belief changes in response to the message 
were reflected in the output of the measurement by the computer mouse technique.  H1.1 
was supported by the McGreevy data.
Message Type and the Number of Local Movements
Regarding the relationship between message type (univalent vs. mixed-valence 
message) and the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the number of 
negative local movements during the message-receipt phase, H1.2 was proposed: 
H1.2: During the message-receipt phase, the ratio of the number of positive local
movements to the number of negative local movements in belief trajectories is
greater for positively univalent messages than for mixed-valence messages.
In McGreevy’s study, 16 pieces of positive information about Candidate 1 is
followed by 14 pieces of positive information about Candidate 2 in the similar-candidate 
condition.  In the different-candidate condition, 15 pieces of negative information about 
Candidate 1 is followed by 14 pieces of positive information about Candidate 2.  If local 
movements reflect belief change in response to information in the message, it is expected 
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that the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the number of negative local 
movements is greater in the different-candidate condition (the univalent message 
condition) than the similar-candidate condition (the mixed-valence message condition). 
Instead of the ratio of the number of positive to the number of negative movements, the 
following formula was used, which was named the positivity of movements: 
)1log()1log( +−+= qpPositivityMovements ,       (3.1)
where p is the number of positive movements and q is the number of negative movements.  
Equation 3.1 is a logarithmic transformation of the ratio of the number of positive 
movements to the number of negative movements after adding 1 to the number of 
positive movements and to the number of negative movements.  If the number of positive 
movements is equal to the number of negative movements, positivity will be zero.  The 
above formula is used because it provides not only information about the proportion of 
positive movements to negative movements, but also because it has a relatively normal 
distribution (the skewness of positivity of movements is .12, ns, in the message-receipt 
phase, and -.41, ns, in the post-message phase).   
Table 3.5 shows the means and standard deviations of positivity of movements by 
condition.  Results from ANOVA showed that positivity of movements was greater in the 
different-candidate condition than the similar-candidate condition, F(1, 74) = 10.71, p
< .01, and partial η2 = 13 (see Table 3.6 for ANOVA results).  Results showed that 
message recipients generated more positive local movements than negative local 
movement in response to a (positive) univalent message compared to a mixed-valence 
message.  
Also, as expected, in the similar-candidate condition, the mean of positivity of 
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movements was -.02 (SD = .63), which indicates the number of positive and the number 
of negative movement is about equal.  On the other hand, in the different-candidate 
condition, the mean of positivity of movements was .45 (SD = .61), which indicates that 
the number of positive movement is greater than the number of negative movements.
These results show that the number of local movements during the message-receipt 
reflects information in the message.  H1.2 was supported by the McGreevy data.  These
results also provide evidence for validity of the computer mouse technique.
Strength of Information and the Effect of the Number of Local Movements
Regarding the relationship between weights of information in the message and 
belief trajectories during message receipt, H1.3 was proposed: 
H1.3: Belief trajectories in the message-receipt phase will reflect the weights of 
the pieces of information in the message.
In one of her pilot studies, McGreevy (1996) asked participants to indicate the 
importance of hobbies and personality characteristics for success or failure in college (p. 
55).  Importance levels were measured with a scale in which zero indicated the highest 
probability of failure and 10 indicated the highest probability of success.  Based on these
results, McGreevy selected hobbies and personality characteristics representing success 
that were not significantly different from each other. She also selected some hobbies 
and personality characteristics representing failure in college that were significantly 
different from those hobbies or characteristics representing success in college.  
McGreevy created sentences for the message with those hobbies or characteristics.  
Table 3.7 shows means and standard deviations of importance levels of hobbies and 
characteristics that were included in the message.  In Table 3.7, hobbies and 
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characteristics were listed according the order in the message in which they were 
presented in the experiment.  H1.3 and Equation 1.7 predict that belief trajectories 
during the message-receipt phase should reflect the amount and the order of weights of 
pieces of information in Table 3.7.
Observed belief trajectories showed that participants did not make local movements 
in response to every piece of information.  There are 32 sentences and 13 groups of 
pieces of information in the similar-candidate condition and 31 sentences and 13 groups 
of pieces of information in the different-candidate condition (see pp. 16-20).  However, 
the number of local movements was not equal to the number of groups of pieces of 
information and varied among participants (M = 11.17, SD = 6.67, N = 78; there was no 
statistically significant difference between the similar-candidate and the different-
candidate condition).  It seems that some participants had local movements after 
processing multiple pieces of information.  Instead of weights for individual pieces of 
information, average weights of groups of pieces of information were used to predict 
belief trajectories.   
The messages in the McGreevy study had two parts: The first part described 
Candidate 1 and the second part described Candidate 2.  The average importance of 
characteristics is 8.03 for Candidate 1 and 8.07 for Candidate 2 in the similar-candidate 
condition, and 5.05 for Candidate 1 and 8.07 for Candidate 2 in the different-candidate 
condition. The message for Candidate 2 is the same in both conditions.  
The number of sentences and the number of groups of pieces of information about 
Candidate 1 and Candidate 2 were balanced.  There were 17 sentences for Candidate 1 
(7 grouped pieces of information) and 15 sentences for Candidate 2 (7 grouped pieces of 
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information) in the similar-candidate condition; 16 sentences for Candidate 1 (6 grouped 
pieces of information) and 15 sentences for Candidate 2 (7 grouped pieces of 
information) in the different-candidate condition.  Therefore, it is assumed that the 
amount of belief change in the first half of local movements of a trajectory represents 










where 1HP∆ represents the amount of belief change in the first half of local movements.
Greater 1HP∆  indicates greater favorability toward Candidate 2, and N is the total 
number of local movements in the message-receipt phase.  Because the average weight 
of information about Candidate 1 is greater for the similar-candidate condition than for 
the different-candidate condition, 1HP∆  is expected to be greater for different-candidate 
condition than the similar-candidate condition.    
On the other hand, the amount of belief change in response to messages for 
Candidate 2 is expected not to be different between two conditions because the message 
is the same in both conditions.  Also, because the average weight of information about 
Candidate 2, 8.07, is close to the average weight of information about Candidate 1 in the 
similar-candidate condition, 8.03, the absolute amount of belief change in response to the 
message for Candidate 2 in the similar-candidate condition is not expected to be different 
from the absolute amount of belief change in response to the message for Candidate 1 in 
the similar-candidate condition. The amount of belief change in response to information 

























A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to test H1.3.  The amount of 
belief change in the first half of local movements and the amount of belief change in the 
second half of local movements were predicted by candidate similarity and distraction 
(see Table 3.8 for means and standard deviations and Table 3.9 for the MANOVA 
analysis).  The results show that the amount of negative belief change in the first half of 
the local movements was significantly greater in the similar-candidate condition (M = -
18.30, SD = 19.86, n = 70) than in the different-candidate condition (M = .12, SD = 21.55, 
n = 70), F(1, 66) = 14.50, p < .01, and partial η2 = .18, but the amount of belief change in
the second half of the local movements was not significantly different between the two 
conditions (M = 27.99, SD = 22.31, n = 70 for the similar-candidate condition; M = 24.83, 
SD = 33.42, n = 70 for the different-candidate condition).  These results are consistent 
with the prediction of H1.3.  
The mean amount of belief change in the first half of local movements in the 
different-candidate condition was found to be about zero, .12.  On the other hand, the 
average weight for hobbies and characteristics for Candidate 1 in the different-candidate 
condition was 5.05.  The value 5.05 on 10-point scale suggests that those hobbies and 
characteristics of the candidate were neither perceived as indicators of failure nor of 
success, but provided neutral information.  These results show that the amount of belief 
change in the first half of local movements in the different-candidate condition reflects 
the weights of pieces of information in the message.  
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To examine whether the absolute amount of belief change in response to the 
message for Candidate 2 is not different from the absolute amount of belief change in 
response to the message for Candidate 1 in the similar-candidate condition, a paired t-test 
was conducted.  The results showed that the absolute amount of belief change in the 
second half of local movements (M = 29.69, SD = 19.93, n = 35) was greater than the 
absolute amount of belief change in the first half of local movements (M = 22.48, SD = 
14.80, n = 35), t(34) = 2.01, p ≤ .05, two-tailed.  Even though the average weights are 
similar between information for Candidate 1 and information for Candidate 2, the 
information presented later induced greater belief change.  This result is not consistent 
with the prediction of H1.3 but suggests a recency effect.  H1.3 was partially supported. 
The above results provide some evidence for validity of the computer-mouse 
technique.  Results of H1.2 show that the number of positive and negative pieces of 
information in the message appears as a cause of the belief trajectories.  Moreover, results 
of H1.3 suggest that the weights of information in the message were represented in belief 
trajectories obtained by the computer-mouse technique.
Patterns of Belief Change during the Post-Message Phase
A spatial-spring linkage model of cognitive forces (Kaplowitz et al., 1983) 
predicted oscillatory and damping patterns of belief change during judgment.  
Patterns of Belief Change in Micro Local Movements: Oscillatory and Damping Patterns
Oscillatory and damping patterns of belief change in micro local movements were 
hypothesized in H2.1.1, and H2.1.2.   
H2.1.1: During judgment, a local movement is more likely to be followed by a 
local movement whose direction is opposite to the direction of the preceding one.
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H2.1.2: During judgment, the absolute amount of belief change by a local 
movement is smaller than the absolute amount of belief change of the proceeding 
local movement.
Equation 1.11 summarizes H2.1.1, and H2.1.2. 
,2;01-;)2)(1()1( ≥<<∆=∆ −−− ilPlP iiiiii (1.8) 
where il  is a constant for the i-th local movement. In order to test the above equations, 
the amount of belief change by micro local movement is regressed on the amount of 
belief change by the previous micro local movement.  That is,
)0(11)1(2 PlP ∆=∆ , (3.4)




)2)(1()1()1( −−−− ∆=∆ NNNNN PlP . (3.6)
Hypothesis 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 predict that 000.1 <<− il .  First, the amount of belief 
change by a local movement from the previous belief, )1( −∆ iiP , was obtained for all data 
sets. Then, )1( −∆ iiP was regressed on )2)(1( −−∆ iiP . Regression analysis was done only if the 
sample size was greater than 20.  The number of regression analyses was six for the 
McGreevy data, four for the Wang data, four for the criminal-sentencing data, and two
for the tuition-increase data.
McGreevy data.  Six regression analyses were conducted (the minimum N = 26).  
Among the six regression analyses, only one regression analysis, regression of the 6th
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micro local movement on the 5th micro local movement, showed a statistically significant 
negative effect (l5 = -0.96, p < .01; see Table 3.10 for the regression results).  In the other 
regression cases, no statistically significant relationship was found in the amount of belief 
change between two consecutive micro movements.  Neither an oscillatory nor a 
damping pattern was supported by the McGreevy data.
Wang data. Four regression analyses were conducted (the minimum N = 22; see 
Table 3.11 for the regression results).  Results for the Wang data showed a strong 
oscillatory pattern in micro local movements.  Regression coefficients in all four-
regression cases showed statistically significant negative effects (l1 = -1.03, p < .01; l2 =   
-0.70, p < .01; l3 = -0.73, p < .01; l4 = -0.50, p < .01), which indicates oscillatory patterns 
of belief trajectories. H2.1.1 was supported.  However, the regression coefficient of l1 (=
-1.03) indicates that the amount of belief change by the 2nd micro movement is a little bit 
greater than the1st micro movement, which is somewhat inconsistent with the damping 
pattern.  Coefficients from other four regression cases were found between -1.00 and 0, 
which indicates a damping pattern of belief trajectories. H2.1.2 was generally supported 
by the Wang data.   
Criminal-sentencing data. Four regression analyses were conducted (the 
minimum N = 33; see Table 3.12 for the regression results).  In the criminal-sentencing 
data, neither l1 nor l2 was statistically significant. Neither an oscillatory pattern nor a 
damping pattern was found for micro movements in the criminal-sentencing data.  H2.1.1
and H2.2.2 were not supported by the criminal-sentencing data. 
Tuition-increase data. Two regression analyses were conducted (the minimum N 
= 29; see Table 3.13 for the regression results).  In the tuition-increase data, both 
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regression coefficients were negative and statistically significant and found between        
-1.00 and 0 (l1 = -.51, p < .01; l2 = -.37, p < .1), which indicates oscillatory and damping 
patterns of belief trajectories.  The tuition-increase data generally support H2.1.1 and 
H2.1.2.
In sum, results from regression analysis with micro local movements provide 
strong supporting evidence for an oscillatory pattern in the Wang data and the tuition-
increase data, and but not in the McGreevy data and the criminal-sentencing data.8
Damping Pattern: Decrease of Absolute Amount of Belief Change
A damping pattern can be assessed by examining whether the absolute amount of 
belief change by local movements decreases as the decision approaches the final 
judgment.  To test for a damping pattern of belief change, the absolute amounts of belief 
change by the last two micro movements were compared and analyzed with a repeated-
measures analysis of variance.  Only cases that have at least two micro local movements 
were included for the analysis.  
McGreevy data. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (N = 54) was 
conducted on the absolute amount of belief change from the previous belief by ordinal 
time, candidate similarity, and distraction (see Table 3.14 for means and standard 
deviations and Table 3.15 for the repeated-measures analysis of variance results). 
Ordinal time was a repeated measure and consisted of two time points, the local 
movement before the final local movement and the final local movement.  The absolute 
amount of belief change was significantly greater for the final movement (M = 34.87; SD
= 27.55) than for the movement before the final movement (M = 14.34; SD = 19.38), F(1, 
50) = 37.12, p < .01, and partial η2= .43. This result indicates that the absolute amount of 
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belief change increased rather than decreased at the end of judgment. Belief trajectories 
did not show a damping pattern. H2.1.2 was not supported by the McGreevy data.
Wang data. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (N = 44) was conducted on 
the absolute amount of belief change from the previous belief by ordinal time, 
individuation, and distraction (see Table 3.16 for means and standard deviations and 
Table 3.17 for the repeated-measures analysis of variance results). Ordinal time consisted 
of two time points, the local movement before the final local movement and the final 
local movement.  The absolute amount of belief change of the final movement (M = 
30.41; SD = 33.73) is not significantly different from the absolute amount of belief 
change of the movement before the final movement (M = 26.12; SD = 26.30), F(1, 40)
= .60, ns.  Belief trajectories did not show a damping pattern. 
Criminal-sentencing data. A repeated-measures analysis of variance (N = 48) was 
conducted for the absolute amount of belief change by ordinal time, source credibility 
and grouped individual message discrepancy (see Table 3.18 for means and standard 
deviations and Table 3.19 for repeated-measures analysis of variance results).  Ordinal 
time consisted of two time points, the local movement before the final local movement 
and the final local movement.  The absolute amount of belief change was significantly 
smaller for the final movement (M = 4.27; SD = 3.83) than for the movement before the 
final movement (M = 2.61; SD = 2.25), F(1, 42) = 5.46, p ≤ .05, partial η2= .12.  This
result suggests that belief trajectories are damped over time. Unlike the McGreevy data 
and Wang data, a damping pattern was found in the criminal-sentencing data. H2.1.2 was 
supported by the criminal-sentencing data.
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Tuition-increase data.  A repeated-measures analysis of variance (N = 56) was 
conducted on the absolute amount of belief change by ordinal time, source credibility and 
manipulated message discrepancy (see Table 3.20 for means and standard deviations and 
Table 3.21 for repeated-measures analysis of variance results). Ordinal time consisted of 
two time points, the local movement before the final local movement and the final local 
movement.  The absolute amount of belief change linearly increased as a function of 
ordinal time, F(1, 59) = 33.22, p < .01, partial η2 = .36 (M = 6.23 and SD =3.27 for the 
movement before the final movement; M = 8.01 and SD =2.76 for the final movement). 
The absolute amount of belief change increased in the last two micro movements, which 
is contrary to the expected damping pattern.  The results also showed that the absolute 
amount of belief change in the last two micro movements increased as message 
discrepancy increased, F(1, 59) = 6.82, p < .05, and partial η2 = .10. 
In sum, a damping pattern in belief trajectory was not found in the McGreevy’s 
study, the Wang study, and the tuition-increase issue but was found in the criminal-
sentencing issue. 
Patterns of Belief Change in Macro Local Movements: Damping Patterns
For the damping pattern in macro local movements, H2.2 and Equation 1.14 were 
proposed:
H2.2: During judgment, the amount of belief change of a macro local movement 
will be smaller than the amount of belief change of the proceeding macro of local 
movement.









is a constant for i-th macro local movement. Like micro movement cases, the 
amount of belief change by a macro local movement was regressed on the amount of 
belief change by the previous macro local movement.  That is,
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H2.2 predicts that 0
~
00.1 <<− il .  The amount of belief change by a macro local 
movement, )1(
~
−∆ iiP , was analyzed in all data sets.  Variables were not transformed. 
Regression analyses were conducted when the sample size was more than 20.  As a result, 
the number of regression analyses was two for the McGreevy data, three for the Wang 
data, one for the criminal-sentencing data, and one for the tuition-increase data. 
McGreevy data.  Two regression analysis were conducted (the minimum N = 25;
see Table 3.22 for the regression analyses). In the McGreevy data, regression 
coefficients in both regression cases are significantly smaller than 0 but close to -1.00 
( 1
~
l = -.93, p < .01; 2
~
l = -.99, p < .01).  Evidence is not strong enough to support a 
damping pattern. H2.2 was not supported by the McGreevy data.
Wang data. Three regression analyses were conducted (the minimum N = 23; see 
Table 3.23 for the regression analyses). Results from the Wang data show that one of the 
regression coefficients is less than -1.00 ( 1
~
l = -1.54, p < .01) even though the other two 
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coefficients are found between -1.00 and 0 ( 2
~
l = -.71, p < .01; 3
~
l = -.77, p < .01). 
Decrease in the absolute amount of belief change by macro local movements was found 
in two out of three macro local movements.  H2.2 was only partially supported in the 
Wang data.
Criminal-sentencing data. One regression analysis was conducted (see Table 3.24 
for the regression analysis).  Results from the criminal-sentencing data showed that the 
regression coefficients were statistically significant and between -1.00 and 0 ( 1
~
l = -.45, p
< .01).  Absolute amounts of belief change by macro local movements were found to 
decrease over time. H2.2 was supported for the criminal-sentencing data. 
Tuition-increase data.  As a highly involving issue, there were not many macro 
movements in the tuition-increase data.  Seven cases (7%) were fount to have no macro 
movements; 72 cases (74%) had one macro movement; 17 (14%) cases had two macro 
movements; and one cases had 8 macro movements (N = 97, M = 1.18, SD = .85). Only
one regression analysis was conducted (N = 18; see Table 3.25 for the regression 
analysis).  In the tuition-increase data, the coefficient of the regression, 1
~
l , was not 
statistically significant. No systematic relationship between the first macro local 
movement and the second macro local movement was found. H2.2 was not supported by 
the tuition-increase data.
In sum, H2.2 was supported by the criminal-sentencing data and partially 
supported by the Wang data.  However, H2.2 was not supported by the McGreevy data or  
the tuition-increase data. 
Cognitive Responses and Local Movement during the Post-Message Phase
Message Type and the Number of Local Movements
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Regarding the relationship between message type (univalent versus mixed-
valence) and the number of local movements during the post-message phase, H3.1.1 was 
proposed:
H3.1.1: During the post-message phase, the ratio of the number of positive local 
movements to the number of negative local movements is greater for positively 
univalent messages than for mixed-valence messages. 
McGreevy data.  To test H3.1.1, first positivity of movements in the post-message 
phase was obtained using the formula in Equation 3.1.  Then an ANOVA was conducted 
for positivity of movements by candidate similarity and distraction for the post-message 
phase (see Table 3.26 for means and standard deviations and Table 3.27 for the ANOVA 
results). The message given in the similar-candidate condition was considered a mixed-
valence message and the message given in the different-candidate condition was 
considered a univalent message. 
Results showed that positivity of movements in the post-message phase was
greater in the different-candidate condition (a univalent message) than the similar-
candidate condition (a mixed-valence message), F(1, 74) = 4.88, p < .05, partial η2 = .13.  
In the univalent message condition, the number of positive movements was not much 
different from the number of negative movements (the mean of positivity of movements 
is -.05) whereas in the mixed-valence message condition, the number of positive 
movements was greater than to the number of negative movements (the mean of 
positivity of movements is .45). This result suggests that individuals had more positive 
belief changes, which is assumed to be from self-generated positive thoughts, in response 
to a positively univalent message whereas they made an equal number of positive and 
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negative belief changes during judgment in response to a mixed-valence message. 
Message type (univalent versus mixed-valence) showed an effect on local movements in 
belief trajectories during the post-message phase as well as during the message-receipt 
phase (H1.2).  
Results also show an interaction between candidate similarity and distraction (F[1, 
74] = 4.45, p < .05, partial η2 = .06).  Positivity of movements in the different-candidate 
condition was significantly greater than positivity the similar-candidate condition only 
when participants were distracted by noise (F[1, 39] = 10.11, p < .05, partial η2 = .21; see 
Table 3.26).  This interaction was not expected.  Further investigation is needed to 
account for this interaction.  
Wang data.  In Wang’s study, the no-individuation condition had a univalent 
message whereas the no-individuation condition had a mixed-valence message.  Because 
higher numbers mean more favorability toward the Caucasian applicant, the message in 
the no-individuation condition is positively univalent.  H3.1.1 predicts that the ratio of the 
number of positive local movements to the number of negative local movements is 
greater in no-individuation condition than in the individuation condition.  Instead of the 
ratio, positivity of movements was used (see Equation 3.1).
An ANOVA was conducted for positivity of movements by individuation and 
distraction (see Table 3.28 for means and standard deviations and Table 3.29 for 
ANOVA results).  Results showed that positivity of movements was greater in the no-
individuation condition (M = .55; SD = .48) than in the individuation condition (M = -.28; 
SD = .40), F(1, 74) = 56.97, p < .01, and partial η2 = .48.  In response to a positively 
univalent message, a greater number of positive local movements than negative local 
84
movements was generated whereas in response to a mixed-valence message, the number 
of negative local movements was greater than the number of positive local movements.  
The absolute value of positivity of movements was smaller in the individuation condition 
(mixed-valence message) than in the no-individuation condition (univalent message 
condition).  This result supports H3.1.1.  
With the compute mouse technique and local movement framework, belief 
changes during judgments were reflected as predicted.  Result on the relationship 
between message type and the number of local movements in belief trajectories during 
the post-message phase provides supporting evidence about validity of local movement 
framework.
Message Type and the Total Number of Local Movements
Regarding the types of message and the total number of local movements, H3.1.2 
was proposed:
H3.1.2: During the post-message phase, the number of local movements is greater 
for mixed-valence messages than for univalent messages.
The McGreevy data was used to test H3.1.2.  In McGreevy’s study, the number of 
pieces of information, the number of sentences in the text, is 32 in the similar-candidate 
condition and 31 in the different-candidate condition.  Therefore, the number of local 
movements in the message-receipt phase is expected to be similar between the two 
conditions. However, in the post-message phase, a greater number of local movements is 
expected in the similar-candidate condition than in the different-candidate condition.  The 
message in the similar-candidate condition is mixed-valence and more difficult than the 
message in the different-candidate condition, which is univalent.  McGreevy measured 
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the perceived difficulty of the decision and found that the decision in the similar-
candidate condition was perceived to be more difficult than the decision in the different-
candidate condition, F(1, 97) = 43.88, p < .01 (McGreevy, 1996, p. 169). 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance was conducted to test this hypothesis 
(see Table 3.30 for means and standard deviations and Table 3.31 for ANOVA results). 
The total numbers of micro local movements in both phases were transformed before the 
analysis to meet the distributional assumptions (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977).  The total 
number of micro local movements was analyzed in terms of phases, candidate similarity, 
and distraction.  Results show that a statistically significant interaction between phase 
and candidate similarity, F(1, 74) = 12.49, p < .01, and partial η2= .14.  To examine the 
interaction between phase and candidate similarity, an ANOVA was conducted for the 
total number of micro local movements by candidate similarity and distraction in each 
phase.  Results shows that candidate similarity has a statistically significant effect on the 
total number of micro local movements in the post-message phase, F(1, 74) = 13.58, p
< .01, and partial η2= .16, but not in the message-receipt phase, F(1, 74) = 1.07, ns, and 
partial η2= .01.  As predicted, the total number of local movements was not different 
between the univalent message condition and the mixed-valence message condition 
during the message-receipt phase but was found to be greater in the mixed-valence 
message condition than the univalent message condition during the post-message phase.  
Results showed that during the message-receipt phase, the number of belief changes 
measured by local movements corresponded to the number of pieces of information, but 
during the post-message phase, the number of belief changes was affected by the 
difficulty of the message.  H2.3.2 was supported by the McGreevy data.
86
Message Type and Final Belief Change 
Regarding the mediating role of the number of local movements between message 
type and the final decision, H3.1.3 was proposed:
H3.1.3: The effect of message type (univalent versus mixed-valence) on the final 
decision is mediated by the number of positive and the number of negative local 
movements.
McGreevy data. Hypothesis 3.1.3 can be represented by a causal model, in which 
the number of positive and the number of negative local movement mediates the effect of 
the type of message on final decision.  First, the final decision was obtained from final 
position.  Final position, NP , was expected to be either 0 or 100.  In 72 (92%) of the 78 
cases, final positions were found within 5 points of 0 or 100.  For the six other cases, if a 
final position was within 25 points from 0, the final decision was categorized as 
Candidate 1. If a final position was within 25 points from 100, the final decision was 
categorized as Candidate 2.  Otherwise, final positions were categorized as neutral. 
Because the final decision is a dichotomous variable, the mediating role of local 
movements was tested by stepwise logistic regression in which the final decision was 
regressed only on candidate similarity at the first step and then regressed on both 
candidate similarity and the number of positive and negative local movements at the 
second step.  If the numbers of positive and negative local movements mediate the effect 
of candidate similarity on the final decision, the effect of candidate similarity on the final 
decision at the first step should be significantly less at the second step because of the 
effect of numbers of positive and negative local movements on the final decision.    
Table 3.32 is the cross-tabulation of final decision by candidate similarity in the 
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McGreevy data.  Three cases were found to be neutral.  Without the neutral cases, a chi-
square test shows that there was a significant difference among the different groups, χ2(1, 
N = 75) = 4.01, p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  As expected, in the different-candidate 
condition, more participants chose Candidate 2 (80.56%, n = 29) over Candidate 1
(19.44%, n = 7).  In the similar-candidate condition, the number of participants who 
chose Candidate 2 (58.97%, n = 23) was greater than the number of participants who 
chose Candidate 1 (41.03%, n = 16).  In the similar-candidate condition, the percent 
difference between participants who chose Candidate 2 and participants who chose 
Candidate 1 was 61.11%, whereas the difference was 17.95% in the different-candidate 
condition.  
Table 3.33 shows results of the stepwise logistic regression.  Neutral cases were 
included in the analysis.  When candidate similarity was the only exogenous variable, 
candidate similarity showed a statistically significant effect on the final decision, B = 
1.06 (p ≤ .05).  However, when the number of positive and negative movements were 
added as exogenous variables, both the effect of the number of positive movements, B = 
1.16 (p < .01), and the effect the number of negative movements, B = -1.18 (p < .01), 
were statistically significant but the effect of candidate similarity became non-significant
(B = .72, ns). With the result for Hypothesis 3.1.1, the result from the stepwise 
regression analysis suggests that the type of message exerts its effect on the final decision 
through the number of positive and negative movements. 
Wang data. Like in the McGreevy data, final decision, a dichotomous variable, 
was predicted by message type (i.e., individuation) and the number of positive and the 
number of negative movements in the Wang data.  Results showed that the African 
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American applicant was preferred to the Caucasian applicant in the individuation 
condition whereas the Caucasian applicant was preferred to the African American 
applicant in the no-individuation condition, χ2 (1, N = 66) = 44.27, p < .01 (see Table 
3.34).  Results from a stepwise logistic regression of the final decision on individuation 
and the numbers of positive and negative movements showed that the effect of 
individuation still had a significant effect (B = 1.73, p < .01, N = 66) even when the 
number of positive movements (B = 3.30, p ≤ .05) and the number of negative 
movements (B = -3.42, p ≤ .05) on the final decision were controlled (see Table 3.35 for 
the stepwise logistic regression results).  This result showed that the type of message had
both direct and indirect effects on the final judgment. 
In sum, the McGreevy data shows that the type of message exerts its effect on the 
final decision through the number of local movement whereas the Wang data shows that 
the type of message has an effect on the final decision both directly and indirectly 
through the number of local movements. Hypothesis 3.1.3 was only partially supported.
Cognitive Responses and the Number of Local Movements 
Regarding the relationship between cognitive responses and local movements, 
H3.2.1 was proposed: 
H3.2.1: There will be a positive relationship between the number of positive local 
movements and the number of positive thoughts, and between the number of 
negative local movements and the number of negative thoughts.
In the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data, after participants 
made their final judgments, they were asked to list the thoughts they had during the 
decision task. Correlation analyses were conducted between the number of positive 
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thoughts and the number of positive movements and between the number of negative 
thoughts and the number of negative movements. 
Criminal-sentencing data.  For the analysis, four relevant variables were 
transformed to the same power (see Appendix C for transformation method and skewness 
before and after transformation).  The correlation between the number of positive 
thoughts about severe sentencing and the number of positive movements was .38 (N = 
93; p < .01, one-tailed test).  However, the correlation between the number of negative 
thoughts about severe sentencing and the number of negative movement was not 
statistically significant (N = 93, r = .01, ns). Only the correlation between the number of 
positive thoughts and the number of positive movements was consistent with the 
prediction.  H3.2.1 was partially supported by the criminal-sentencing data.
Tuition-increase data. For the analysis, four relevant variables were transformed 
to the same power (see Appendix C for transformation method and skewness before and 
after transformation). The correlation between the number of positive thoughts about a 
tuition increase and the number of positive movements was .15 (N = 97, p < .10, one-
tailed test).  The correlation between the number of negative thoughts about tuition 
increase and the number of negative movements is not statistically significant (N = 97, r
= .06, ns). H3.2.1 was not supported by the tuition-increase data.
In both data sets, the number of positive local movements was found to be 
correlated with the number of positive thoughts.  However, there was no statistically 
significant correlation between the number of negative local movements and the number 
of negative thoughts in either data set.  Systematic relationships between the number of 
local movements and the number of thoughts reported by participants were expected but 
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were found only for the relationship between positive local movements and positive 
thoughts.   
Effects of Cognitive Responses and Local Movements on Beliefs
Regarding effects of cognitive responses and local movements on beliefs, H3.2.2 
was proposed:
H3.2.2: The ratio of the effect of the number of positive thoughts on beliefs to the 
effect of the number of negative thoughts on beliefs will be the same as the ratio 
of the effect of the number of positive local movements on beliefs to the effect of 
the number of negative local movements on beliefs.
Two stages of analysis were needed to test this hypothesis.  In the first stage, the 
following two regression analyses were conducted to find the effect of the number of 
movements on beliefs and the effect of the number of thoughts on beliefs:
1210)0( ζ+++=∆ mmN qgpggP ; (3.10)
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where mp is the number of positive movements, mq is the number of negative movements, 
thp is the number of positive thoughts, thq is the number of negative thoughts, gs and bs 
are regression coefficients, and  1ζ  and 2ζ are error terms.  For each regression analysis, 
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where mR is the ratio of the effect of the number of positive local movements on belief to 
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where thR is the ratio of the effect of the number of positive thoughts on belief to the 
effect of the number of negative thought on belief.
In the second stage, a structural equation modeling analysis was conducted to test 
whether the difference between mR and thR  was statistically significant.  In the structural 
equation model, mR  was constrained to be equal to thR .  The following constrained 
model was tested: 
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The ratio between 1g  and 2g was obtained from Equation 3.10 and imposed on 
Equation 3.14.  Equation 3.11 is an unconstrained model and Equation 3.14 is a 
constrained model.  If the constrained model fits the data as well as the unconstrained 
model does, the two ratios can be said not to be significantly different from each other. 
Criminal-sentencing data.  First, the two regression analyses were conducted: (1) 
final belief change was predicted by the number of positive local movements and the 
number of negative local movements (local movement model); (2) final belief change 
was predicted by the number of positive thoughts and the number of negative thoughts 
(cognitive response model).  In both regression analyses, the independent variables were 
transformed to meet assumptions for regression analysis with the same power (see 
Appendix C for transformation method and skewness before and after transformation). 
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Table 3.36 shows the result of the two regression analyses.  In the local movement model, 
the number of positive local movement was found to have a statistically significant effect 
on final belief change, B = 8.24, SE = 1.53, β = .53, p < .01, one-tailed, whereas the 
effect of number of negative thoughts was not a significant predictor, B = -1.71, SE = 
1.46, β = -.12, ns.  The ratio of the effect of the number of positive movements to the 
effect of the number of negative movements was -4.81. 
In the cognitive response model, the number of positive thoughts was found to 
have a marginally significant effect on final belief change, B = 2.23, SE = 1.71, β = 1.43, 
p < .10, one-tailed. The effect of number of negative thoughts on beliefs was not 
significant, B = -1.90, SE = 1.75, β = -.12, ns. The ratio of the effect of the number of 
positive thoughts to the effect of the number of negative thoughts was -1.17.  
A structural equation modeling analysis was conducted to see whether the 
constrained model would fit the data.  To find estimates, the maximum likelihood method 
was used with unstandardized data (see Table 3.37 for covariances among variables in the 
model; Table 3.38 shows the results of the structural equation modeling analysis).  The 
ratio of the effect of the number of positive movements to the effect of the number of 
negative movements, -4.81, was imposed on the restricted model.  The structural 
coefficient was 2.87 (SE = 1.48, p ≤ .05, one-tailed) for the effect of the number of 
positive thoughts on beliefs and -.60 (SE = 0.31, p ≤ .05, one-tailed) for the effect of the 
number of negative thoughts on beliefs.  The ratio of two coefficients for the constrained 
model is approximately equal to the imposed ratio.  The constrained model was found to 
fit the data well. The constrained model’s minimum fit function chi-square was found to 
be not significant, χ2 (df = 1) = .58, ns.  Other measures of goodness of fit also showed 
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that the constrained model fits the data: The root mean square error of approximation < 
0.01, normed fit index = .96, and the comparative fit index = 1.00.  Because the 
unconstrained model is just identified, which fits the data perfectly by definition, the 
statistical significance of the constrained model’s minimum fit function chi-square 
indicates whether the constrained model fits the data as well as the unconstrained model 
does.  Results showed that the constrained model is good as the unconstrained model, 
which indicates that the ratios between effects of local movements and the effects of 
thoughts on final beliefs are not significantly different from each other.  Results from the 
criminal-sentencing data support H3.2.2. 
Tuition-increases data. Like the criminal-sentencing data, two regression analyses 
were conducted: (1) final belief change was predicted by the number of positive local 
movements and the number of negative local movements (local movement model); (2) 
final belief change was predicted by the number of positive thoughts and the number of 
negative thoughts (cognitive response model).  Table 3.39 shows the result of the two 
regression analyses.  In the local movement model, the number of positive local 
movement was found to have a statistically significant effect on final belief change, B = 
6.47, SE = .67, β = .70, p < .01, one-tailed, whereas the effect of number of negative 
thoughts was marginally significant, B = -1.13, SE = .73, β = -.12, p < .10, one-tailed. 
The ratio of the effect of the number of positive movements to the effect of the number of 
negative movements was -5.70. 
In the cognitive response model, the number of positive thoughts was found to 
have a statistically significant effect on final beliefs, B = 2.00, SE = .92, β = .24, p ≤ .05, 
one-tailed. The effect of number of negative thoughts on beliefs was not significant, B = -
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.70, SE = .73, β = -.11, ns. The ratio of the effect of the number of positive thoughts to 
the effect of the number of negative thoughts was -2.86.  
A structural equation modeling analysis was conducted to see whether the 
constrained model would fit the data.  To find estimates, the maximum likelihood method 
was used with unstandardized data (see Table 3.40 for covariances among variables in the 
model; Table 3.41 shows the results of the structural equation modeling analysis).  The 
ratio of the effect of the number of positive movements to the effect of the number of 
negative movements, -5.70, was imposed to the restricted model.  The structural 
coefficient was 2.24 (SE = .72, p < .01, one-tailed) for the effect of the number of 
positive thought on beliefs, and -.39 (SE = 0.13, p < .01, one-tailed) for the effect of the 
number of negative thought on beliefs.  The ratio of two coefficients for the constrained 
model is approximately equal to the imposed ratio.  The constrained model’s minimum fit 
function chi-square was found to be not significant, χ2 (df = 1) = .18, ns, which indicates 
that the constrained model fits the data well.  Other measures of goodness of fit also 
showed that the constrained model fits the data: The root mean square error of 
approximation < 0.01, normed fit index = .99 and the comparative fit index = 1.00. 
Results showed that the constrained model is as good as the unconstrained model, which 
indicates that the ratios between effects of local movements and the effects of thoughts on 
final beliefs are not significantly different from each other.  Results from the tuition-
increase data support H3.2.2. 
Both data sets showed similarities between the effect of local movements on 
beliefs and the effect of thoughts on beliefss.  These similarities could result from the fact 
that both local movements in belief trajectories measured by the computer mouse 
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technique and thoughts reported by the thought-listing techniques measure cognitive 
responses during judgment. 
The Effect of Message Discrepancy on Beliefs during Judgment
Message Discrepancy, Cognitive Responses and Local Movements
Regarding the relationship between message discrepancy and the number of local 
movements, H4.1.1 was proposed:
H4.1.1: Assuming the message discrepancy is positive, as message discrepancy 
increases, the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the number of 
negative local movements will decrease.
Criminal-sentencing data. Positivity of movements (see Equation 3.1) was used 
instead of the ratio of the number of positive local movements to the number of negative 
local movements.  Positivity of movements was regressed on individual message 
discrepancy and source credibility to test the hypothesis (see Table 3.42 for the regression 
results).  Results showed that message discrepancy did not show a statistically significant
effect on positivity in the number of local movements (B = .004, ns).  H4.1.1 was not 
supported by the criminal-sentencing data.  
Previous studies (Brock, 1967; Toy, 1982) found that message discrepancy has an 
effect on the number of positive thoughts and the number of negative thoughts.  The 
effect of message discrepancy on positivity of thoughts was examined.  Positivity of 
thoughts was computed by the following equation:
)1log()1log( +−+= nmPositivitythoguhts ,       (3.16) 
where m is the number of positive movements and n is the number of negative 
movements.  Individual message discrepancy was found to have a statistically significant 
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negative effect on positivity of thoughts in the criminal-sentencing data (B = -.01, p < .05, 
see Table 3.43 for the regression results).  This result indicates that as message 
discrepancy increases, the number of negative thoughts about the message position 
increases, which is consistent with Toy (1982).
Tuition-increase data. An ANOVA was conducted on positivity of movements by 
linear and quadratic message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.44 for 
means and standard deviations and Table 3.45 for the ANOVA analysis). Neither linear 
nor quadratic message discrepancy had a significant effect on positivity of movements . 
However, an interaction effect between source credibility and quadratic message
discrepancy was found to be statistically significant, F(1, 91) = 7.26, p < .01, and partial 
η2 = .07.  To specify the effect of quadratic message discrepancy on initial belief change 
for each level of source credibility, positivity of movements were predicted by linear and 
quadratic message discrepancy for each level of source credibility (see Table 3.46 for the 
ANOVA analyses).  Results showed that in the low source credibility condition, as 
message discrepancy increased, positivity of movements increased and then decreased, 
F(1, 91) = 6.42, p < .01, and partial η2 = .12. Positivity of movements was greater for the 
moderately discrepant message than the extremely discrepant message, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis.  H4.1.1 was partially supported by the tuition-increase 
data. 
The effect of message discrepancy on positivity of thoughts were also examined 
to see whether the pattern found in previous studies (Brock, 1967; Toy, 1982) would be 
observed in the tuition-increase data.  Results showed that message discrepancy did not 
have an effect on positivity of thoughts in the tuition-increase data (see Table 3.47 for 
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means and standard deviations and Table 3.48 for the ANOVA analysis).
Message discrepancy was expected to have a negative effect on positivity of 
movements.  The results were mixed.  In the criminal-sentencing data, message 
discrepancy had no significant effect on positivity of movements.  However, in the 
tuition-increase data, positivity of movements was found to be greater for the moderately 
discrepant message than for the extremely discrepant message.  
Message Discrepancy and Initial Belief Change
Regarding the relationship between message discrepancy on the amount of belief 
change of the first local movement, initial belief change, H4.1.2 was proposed:
H4.1.2: The greater the message discrepancy, the greater the belief change of the 
first micro local movement in the direction advocated by the message.
The belief change of the first micro local movement, )0(1P∆ , is used for initial 
belief change. The criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data were used to 
test the effect of message discrepancy on initial belief change.  
Criminal-sentencing data. A regression analysis was conducted to test H 4.1.2.  In 
the regression analysis, initial belief change was regressed on linear and quadratic 
individual message discrepancy, source credibility, the interaction between the linear 
individual message discrepancy and source credibility, and the interaction between 
quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.49 for 
correlations among the exogenous variables and Table 3.50 for the regression results).  
The effect of quadratic individual message discrepancy and the interaction effect between 
quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility were not hypothesized 
for initial belief change but were incorporated in the regression equation because it 
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allows for a comparison of the results for initial belief change with the results for final 
belief change.  For this analysis, only cases with at least one local movement were 
included (N= 81). 
The regression showed a statistically significant effect of linear message 
discrepancy on initial belief change (B = .18, SE = .06, p < .01).  As message discrepancy 
increased, initial belief change linearly increased.  Results showed the interaction 
between source credibility and linear message discrepancy was marginally significant (B
= .22, SE = .12, p = .06) and quadratic individual message discrepancy was also 
marginally significant, p < .10.  Table 3.51 shows results from regression analyses for 
initial belief change on linear individual message discrepancy for low and high source 
credibility conditions.  For the low source credibility condition, linear individual message 
discrepancy was marginally significant (B = .07, SE = .04, p = .07) but quadratic 
individual message discrepancy was statistically significant (B = -.01, SE = .04, p < .01).  
On the other hand, for the high source credibility condition, only linear individual 
message discrepancy was statistically significant (B = .29, SE = .12, p < .01).  Figure 10 
shows a nonmonotonic relationship between message discrepancy and initial belief 
change for the low source credibility condition; as message discrepancy increases, the 
amount for initial belief change increases and then decreases for the low source 
credibility condition.  Results from the criminal-sentencing data only partially supported 
H4.1.2. 
Tuition-increase data.  An ANOVA was conducted on initial belief change by 
linear and quadratic message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.52 for 
means and standard deviations, and Table 3.53 for ANOVA results).  The mean of initial
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belief change was 4.73%, which was significantly different from the mean of initial 
position (t = 17.24, df = 89, p < .01).  Initial positions about the tuition increase were 
measured at the beginning of the experiment and 98 out of 99 participants reported zero 
increase as their initial positions.  Results showed that quadratic message discrepancy had 
a marginally significant effect (F[1, 84] = 2.94, p < .10, partial η2 = .03), and a 
statistically significant interaction effect with source credibility (F[1, 84] = 4.68, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .05).  To specify the effect of quadratic message discrepancy on initial belief 
change for each level of source credibility, ANOVAs were conducted for the low and the 
high source credibility conditions (see Table 3.54 for the ANOVA results).  The results 
showed that in the low source credibility condition, the amount of initial belief change 
increased and then decreased, F(1, 42) = 4.73, p < .01, and partial η2 = .10.  Figure 11 
shows a nonmonotonic relationship between message discrepancy and initial belief 
change for the low source credibility condition.  A linear relationship between message 
discrepancy and the amount of initial belief change was expected but a nonmonotonic 
relationship between the two variables was found.  Results from the tuition-increase data 
did not support H4.1.2.
Message Discrepancy and Final Belief Change
Regarding the effect of message discrepancy on final beliefs, H4.1.3 was
proposed:
H4.1.3: As message discrepancy increases, the amount of final belief change will 
increase up to a certain point and then decrease.
The belief change of the final micro local movement, )0(NP∆ , is used for final 
belief change. H4.1.3 predicts an inverted U-shaped nonmonotonic effect of message 
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discrepancy on final belief change. The criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase 
data were used to test the effect of message discrepancy on final belief change.
Criminal-sentencing data.  A regression analysis was conducted to test H4.1.3.  
In the regression analysis, final belief change was regressed on linear and quadratic 
individual message discrepancy, source credibility, the interaction between the linear 
individual message discrepancy and source credibility, and the interaction between 
quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.55 for the 
regression results).  Quadratic individual message discrepancy was included as a 
predictor in order to capture the proposed nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy 
on final belief change.  A quadratic function is one of the simplest forms for 
nonmonotonic relationship. 
The results showed that the effect of linear message discrepancy was statistically
significant (B = .20, SE = .05, p < .01) and the effect of quadratic message discrepancy 
was marginally significant (B = -.01, SE = .005, p = .81).  The interaction between source 
credibility and linear message discrepancy was statistically significant (B = .29, SE = .11, 
p < .01).  
To examine different effect of message discrepancy on final belief change 
between low and high source credibility, regression analyses were conducted for each 
level of source credibility separately (see Table 3.56 for the regression results).  Results 
showed a contrasting pattern in terms of the effect of linear and quadratic message
discrepancy on final belief change between the low and the high source credibility 
condition.  For the low source credibility condition, the effect of the linear message was 
not statistically significant but quadratic message discrepancy was statistically significant 
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(B = -.01, SE = .004, p < .01).  For the high source credibility condition, only the effect of 
linear message discrepancy was statistically significant (B = .35, SE = .10, p < .01).  
Figure 11 represents differences in final belief change by individual message 
discrepancy and source credibility. In Figure 11, final belief change increases 
monotonically as message discrepancy increases for the high credibility condition. 
However, for the low credibility condition, final belief change shows a nonmonotonic 
pattern. An inverted U-shaped nonmonotonic pattern of the relationship between 
message discrepancy and final belief change was found only for the low credibility
condition.  H4.1.3 was partially supported by the criminal-sentencing data. 
Tuition-increase data. An ANOVA was conducted on final Belief Change by 
linear and quadratic message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.57 for 
means and standard deviations and Table 3.58 for ANOVA results).  The overall mean of 
final belief change for all cases was 7.13%, which is significantly different from the 
initial position (t = 22.25, df = 89, p < .01).  Results showed that linear message
discrepancy had statistically significant positive effect on final belief change, F(1, 84) = 
5.65, partial η2 = .06, and p ≤ .05.  A nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy on 
final belief change was expected but a linear increasing pattern was found between 
message discrepancy and final belief change (see Figure 12).  Results from the tuition-
increase data did not support H4.1.3.
Change of Effect of Message Discrepancy on Beliefs over Time
Regarding change of effect of message discrepancy on beliefs during judgment, 
H4.1.4 was proposed:
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H4.1.4: Assuming message discrepancy is positive, the effect of message 
discrepancy on beliefs decreases over time during judgment.
Criminal-sentencing data.  To test Hypothesis 4.1.4, a repeated-measures analysis 
of variance was conducted (see Table 3.59 for means and standard deviations of initial
and final belief change by source credibility and individual message discrepancy, and 
Table 3.60 for the repeated-measures analysis of variance results).  In the analysis, belief 
change from the initial position was the dependent variable, linear and quadratic 
individual message discrepancy and source credibility were independent variables, and 
ordinal time was the repeated measure.  Ordinal time consists of two time points: time of 
the first local movement and time of the final local movement.  A decrease of the effect 
of message discrepancy on beliefs was expected between the first local movement and 
the final local movement. 
Results showed that neither the linear nor quadratic effect of message discrepancy 
on belief change was significant between the two time points.  Results show a marginally 
significant three-way interaction effect among ordinal time, source credibility and 
quadratic message discrepancy, F(1, 75) = .33, p = .07, and partial η2 = .04.  The effect of 
quadratic message discrepancy in the low source credibility condition was stronger in the 
final local movement (B = -.012, SE B = .004; β = -.466, p = .004) than in the first local 
movement (B = -.007, SE B= .003; β = -.350, p = .034).  Observed nonmonotonic 
relationships between message discrepancy and belief change in the low source 
credibility condition indicates that moderately discrepant messages have a stronger effect 
on beliefs than extremely discrepant messages (see Figure 10 and Figure 11).  Therefore, 
the increase of the nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy indicates the decrease of 
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the effect of extremely discrepant messages on beliefs, which is consistent with the 
prediction of H4.1.4.  H4.1.4 was partially supported by the criminal-sentencing data.   
Tuition-increase data. To test H4.1.4, a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
was conducted for Belief Changes by ordinal time, linear and quadratic message 
discrepancy, and source credibility (see Table 3.52 for means and standard deviations of 
initial belief change, Table 3.57 for means and standard deviations of final belief change, 
and Table 3.58 for the repeated-measures analysis of variance results).  H4.1.4 predicts 
that the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs decreases over time.  More specifically, 
H4.1.4 predicts that the linear (positive) effect of message discrepancy decreases over 
time but the nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy increases over time.  
Results showed that the effect of linear message discrepancy on beliefs increased 
over time but the effect was marginally significant, F(1, 84) = 2.89, p = .09, and partial η2
= .03.  A three-way interaction among ordinal time, source credibility and quadratic 
message discrepancy was found to be statistically significant, F(1, 84) = 7.71, p ≤ .05, 
and partial η2 = .08.  A repeated-measures analysis of variance for each level of source 
credibility (see Table 3.62 for the results) showed that the interaction between ordinal 
time and quadratic message discrepancy was statistically significant in the low source 
credibility condition (F[1, 42] = 5.63, p ≤ .05, partial η2 = .12), but not in the high 
credibility condition (F[1, 42] = 2.17, ns, and partial η2 = .05).  For the low source
credibility condition, the effect of quadratic message discrepancy was found to be 
statistically significant only for initial Belief Change (F[1, 42] = 4.73, p ≤ .05, and partial 
η2 = .57), but not for final Belief Change (F[1, 42] = .09, ns, and partial η2 < .01).  In 
contrast to the quadratic effect, the effect of linear message discrepancy on beliefs was 
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not statistically significant for the first local movement (F[1, 42] = .2.75, ns, and partial 
η2 = .06), but was statistically significant for the final local movement (F[1, 42] = .4.61, p
≤ .05, and partial η2 = .10).  
These results showed that for messages from less credible source, the quadratic 
effect of message discrepancy decreased over time but the linear effect of message 
discrepancy increased, which is opposite to H4.1.4.  H4.1.4 was not supported by the 
tuition-increase data.  The results also showed that the amount of final belief change (M = 
4.73, SD = 2.60) was greater than the amount of initial belief change (M.= 7.13, SD = 
3.14), F(1, 84) = .51.99, p ≤ .05, and partial η2 = .38. 
The Effect of Source Credibility on Beliefs during Judgment
Source Credibility, Cognitive Responses and Local Movements
Regarding the relationship between source credibility and the number of local 
movements, H4.2.1 was proposed:
H4.2.1: Assuming that message discrepancy is positive, for less involving issues, 
the ratio of positive local movements to the number of negative local movements 
will be greater in a message from a high than a low credibility source.  However, 
for highly involving issues, the ratio of positive local movements to the number of 
negative local movements will not differ between messages from a high and a low
credibility source. 
H4.2.1 was tested by the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data.  
Compared to the tuition-increase data, the criminal-sentencing data is less involving. Two 
separate regression analysis were conducted. 
Criminal-sentencing data. The regression analysis for Hypothesis 4.1.1 was used 
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to test Hypothesis 4.2.1. Positivity of movements was regressed on individual message 
discrepancy and source credibility. Because the criminal-sentencing issue is relatively 
less involving, source credibility is likely to have an effect on positivity of movements 
for this issue. Results showed that source credibility did not have statistically significant 
effect on positivity of movements , B = -.02, ns (see Table 3.42 for regression results). 
Positivity in the numbers of movements in belief trajectories were not different between 
high and low source credibility conditions.  This result is not consistent with H4.2.1. 
Source credibility also did not show a statistically significant effect on positivity 
of thoughts (see Table 3.41 for regression results).  This result is not consistent with 
Cook (1969) and Hass (1982).
Tuition-increase data. As a highly involving issue, it was expected that positivity 
of movements was not much influenced by source credibility. An ANOVA was 
conducted on positivity of movements by source credibility and message discrepancy. 
Results showed that positivity of movements was marginally greater for the high source 
credibility condition (M = .88; SD = .44) than for the low source credibility condition (M
= .73; SD = .49), F(1, 97) = .2.82, p < .10, and partial η2 = .03 (see Table 3.44 for means 
and standard deviations and Table 3.45 for ANOVA results). The results from the tuition 
increase issue are not consistent with H4.2.1.  Even though the issue is personally 
involving, source credibility was found to have a marginal effect on the number of micro 
movements in belief trajectories. 
For the tuition-increase issue, positivity of thoughts was not affected by source 
credibility (see Table 3.47 for means and standard deviations and Table 3.48 for ANOVA 
results). 
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Source Credibility and Initial Belief Change
Regarding the relationship between source credibility on the amount of belief 
change of the first local movement, initial belief change, H4.2.2 was proposed:
H4.2.2: Controlling for message discrepancy, the amount of belief change by the 
first local movement from a message with a high credibility source will not differ 
from the same message from a low credibility source.
Criminal-sentencing data. The regression analysis for Hypothesis 4.1.2 was used 
to test Hypothesis 4.2.2.  Initial belief change was regressed on linear and quadratic 
individual message discrepancy, source credibility, the interaction between the linear 
individual message discrepancy and source credibility, and the interaction between 
quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.50 for 
regression results).  Results from the regression analysis showed that the effect of source 
credibility was statistically significant (B = 4.41, SE = 1.66, p ≤ .05).  Results also 
showed that source credibility increased the effect of linear message discrepancy on 
initial belief change (marginally significant, B = .22, SE = .12, p = .06).  The effect of 
linear message discrepancy on initial belief change is .07 (SE = .04, p = .07) in the low 
source credibility condition and .29 (SE = .12, p ≤ .05) in the high source credibility 
condition.  In contrast to H4.2.2, source credibility did have an effect on beliefs at the 
beginning of judgment. H4.2.2 was not supported by the criminal-sentencing data. 
Tuition-increase data. An ANOVA was conducted on belief change by the first 
micro local movement by source credibility and message discrepancy (see Table 3.52 for 
means and standard deviations and Table 3.53 for ANOVA results).  As a highly 
involving issue, source credibility was not expected to have an effect on initial belief 
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change for the tuition-increase data. Results showed that the effect of source credibility
was not significant, F(1,84) = 1.46, ns.  This result is consistent with H4.2.2.
Source Credibility and Final Belief Change
Regarding to the effect of source credibility on final beliefs, H4.2.3 and H4.2.4 
were proposed:
H4.2.3: For less involving issues, the amount of final belief change will be greater 
for a message from a high than a low credibility source.  However, for highly 
involving issues, there will be no difference in the amount of final belief change 
between messages from a high and a low credibility source.
H4.2.4: As source credibility increases, the effect of message discrepancy on 
final beliefs increases.
H4.2.3 was tested by the two data-sets.  For the criminal-sentencing issue, which 
is less involving, significant effect of source credibility on final belief change was 
expected, but for the tuition-increase issue, which is more involving, no difference in the 
amount of final belief change between messages from a high and a low credibility source 
was expected.  
Criminal-sentencing data. The regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4.1.3
was used to test Hypothesis 4.2.3 and Hypothesis 4.2.4. Final belief change was regressed 
on linear and quadratic individual message discrepancy, source credibility, the interaction 
between the linear individual message discrepancy and source credibility, and the 
interaction between quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility. As 
a relatively less involving issue, source credibility was expected to have an effect on final 
belief change.  
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Results of the regression analysis showed that source credibility had a positive 
effect on final belief change (B = 4.31, SE = 1.52, p < .01) (see Table 3.55 for regression 
results). The message from a highly credible source (M = 8.78; SD = 9.62) induced 
greater belief change than the message from a less credible source (M = 4.75; SD = 4.59). 
Results also showed that source credibility had a significant interaction effect 
with linear message discrepancy on final belief change (B = .29, SE = .11, p < .01).  The 
effect of message discrepancy on final Belief Change was greater for the high credibility 
condition (B = .35, SE = .10, p < .01) than the low credibility condition (B = .06, ns). 
These results are consistent with H4.2.3 and H4.2.4.
Tuition-increase data. An ANOVA was conducted on final belief change by 
message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.57 for means and standard 
deviations and Table 3.58 for ANOVA results).  As a highly involving issue, source 
credibility was not expected to have an effect on final belief change for the tuition-
increase data.  Results showed that the final belief change was greater for the message
from highly credible source (M = 7.72; SD = 3.00) than for the message from less 
credible source (M = 6.53; SD = 2.99), F(1, 84) = 3.10, p = .08, and partial η2 = .08.  
Even though the issue was personally involving, source credibility only had a marginal 
effect on the final belief change. H4.2.3 was not supported by the tuition-increase data. 
Change of Effect of Source Credibility on Beliefs over Time
Regarding change of the effect of source credibility on beliefs over time, H4.2.5
was proposed:  
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H4.2.5: For less involving issues, the effect of source credibility on beliefs 
increases over time during judgment. However, for highly involving issues, no 
significant change in the effect of source credibility is expected.
Criminal-sentencing data. H4.2.5 was tested by the repeated-measures analysis of 
variance used to test Hypothesis 4.1.4.  The amount of belief change was explained by 
ordinal time (the point of the initial and the final local movement), individual message 
discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.59 for means and standard deviations by 
source credibility and individual message discrepancy for initial and final belief change 
and Table 3.60 for the repeated-measures analysis of variance results).  Results from the 
repeated-measures analysis of variance showed that source credibility had an effect on 
overall beliefs, F(1, 75) = 12.87,  p < .01, and partial η2 = .15, but the effect of source 
credibility on beliefs did not significantly differ between initial and final local movement, 
F(1, 75) = .01, ns. 
Tuition-increase data. A repeated-measures analysis of variance was conducted 
for beliefs by ordinal time, message discrepancy and source credibility (see Table 3.52
for means and standard deviations in initial belief change, Table 3.57 for means and 
standard deviations in final belief change and Table 3.61 for the repeated-measures 
analysis of variance results).  The effect of source credibility on beliefs was significantly 
different between initial belief change and final belief change, F(1, 84) = 7.45, p ≤ .05, 
and partial η2 = .08.  The mean difference in the amount of belief change between high 
and low source credibility was greater in the final local movement (= 1.11) than in the 
first local movement (= -.55). This result suggests that the effect of source credibility 
increases over time. 
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Increase of the effect of source credibility was expected for a less involving issue 
but not expected for a highly involving issue like tuition increase.  However, increase of 
the effect of source credibility was found even for a highly involving issue. Results from 
the tuition-increase data did not support H4.2.5. 
With four data-sets, twenty hypotheses about dynamic belief change during 




In this chapter, the theoretical rationale and the method of the study are first
summarized.  Second, significance of the findings, limitations of the study, and questions 
for the future study are discussed. 
Summary of the Study
The time course of belief change during judgment is an important aspect of the 
process of belief change that has not been systematically explored.  The time course of 
belief change during judgment provides information about the dynamic aspects of the 
cognitive system, the structural properties of the cognitive system, cognitive responses 
during judgment, and the effect of distal variables on beliefs.  This study investigates the 
time course of belief change during judgment to enhance our understanding of the 
process of belief change and of cognitive systems.  Based on theories and findings from 
previous studies, hypotheses were developed about the time course of belief changes, 
which were tested with four data sets from three previous studies (Fink et al., 2002; 
McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993). 
Studies of belief change during judgment were reviewed.  Although there are 
several theories that have implications for belief change during judgment (e.g., post-
decisional cognitive dissonance theory; the self-generated attitude change model), a 
spatial-spring model of cognitive force (Kaplowitz et al., 1983) is a model that most 
explicitly aims at describing and explaining the time course of belief change during 
judgment.  The model has two basic assumptions about cognitive structure.  First, 
concepts are located in a cognitive space and belief change is equivalent to motion of a 
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concept in a cognitive space.  Second, concepts in a cognitive system are linked with 
each other and the linkages are spring-like.  These two assumptions and the associated 
laws of motions lead to a mathematical model for the motion of a concept in cognitive 
space as a result of the impact of a message.  The model predicts possible oscillatory 
patterns of motion of a concept.  With an assumption that cognitive systems have a 
sufficiently strong damping force, the motion of a concept is predicted to show 
oscillatory and damping patterns. The model suggests that when a person receives 
persuasive messages, he or she may experience several belief changes during judgment. 
The direction of belief change is expected to alternate and the amount of belief change in 
each direction is expected to decrease over time.
In Fink et al.’s (2002) study, McGreevy’s (1996) study, and Wang’s (1993) study, 
a computer mouse technique was used to measure instantaneous belief change for each 
individual.  The computer mouse technique provided individual belief trajectories.  Due 
to the unexpected irregularities and complexity of belief trajectories, analyses in those 
studies were limited to some overall aspects of the belief trajectories such as the 
difference between the maximum and the minimum positions or the number of changes 
in direction. 
Belief trajectories obtained by the computer mouse technique show repetitions of 
a stay and a move, which is assumed to reflect the participant’s micro belief change 
during judgment.  In this dissertation, belief trajectories were divided into sets of a stay 
and a move, labeled local movements.  By analyzing local movements, micro aspects of 
belief trajectories were analyzed.  Hypotheses were developed for the following aspects 
of micro belief change during judgment: 
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 patterns of belief change during the message-receipt phase in response to 
different message structures (univalent versus mixed-valence messages); 
 patterns of belief change during the post-message phase in response to different 
message structures; 
 the number of micro belief changes during the post-message phase; 
 the relationship between cognitive responses and the number of local 
movements,
 the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs at different time points during 
judgment; 
 the effect of source credibility on beliefs at different time points during 
judgment; 
 the effect of message discrepancy and source credibility on the number of 
positive and negative local movements.  
Data from studies that used the computer mouse technique to measure belief 
change during judgment (Fink et al., 2002; Kaplowitz et al., 1983; McGreevy, 1996; 
Wang, 1993) were reanalyzed.  In McGreevy’s (1996) study (N = 102), participants were 
asked to choose one of the two candidates for college admission based on messages about 
the candidates.  The message given to participants consisted of either information about 
two high-quality candidates (the mixed-valence message) or information about one high-
quality candidate and one low-quality candidate (the univalent message).  In addition, 
participants were placed either in a noisy room or in a quiet room to create different 
levels of distraction.  Participants were asked to indicate their positions about candidates 
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both during the message-receipt phase and the post-message phase.  Participants’ position 
was recorded at least every 24 ms. 
In Wang’s (1993) study (N = 66), participants listened to messages about an 
African American candidate and a Caucasian candidate for college admission and asked 
to choose one candidate. In the message, the African American candidate was described 
either stereotypically (no-individuation condition) or in an individuated way 
(individuation condition).  Information about the Caucasian candidate was the same in 
both conditions.  In addition, participants were placed either in a noisy room or in a quiet 
room for different levels of distraction.  Participants were asked to indicate their position 
about candidates after receiving the message.  Participants’ position about candidates was 
recorded at least every 33 ms.
In Fink et al.’s (2002) study (N = 99), participants were given messages about 
two issues, a criminal-sentencing scenario and a tuition increase scenario, and asked to 
indicate their positions about these two issues.  For the criminal-sentencing issue, 
participants received a message about a judge’s sentence to a defendant who allegedly 
committed armed robbery.  The participants also received the text of the speech the judge 
supposedly delivered in sentencing the defendant.  The judge’s criminal sentence varied 
to create different levels of message discrepancy.  The judge was described as either not 
respected in the state or as one of the most respected judges in the state, which created 
different levels of source credibility. 
For the tuition-increase issue, the message was a statement that was allegedly 
written by a member of the state legislature.  The proposed amount of tuition increase in 
the message varied to create small, moderate, and extreme discrepancy messages.  The 
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legislator, the hypothetical writer of the statement about the tuition increase, was 
described either as one whose knowledge of the issues and willingness to be fair to 
students were often questioned (low source credibility) or as one who was praised by 
student groups (high source credibility).  Compared to the criminal-sentencing issue, the 
tuition-increase issue was more personally involving to participants because participants 
were college students. Participants’ position was recorded by computer at least every 77 
ms.  
These three studies produced four sets of belief trajectories.  For each belief 
trajectory, local movements were identified with a pre-specified algorithm with carefully 
chosen constraints.  
Summary and Interpretation of Results
Patterns of Belief Change during Judgment
Patterns of belief change during the message-receipt phase.  For the patterns of 
belief change during the message-receipt phase, three hypotheses were proposed.  First, 
U-shaped or inverted U-shaped patterns of belief change are expected for mixed-valence 
messages, whereas unidirectional (monotonic) patterns of local movements are expected 
for univalent messages (H1.1).  This hypothesis was tested with the McGreevy data and
was supported by the data.  In the mixed-valence message condition (the similar-
candidate condition), belief trajectories showed U-shaped patterns and the quadratic 
effect of the time was dominant (with a strong effect, partial η2 = .54), whereas in the 
univalent message condition (the different-candidate condition), the (positive) linear 
effect of the time was dominant (with a strong effect, partial η2 = .50).  These findings
suggest that the valence and the sequence of information in the message have an effect on 
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micro belief change while the recipient receives a message.  Beliefs of the recipients
changed during the message-receipt phase in accordance to the valence of information in 
the message. 
Patterns of belief change during the message-receipt phase between the univalent 
message condition and the mixed-valence message condition was also tested in terms of 
the number of positive and the number of negative local movements. It was expected that 
positivity of movements during the message-receipt phase will be greater for positively 
univalent messages than for the mixed-valence messages (H1.2).  Positivity of 
movements is a logarithmic transformation of the ratio of the number of positive 
movements to the number of negative movements (see Equation 3.1). This hypothesis 
was tested with the McGreevy data and supported.  In response to a positively univalent 
message (the different-candidate condition), positive local movements outnumbered 
negative local movements, whereas in the mixed-valence message condition (the similar-
candidate condition), the number of the positive local movements was not significantly 
different from the number of negative local movements.  The effect size of message type
on positivity of movements was somewhat small (partial η2 = .13).  This finding also 
shows that while receiving message recipients experience belief changes according to the 
valence and the amount of information in the message.
Beliefs are a function of importance or weight of information (Anderson, 1971).  
Weights of information in a message were expected to be reflected in the amount of 
belief change by local movements in a belief trajectory (H1.3).  Results showed that 
belief trajectories reflected average weights of pieces of information for each candidate.  
The first half of belief trajectories was found to reflect the average weights of pieces of 
117
information about the first candidate, and the second half of belief trajectories was found 
to reflect the average weights of pieces of information about the second candidate.
McGreevy data supported H1.3.  In addition, because the average weights of pieces of 
information about the first candidate and the second candidate in the similar-candidate 
condition was close, the absolute amount of belief change was expected not to be 
different between the first half and the second half of belief trajectories.  However, it was 
found that the absolute amount of belief change was greater in the second half than in the 
first half of belief trajectories.  
Previous studies on order effects have reported mixed results.  Some studies have 
found that early information on an issue has a stronger impact on beliefs than later 
information, which is a primacy effect; others have found that later information exerts the 
stronger impact, which is a recency effect. Others have found that order of presentation 
has no effect (Hovland et al., 1957).  Anderson and Farkas (1973) presented participants 
with a series of paragraphs about some United States Presidents and measured 
participants’ beliefs about statesmanship at four different time points.  They found that 
the most recent information had the greatest impact on beliefs, which indicates a recency 
effect.  Results from the present study also support a recency effect. 
Patterns of belief change during the post-message phase. Under some not too 
restrictive assumptions, the spatial-spring model of cognitive force predicts oscillatory 
patterns of belief change during judgment.  The oscillatory patterns of belief change 
during judgment after receiving messages (H2.1.1) were tested with four sets of belief 
trajectories (Fink et al., 2002: criminal- sentencing issue, Fink et al., 2002: tuition-
increase issue; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993). 
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For the Wang data and the tuition-increase data, oscillatory patterns were found to 
be statistically significant.  For the Wang data, the effect size was strong (R2 ranges 
between .39 to .68).   For the tuition-increase data, the effect size is somewhat small (R2
ranges between .12 to .38). However, for the McGreevy data and in the criminal-
sentencing data, oscillatory patterns of belief change were not statistically significant, 
which suggests that beliefs are not likely to oscillate for every micro belief change.  
Oscillatory patterns of belief change were found in one of the dichotomous decisions and 
one of the continuous decisions.  Thus, the oscillatory patterns of belief change suggested 
by the spatial-spring model were only partially supported. Further investigation is 
needed to explain inconsistencies among results from different data sets.
The spatial-spring model also predicts that a damping pattern will be found in the 
time course of belief change during judgment.  It was expected that the absolute amount 
of belief change in local movements will decrease over time (H2.1.2).  Results from the 
criminal-sentencing data showed that the absolute amount of belief change significantly 
decreased over time with a somewhat small effect (partial η2 = .12). However, contrary 
to the hypothesis, a statistically significant increase in the absolute amount of belief 
change by a local movement at the end of belief trajectory was found in the McGreevy 
data (with a somewhat strong effect, partial η2 = .43) and the tuition-increase data (with a 
moderate effect, partial η2 = .36).  In the Wang data, the increase was not statistically
significant. 
The lack of a damping pattern found in the McGreevy data and the Wang data 
could be explained by the decision issues.  In both the McGreevy data and the Wang data, 
the decision involved choosing one of two alternatives, which is dichotomous decision.  
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In dichotomous decisions, decision makers are forced to move to one of two ends of the 
position scale.  When they have decided, decision makers should be at one of the two 
ends of the scale, which is likely to occur at the final movement.  Therefore, the absolute 
amount of Belief Change by the final movement is more likely to be greater than for 
other previous movements.  On the other hand, there is no such constraint in a continuous 
decision.  In one continuous decision, the criminal-sentencing issue, the expected 
damping pattern was found, but in the other continuous decision, the tuition-increase 
issue, the opposite pattern was found.  The pattern found in the tuition-increase issue may 
suggest that if the decision is highly involving, individuals may have a significant change 
at the end of judgment.  The spatial-spring model predicts that the cognitive system 
generates an underdamped oscillatory trajectory when a damping force is within a certain 
range (see pp. 10-11).  The observed patterns that are different from predictions by the 
spatial-spring model could result from failure of assumptions about the damping force.  
Further investigation is needed to explain different patterns between the criminal-
sentencing data and the tuition-increase data.
Local movements and cognitive responses during the post-message phase.  
During the post-message phase, the number of positive micro belief changes, or local 
movements, was expected to be greater than the number of negative micro belief changes 
in response to positively univalent messages, whereas the number of positive micro belief 
changes was expected not to be different from the number of negative micro belief 
changes in response to mixed-valence messages (H3.1.1).  This hypothesis was tested 
with the McGreevy data and the Wang data and supported by both data sets. A greater 
number of positive local movements than the number of negative local movements was 
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found in the univalent message condition (the different-candidates condition in the 
McGreevy data; the no-individuation condition in the Wang data), whereas the numbers 
of positive and negative local movements were not different in the mixed-valence 
condition (the similar-candidate condition in the McGreevy data; the individuation 
message condition in the Wang data).  The size of effect of message type on positivity of 
movements was somewhat small in the McGreevy data (partial η2 = .13) and somewhat 
strong in the Wang data (partial η2 = .48).  This observed relationship between message 
type and the number of local movements in belief trajectories during the post-message 
phase provides another piece of evidence about the validity of the measurement process 
using the computer mouse technique and the local movement framework.
It was expected that in response to mixed-valence messages, people have more 
micro belief changes than to the univalent messages during the post-message phase 
(H3.1.2).  A decision is more difficult for the mixed-valence message than for the 
univalent message.  Therefore, more cognitive responses and micro belief changes were
expected in response to a mixed-valence message than a univalent message.  This 
hypothesis was tested with the McGreevy data and supported by the data. The total
number of local movements was not different in the message-receipt phase in both the 
univalent-message condition (the different-candidates condition) and the mixed-valence 
message condition (the similar-candidates condition).  However, in the post-message
phase, the total number of local movements was found to be greater in the mixed-valence 
message condition than in the univalent message condition (with a somewhat small effect, 
partial η2 = .16).  This finding suggests that people may generate more cognitive 
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responses and experience more micro belief changes during judgment for more difficult 
issues. 
According to the cognitive response approach, cognitive responses mediate the 
effect of messages on beliefs.  Assuming local movements reflect cognitive responses 
during judgments, it was hypothesized that the effect of message type (univalent versus 
mixed-valence messages) on the final decision is mediated by the number of positive and 
the number of negative local movements (H3.1.3).  This hypothesis was tested by the 
McGreevy data and the Wang data.  In the McGreevy data, statistical evidence was found 
for an indirect effect of the message type on the final decision through the number of 
positive and the number of negative local movements.  In the Wang data, message type 
was found to have both direct and indirect effects on the final decision.  In the indirect 
effect, the effect of the message type on the final decision was exerted through the 
number of positive and the number of negative movements.  Findings for the McGreevy 
data and the Wang data suggest that local movements in belief trajectories seem to reflect 
cognitive responses that recipients generate during judgment. 
Assuming that cognitive responses have an effect on the recipients’ belief during 
judgment and that those belief changes can be represented by local movements in belief 
trajectories, a positive relationship between the number of positive local movements and 
the number of positive thoughts, and between the number of negative local movements
and the number of negative thoughts were expected (H3.2.1).  This hypothesis was tested 
with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data.  In the criminal-
sentencing data, a positive correlation was found between the number of positive local 
movements using the computer mouse technique and the number of positive thoughts that 
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recipients reported after judgment (r = .38). However, no significant correlation was 
found between the number of negative local movements and the number of negative 
thoughts.  In the tuition-increase data, the correlation between the number of positive 
local movements and the number of positive thoughts was found to be marginally 
significant (r = .15) and the correlation between the number of negative local movements 
and the number of negative thoughts was not significant.
This lack of systematic relationships between the number of local movements and 
the number of self-reported thoughts may be attributed to three factors.  First, micro 
belief changes during judgment may not be caused by cognitive responses during 
judgment.  Second, assuming that micro belief changes during judgment are caused by 
cognitive responses during judgment, local movements in the belief trajectories may not 
validly measure micro belief change during judgment.  Third, self-reported thoughts after 
judgment may not validly measure cognitive responses during judgment because of 
inaccurate memory and influence of the final decision on recall.  The McGreevy (1996) 
data and the Wang (1993) data provide evidence for the validity of belief trajectories as a 
measure of micro belief change (see results of H1.1, H1.2, H1.3, H3.1.1, and H3.1.2).  
However, it is unclear which measure is responsible for the lack of systematic 
relationships between the number of local movements and the number of self-reported 
thoughts.  Further investigation is needed to explore the cause of the lack of systematic 
relationships between these two measures.     
Assuming local movements in belief trajectories represent micro belief change 
due to cognitive responses during judgment, some similarities between weights of 
cognitive responses on beliefs and weights of local movements on beliefs were expected 
123
(H3.2.2). This hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-
increase data.  In both the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data, the 
results showed the ratio of the effect of the number of positive local movements on 
beliefs to the effect of the number of negative movements on beliefs was not significantly 
different from the ratio of the effect of the number of positive thoughts on beliefs to the 
effect of the number of negative thoughts on beliefs.  This finding supports the idea that 
local movements in belief trajectories measures micro belief change due to cognitive 
responses during judgment.
Message Discrepancy, Source Credibility, and Dynamics of Judgment
How do message discrepancy and source credibility influence belief systems? 
This question was investigated by examining the effect of message discrepancy and 
source credibility on beliefs at different time points during judgment, and by examining 
the effect of message discrepancy and source credibility on cognitive responses.  
Hypotheses were tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data.
Message discrepancy, cognitive responses, and local movement.  Based on the 
studies on the relationship between message discrepancy and counterarguments (Brock, 
1967; Toy, 1982), it was expected that as message discrepancy increases, positivity of 
movements decreases, given that message discrepancy is positive (H4.1.1). This 
hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data. In 
the criminal-sentencing data, message discrepancy did not have a significant effect on 
positivity of movements.  The hypothesis was not supported.  However, message 
discrepancy was found to have a negative effect on the number of thoughts.  As message 
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discrepancy increased, positivity of thoughts decreased (β = .14; see Table 3.43).  This 
finding is generally consistent with Toy (1982). 
In the tuition-increase data, a nonmonotonic relationship between message 
discrepancy and positivity of movements was found when the source of the message was 
less credible (with a somewhat small effect, partial η2 = .12).  In particular, when the 
source of the message was less credible, positivity of movements was higher for the 
moderately discrepant message than the extremely discrepant message.  This result 
suggests that extremely discrepant messages induced more negative belief changes during 
judgment than moderately discrepant messages did.  Unlike the criminal-sentencing data, 
a negative effect of message discrepancy on positivity of thoughts was not found in the 
tuition-increase data.  
In summary, message discrepancy showed a negative effect on positivity of
thoughts in the criminal-sentencing data and some negative effect on positivity of 
movements in the tuition-increase data.  Even though the pattern was not consistent 
between the two data sets, the results from both studies generally suggest that extremely
discrepant messages may generate a greater number of counterarguments and induce
more negative belief changes during judgment.  The results have implications for the 
dynamic effect of message discrepancy on beliefs. Assuming generating 
counterarguments takes time and counterarguments decrease the effect of messages on 
beliefs, the amount of belief change by a discrepant message after generating 
counterarguments could be less than the amount of belief change at the beginning of 
judgment.  If so, the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs could decrease over time.
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Further investigation is needed to explain differences in patterns of positivity of 
movements by message discrepancy
Message discrepancy and initial belief change.  According to the Spinozan 
procedure model (Gilbert et al., 1990), people initially accept both true and false 
information as true. Therefore, it was expected that the greater message discrepancy, the 
greater belief change at the beginning of the judgment (H4.1.2).  This hypothesis was 
tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data.  Using the 
criminal-sentencing data, the hypothesis had mixed results.  When the source of the 
message was highly credible, initial belief change linearly increased as message 
discrepancy increased, which is generally consistent with the hypothesis (β = .38; see 
Table 3.51).  However, when the source of the message was less credible, the amount of 
belief change was greatest for a moderately discrepant message (β = .30; see Table 3.51).
Results from the tuition-increase data also showed a nonmonotonic relationship between 
message discrepancy and initial belief change for the message advocated by a less 
credible source (with a small effect size, partial η2 = .10).  
Both data sets showed that when the source of a message is less credible, the 
amount of belief change at the beginning of judgment was greater for moderately 
discrepant messages than extremely discrepant messages.  In Fink et al.’s (2002)
experiment, after participants finished reading the message, they were asked to indicate 
belief position with the computer mouse.  Belief position while reading the message was 
not measured and there was a time interval after reading the message and before 
indicating belief change.  It is possible that participants generated cognitive responses 
and experienced belief changes in response to different levels of discrepant message 
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while reading the message but those belief changes were not reported. Unexpected 
nonmonotonic effects of messages discrepancy on the initial local movement were found 
in the low source credibility condition but the format of the experiment suggests that 
initial belief change of belief trajectories may not indicate belief change at the beginning 
of judgment.  
Message discrepancy and final belief change.  Based on two mathematical models 
regarding the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs (Fink et al., 1983; Laroche, 1977), 
an inverted U-shaped nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy on final belief change 
was predicted (H4.1.3).  This hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and 
the tuition-increase data.  In the criminal-sentencing data, the effect of message 
discrepancy on final belief change was different for the high credibility message 
condition and the low credibility message condition.  For the high credibility message, 
the amount of final belief change linearly increased as message discrepancy increased (β
= .50; see Table 3.56).  However, for the low credibility message, the amount of final 
belief change was greater in the moderately discrepant message condition than in the 
extremely discrepant message condition.  The expected nonmonotonic pattern was found 
only in the low credibility condition (β = .20; see Table 3.56).
The nonmonotonic relationship between message discrepancy and belief position
for the low source credibility condition, which was found in the criminal-sentencing data, 
had also been found in previous studies (Aronson et al., 1963; Bochner & Insko, 1966).  
The nonmonotonic relationship between message discrepancy and final belief change for 
messages from a less credible source is consistent with Laroche’s model.  Lacroche’s
model predicts that when other factors are constant, as the degree of source credibility 
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increases, the relationship between message discrepancy and the amount of belief change 
changes from nonmonotonic (inverted U-shaped) to nonlinear monotonic increasing, to 
linear increasing.  For the high credibility condition, a linear pattern is more likely to be 
found.  The observed pattern in final belief change was generally consistent with the 
findings from previous studies.
For the tuition-increase data, results showed that as message discrepancy 
increased, final belief change linearly increased with a somewhat small effect (partial η2
= .16).  This monotonic increasing pattern was not expected and different from the 
pattern found in the criminal-sentencing data.  Both Laroche’s model and Fink et al.’s 
model predict that as message discrepancy increases, the weight of message discrepancy 
on beliefs exponentially decreases.  As a result, the amount of belief change 
monotonically increases until message discrepancy reaches a certain amount.  After that
amount of message discrepancy, beliefs starts to show decreasing pattern as message 
discrepancy increases.  The amount of message discrepancy for the maximum belief 
change varies depending on other factors such as source credibility.  One possible 
explanation for the lack of a nonmonotonic relationship in the tuition-increase data may 
be that the message position for the extreme message discrepancy, a 22% tuition increase, 
did not reach the amount of message discrepancy that could induce the maximum beliefs.  
Monotonic increasing pattern of beliefs by message discrepancy has been found in other 
studies (Fink et al, 1983; Kaplowitz et al., 1986; Kaplowitz et al., 1991).  Further 
investigation is needed to explain discrepancy in observed patterns between two issues.  
The dynamic effect of message discrepancy on beliefs.  Based on studies of
message discrepancy and counterarguments, it was predicted that the effect of message 
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discrepancy on beliefs was not constant but dynamic.  More specifically, the effect of 
message discrepancy on beliefs was predicted to decrease during judgment (H4.1.4). 
This hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data. 
In the criminal-sentencing data, both at the beginning of judgment and at the end of 
judgment, a nonmonotonic relationship, an inverted U-shape, between message 
discrepancy and beliefs was found for the message from a less credible source.  However, 
the nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy on beliefs was found to be somewhat 
stronger at final belief change than at initial belief change.  It indicates that the effect of 
extremely discrepant messages on beliefs may decrease over time.  
Results from the tuition-increase data showed that for a message from a less 
credible source, the linear effect of message discrepancy on beliefs became stronger over 
time, whereas the nonmonotonic effect of message discrepancy on beliefs became weaker.  
These observed patterns were opposite to predicted patterns.  On this point, no 
explanation is proposed for how an extremely discrepant message with a low source 
credibility affects beliefs when the issue is highly involving.  Further investigation is 
needed to explain the pattern found in the tuition-increase data. 
Source credibility, cognitive responses and local movements.  Based on studies on 
source credibility and cognitive responses (Cook, 1969; Hass, 1981), it was predicted that 
positivity of movements will be greater in a message from a high than a low credibility 
source when the issue is less involving but positivity of movements will not differ
between messages from a high and a low credibility source when the issue is highly 
involving (H4.2.1).  This hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the 
tuition-increase data.  The results showed an opposite pattern.  For the less involving 
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issue, the criminal-sentencing issue, positivity of movements was not different for the 
message from the high and the low credibility source.  On the other hand, for the more 
involving issue, the tuition-increase issue, positivity of movements was somewhat greater 
in a message from a highly credible source than a less credible source (marginally 
significant with a small effect, partial η2 = .03). 
In the criminal-sentencing data, the message from a highly credible source 
induced greater belief change than the message from a less credible source (H4.2.3).  
Results from the criminal-sentencing data suggest that beliefs may be determined not by 
quantity of positive and negative cognitive responses but by the relative strength of 
positive and negative cognitive responses. 
The results from the tuition increase data suggest that even though a message is 
highly involving, source credibility may have an effect on the number of micro belief 
changes during judgment.  Source credibility did not have a significant effect on the 
number of thoughts in either the more involving or less involving issue.  This result is not 
consistent with Cook (1969) or Hass (1982).  
Source credibility and initial belief change. Applying the Spinozan procedure 
model (Gilbert et al., 1990), source credibility was expected to have no effect on initial 
belief change (H4.2.2).  This hypothesis was tested with the criminal-sentencing data and 
the tuition-increase data.  In criminal-sentencing data, however, source credibility did 
have a significant effect on beliefs at the beginning of judgment (β = .27; see Table 3.50).  
Also, the results showed that source credibility increased the effect of message 
discrepancy on initial belief change.  
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Inconsistent with the hypothesis, the results show that people use information 
about the source from the beginning of the judgment period.  In Fink et al.’s (2002) study, 
belief changes at the very beginning of judgment might not be recorded because the 
imperfect measurement procedures of the experiment.  Belief change by the source 
credibility may have occurred while receiving information about the source or before the 
participants started to indicate their positions. 
For the tuition-increase data, the effect of source credibility on beliefs at the 
beginning of the judgment was not significant, which is generally consistent with H4.2.2.
Source credibility and final belief change.  Based on Petty et al. (1981), it was 
predicted that for less involving issues, the amount of final belief change will be greater 
for a message from a high than a low credibility source, whereas for highly involving 
issues there will be no difference in the amount of final belief change between messages 
from a high versus a low credibility source (H4.2.3).  Also, based on Laroche (1977) and 
Fink et al. (1983), it was predicted that as source credibility increases, the effect of 
message discrepancy on final belief change increases (H4.2.4).  These hypotheses were 
tested with the criminal-sentencing data and the tuition-increase data. For the criminal-
sentencing issue, a low involving issue, a significant effect of source credibility on final 
belief change (β = .27; see Tab3.50) and a significant interaction effect between source 
credibility and message discrepancy on final belief change (β = .20; see Tab3.50)  were 
found.  The amount of belief change at the end of judgment was greater for the message 
from a high credibility source than from a low credibility source.  The positive effect of 
message discrepancy on final belief change was greater for the message from a high 
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credibility source than a low credibility source.  These results are consistent with the
prediction and with previous studies.  
For the tuition issue, which is more involving, no effect of source credibility on 
final belief change was expected.  However, results showed that source credibility had a 
positive effect on final belief change (marginal significance with a small effect size, 
partial η2 = .04).  Inconsistent with the prediction, even though the issue was highly 
involving, people used information about the source for the judgment.  In the tuition-
increase data, the effect of message discrepancy did not differ between a message from a 
highly credible source and a message from a less credible source.  
The dynamic effect of source credibility on beliefs.  Based on the role of cognitive 
responses in message processing and belief change, the effect of source credibility on 
beliefs was expected to increase over time during judgment for less involving issues (e.g., 
criminal sentencing), but not to change for highly involving issues (e.g., tuition increase) 
(H4.2.5). 
In the criminal-sentencing data, the results showed that source credibility had 
significant positive effect on beliefs both at the beginning and the end of judgment.  The 
effect of source credibility was not different between at the beginning and the end of 
judgment.  This result suggests that source credibility may exert its effect on beliefs only 
once at the beginning of the judgment and the amount of belief change by source 
credibility at the beginning of the judgment remains during the judgment.  
On the other hand, the effect of source credibility on beliefs was found to increase 
over time in the tuition-increase data.  The difference in belief change for a message from 
a high versus a low credibility source was greater at the end of judgment than at the 
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beginning of judgment. The greater effect of source credibility was expected for a less 
involving issue but was found for a highly involving issue.  The results suggest not only 
that source credibility has an effect on beliefs for a highly involving issue but also that 
source credibility exerts a stronger effect on beliefs at the later phase of judgment.  
However, why an increase of the effect of source credibility on beliefs was found for a 
highly involving issue remains in question.  Further investigation is needed. 
Significance of the Findings, Limitations of the Study, and Directions for Future 
Research
Measurement of Belief Change during Judgment
The computer mouse technique.  Since the early age of persuasion study, 
researchers have been interested in message recipients’ beliefs change as a function of 
time (e.g., Brehm & Wicklund, 1970; Kaplowitz et al., 1983; Tesser, 1978; Walster, 
1964).  Those studies have made significant contributions on understanding the role of 
time on belief change by finding dynamic patterns of belief change during judgment.  
However, those studies had methodological limitations.  Except for Brehm and 
Wicklund’s (1970) study, people typically indicated their positions only once at an 
assigned time point and the observed positions of the group of people were compared to 
positions of another group of people who indicated their positions at a different time 
point (between-participant design with cross-sectional data ).  With this design, 
individuals’ belief change over time was not observed but only inferred from observed 
differences among groups at different time points.  
Another limitation of the early studies lies in the small number of time points for 
measurement of the message recipient’s position.  For example, in Walster (1964), beliefs 
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were measured immediately, 4 minutes, 15 minutes, and 90 minutes after the first 
decision.  Walster found a decrease of attractiveness of a chosen alternative, which was 
interpreted as regret, in the 4-minute delay condition, but she found a later increase in 
attractiveness for the chosen alternative, which was interpreted as dissonance reduction.  
However, it is not clear whether there were other belief reversals between the 4-minute 
delay and the 15 minute delay, or after 15-minute delay.  To find possible belief reversals, 
more measurements over time are needed. 
Another limitation can be found in the enforcement of a uniform time period for 
judgment to individuals.  Individuals may take different time periods for judgment and 
cognitive processing. In Walster’s study, it might be possible that some people were 
experiencing regret but some people were experiencing dissonance reduction in the 4-
minute delay condition. 
To overcome limitations of eariler studies, a new measurement system was 
developed by Fink, Kaplowitz and their colleagues, and independently by Vallacher, 
Nowak, and Kaufman.  The new technique, using a computer mouse, provided belief 
trajectories.  With those belief trajectories, details of belief change during judgment are
observed.  Theories about dynamic belief change were tested with those belief 
trajectories, which provided strong evidence for the dynamic character of human 
judgment (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Vallacher, Nowak, & 
Kaufman, 1996; Wang, 1993).  On the other hand, belief trajectories obtained by the 
computer mouse technique appeared to be irregular and also showed substantial
individual differences.  Because of lack of regularities and individual differences, only 
some overall aspects of belief trajectories were analyzed in previous studies.
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Local movement framework.  The present study proposed a measurement 
framework for belief trajectories. Each belief trajectory was decomposed into local 
movements, which were assumed to represent micro belief change during judgment.  The 
local movement framework made it possible to analyze both overall aspects and the 
micro aspects of belief trajectories.  
With the local movement framework, the validity of the computer mouse 
technique was tested.  In the McGreevy data, six time points were chosen based on local 
movements to see whether the pattern of belief change during judgment reflects the 
structure of the messages during the message-receipt phase.  The observed belief 
trajectories and local movements were found to reflect the order and the valence of 
information in the given message (see the results for H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3). Also, all 
hypotheses for the pattern of belief change during the post-message phase in response to 
different types of messages (H3.1.1 and H3.1.2) were supported by the observed pattern 
of local movements of belief trajectories.  These results provide evidence not only for 
theoretical predictions but also for the validity of the measurement process.  The reliable 
and valid portion of the belief measurement generated from the computer mouse 
technique was large enough to reveal systematic relationships between belief change and 
relevant variables. 
Belief trajectories provide not only information about the course of belief change 
during judgment but also about the cognitive responses during judgment.  Traditionally 
cognitive responses have been measured by the thought-listing technique.  Unlike the 
thought-listing technique, local movements of belief trajectories can measure the amount 
of positive and negative cognitive responses on-line, which is free from the influence of 
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the final judgment.  The present study found evidence for belief trajectories as measures 
of the amount of positive and negative cognitive responses (H3.1.1 and H3.1.2).  
However, expected systematic relationships between belief trajectories and thoughts 
reported by the participants were not found except for the relationship between the 
number of positive local movements and the number of positive thoughts (H3.1.3).  On 
the other hand, the number of local movements of belief trajectories and the number of 
thoughts showed some similarities in effects on beliefs, which provides another piece of 
evidence for belief trajectories as measures of cognitive responses (H3.2.2).  However, 
the lack of systematic relationships between belief trajectories and thoughts reported by 
the participants should be investigated in future research.  
Belief trajectories provide information about the process of belief change, which 
can be used to resolve issues of human judgment.  For example, belief trajectories may be 
used to observe the anchoring effect that was found by Tversky and Kahneman (1974).  
In typical anchoring studies (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), participants were asked 
to make a comparative judgment with an arbitrary number, and then they were asked to 
make an absolute numerical judgment.  It was found that the absolute numerical 
judgment was influenced by the given arbitrary number.  To explain the anchoring 
phenomenon, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that the anchor serves as a 
starting point for adjustment.  In a more detailed explanation, Jacowitz and Kahneman 
(1995) argued that judges adjust their estimates from the anchored value in the 
appropriate direction and this adjustment process terminates at the nearest upper or lower 
boundary of a range of acceptable values, which is generally insufficient for accurate 
estimation.  This adjustment process may be observed when belief trajectories are
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examined.  Also, belief trajectories may be used to identify the role of motivation in 
judgment.  Belief trajectories may be different when participants are highly motivated 
versus when they are not.
The reliability and validity of the measurement here were not fully known. As 
explained in the method section, there could be two kinds of error in the measurement 
process using the computer mouse technique: (1) an error of non-reporting belief change 
(i.e., no computer mouse movement when a belief has changed), and (2) an error of false 
reporting (i.e., computer mouse movement when a belief has not changed).  In the first
case, the number of belief changes will be underestimated.  It is unknown how much the 
number of belief changes was underestimated in the measurement process.  Development 
of methods to assess the reliability of the measurement using the computer mouse 
technique is needed.  Also, more effective instructions and techniques to minimize both 
kinds of error in reporting instantaneous belief change are needed. 
For the message-receipt phase of the McGreevy data, six data points over time 
were used.  However, because of the required minimum number of local movements, the 
number of cases for analysis dropped from 78 to 62.  Applying the local movement 
framework requires more cases.  New methods may be needed to analyze belief 
trajectories with a small number of local movements.
Theoretical Implications and Limitations
The present study proposed hypotheses about patterns of belief change during 
judgment, and the role of message discrepancy, source credibility, and involvement on
belief change during judgment.  Those hypotheses were tested with belief trajectories 
measured by the computer mouse technique.  The results of this dissertation have 
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significant implications for existing theories of belief change, but also have generated 
new questions for future research.  
Dynamic belief change.  Postdecisonal dissonance theory (Festinger & Walster, 
1964), the self-generated attitude change model (Tesser, 1978) and the spatial-spring 
model (Kaplowitz et al., 1983) predict dynamic belief change.  Those theories argue that 
during judgment belief change may occur without external forces.  The present study 
confirmed the idea that processes of belief change are dynamic rather than static.  During 
judgment, significant micro belief changes were observed in all four data-sets.  Micro 
belief change during judgment also showed systematic patterns depending on particular
message variables.  Specifically, the structure of the message was reflected in micro 
belief change during the message-receipt phase (H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3) and the difficulty 
of message (H3.1.1 and H3.1.2), the levels of message discrepancy (H4.1.1 for the 
tuition-increase issue), and the levels of source credibility (H4.2.1 for the tuition-increase 
issue) were reflected in micro belief change during the post-message phase. 
The spatial-spring model (Kaplowitz et al., 1983) predicts oscillatory and 
damping patterns of belief change during judgment under certain conditions.  Oscillatory 
and damping patterns were examined with micro belief change during judgment.  In two  
of four data sets, the oscillatory pattern was found.  However, in the other two data sets, 
the oscillatory pattern was not significant.  The results suggest that a local movement is 
not necessarily followed by a micro belief change whose direction is opposite to the 
previous one.  Individuals may experience two or more micro belief changes with the 
same direction before having a micro belief change that is opposite to the previous one.  
The finding also suggests that the degree of oscillation varies depending on issues.  
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However, why oscillatory patterns were found in two data sets, one with a dichotomous 
and one with a continuous decision, but not found in other two data sets, one with a 
dichotomous and one with a continuous decision, is unknown.  This finding requires 
further investigation.  
Damping patterns were found in one of the continuous decisions.  When the 
decision is dichotomous or highly involving, damping patterns were not found.  This 
result supported the spatial-spring model but also suggests specifying conditions for the 
damping patterns of belief change. 
The findings of the study suggest that the patterns of belief change are more 
complicated than a sinusoidal pattern. 
The effect of message discrepancy on beliefs.  The study proposed and tested a 
model for the temporal variation of the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs during 
judgment: The effect of message discrepancy was expected to be linear and positive at 
the beginning of judgment but the effect was expected to decrease over time.  In one data 
set (the criminal-sentencing data), evidence for the decrease of the effect of message 
discrepancy on beliefs was found even though it was relatively weak.  
This finding provides valuable information about how message variables 
influence beliefs and may resolve some conflicting issues of the effect of message 
discrepancy.  For example, some studies (Aronson et al., 1963; Bochner & Insko, 1966) 
have found a nonmonotonic relationship between message discrepancy and belief change 
whereas other have found a monotonically increasing function of message discrepancy on 
beliefs (Fink et al., 1983; Kaplowitz & Fink, 1991; Kaplowitz et al., 1986).  The 
proposed model, which argues a decrease of the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs 
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over time, suggests that the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs could be either 
nonmonotonic or monotonically increasing depending on the amount of initial belief 
change and the amount of decay of the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs.  The 
different observations in previous studies may result from the different amount of initial 
belief change, which are mainly affected by message positions, and the amount of decay 
of the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs, which are mainly affected by decision 
time and counterarguments. 
However, the effect of message discrepancy on beliefs shows different patterns
depending on issue involvement.  For a highly involving issue with low source credibility, 
message discrepancy initially had a nonmonotonic effect on beliefs but had a linear effect 
on beliefs at the end of judgment.  This increasing pattern of the discrepancy effect for 
highly involving issues was not expected.  In Fink et al.’s (2002) study, issue 
involvement was not manipulated.  Two issues, the criminal-sentencing and the tuition-
increase issue, differ on more than the level of issue involvement.  The role of issue 
involvement on dynamic belief change should be more systematically investigated in 
future studies. 
The role of source credibility on belief change. This study proposed and tested a 
dynamic model for the effect of source credibility on beliefs.  The effect of source 
credibility on beliefs was hypothesized not to be static but to increase during judgment 
for messages about less involving issues.  For a less involving issue, the effect of source 
credibility was found at the beginning of the judgment, and the difference in the amount 
of belief change between messages from a high versus a low credible sources remained at 
the end of judgment.  On the other hand, for a highly involving issue, source credibility 
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had no effect on belief at the beginning of the judgment but had a significant effect at the 
end of judgment.  
Theories of belief change proposed two different ways that source credibility 
affects beliefs.  One argument is that source information is processed independently of
other pieces of information of the message, either as a cue (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty et 
al., 1981) or as a message argument (Kruglanski & Tompson, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  The other view is that source credibility has an effect on the weight of other 
pieces of information of the message (the information integration theory; Anderson, 
1971).  If source information exerts its effect independently, the effect of source 
credibility will be static. If source credibility exerts its effect by increasing or decreasing 
the effect of other pieces of information, as the message is processed, the effect of source 
credibility should increase or decrease.  The finding in the criminal-sentencing data 
supports the former explanation.  In the tuition-increase data, an increasing effect of 
source credibility on beliefs over time was observed, but whether source credibility exerts 
its effect continually during judgment is unclear because only two time points were used.  
Beliefs should be measured at least at three time points to test whether the effect of a 
variable appears continuous.  Also, if micro belief changes had been measured in both the 
message-receipt phase and in the post-message phase, clearer evidence for the role of 
source credibility on belief change would have been adduced. 
In the study, the effect of source credibility on beliefs was found not only for a 
less involving issue but also for a highly involving issue.  This result is somewhat 
inconsistent with Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981).  Kruglanski and Thompson 
(1999) found that when source information is more lengthy and more complex than 
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message arguments, the effect of source credibility on beliefs can be greater for highly 
involving issues than for less involving issues.  Kruglanski and Thompson argued that 
when message arguments are more difficult to process than source information, the effect 
of source credibility will be greater for less issue-involvement cases, and the effect of 
message arguments will be greater for high issue-involvement cases.  However, when 
source information is more difficult to process than message arguments, the opposite 
pattern will appear. 
In the present study, even though the source information was relatively short and 
simple and placed at the beginning of the message (high accessibility), the effect of 
source credibility was found for a highly involving issue.  One explanation for this 
finding can be found in information integration theory (Anderson, 1971).  This theory 
argues that source credibility has an effect on beliefs by increasing or decreasing the 
effect of information on beliefs.  When the issue is highly involving, people tend to 
process more pieces of information and access more difficult information.  If source 
credibility has an effect on the weight of message arguments, the effect of source 
credibility on beliefs can be found regardless of how many pieces of information are 
processed.  The information integration theory predicts that the effect of source 
credibility can be found regardless of the level of involvement of the issue.  Manipulation 
of issue involvement and examination of belief trajectories for both the message-receipt 
phase and the post-message phase can provide critical information about how source 
information is processed in high and low issue involvement conditions. 
The cognitive response model of attitude change. To consider the dynamic effect 
of message discrepancy and source credibility on beliefs during judgment, the cognitive 
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response model of attitude change (Greenwald, 1968; Petty et al., 1981) was used.  The 
cognitive response model explains belief change as a result of cognitive responses that 
individuals generate during judgment.  Findings of the current study have implications 
for the cognitive response model of attitude change.  
The present study proposed that the effect of message discrepancy decreases due 
to the greater number of counterarguments in response to extremely discrepant messages.
This pattern was tested with positive and negative micro belief changes during judgment. 
Positivity in the number of micro local movement was expected to be less for an 
extremely discrepant message than for a moderately discrepant message.  This pattern 
was found only when the message was attributed to a less credible source and the issue of 
the message was more involving.  For the criminal-sentencing data, a nonmonotonic 
relationship was found between message discrepancy and final belief change for the low 
source credibility condition, but there was no significant difference in the number of 
positive micro belief changes and the number of negative belief changes.  This finding 
suggests that in some cases it is not the quantity of positive and negative cognitive 
responses but their strength that plays an important role in belief change. 
The present study proposed that the effect of source credibility increases over 
time due to the greater number of positive cognitive responses for a message from a 
highly credible source and the greater number of negative cognitive responses for a 
message from a low credible source.  It was found that when the issue of the message was 
highly involving, positivity in the number of micro belief changes was greater for the 
message from a highly credible source and the effect of source credibility increased over 
time.  However, when the issue was less involving, even though the message from a 
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highly credible source induced greater belief change than the message from a less 
credible source, the number of positive micro belief changes was not significantly 
different than the number of negative micro belief changes.  These findings suggest that 
cognitive responses have an effect on beliefs, either through the quantity or strength of 
individual cognitive responses.
This dissertation investigated the time course of belief change during judgment 
and attempted to deepen our understanding the process of belief change by analyzing 
micro belief change in belief trajectories.  Interesting patterns about belief change during 
judgment were found and new questions about the role of distal variables on belief 
change during judgment were found.  More importantly, the study opened the door for 
systematic investigation about the time course of belief change that is believed to contain 
critical information about belief systems and human communication process.    
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Footnotes
1 According to Halliday and Resnick (1974), “the velocity of a particle is the rate 
at which its Belief Changes with time” (p. 26), and “the magnitude of the instantaneous
velocity is called the speed and is simply the absolute value of the instantaneous velocity”
( p. 27).
2 Individuals can experience belief change without being aware of the causes of 
that change (Bargh, 1994).  In this case, cognitive responses can follow belief change to 
provide an explanation for it (e.g., misattribution behavior; Zillmann, 1978).
3 Participants were also asked to indicate which candidate they thought was more 
suitable to college in a different question after completing the computer mouse 
measurement. However, participants’ responses to the question were not found in the data 
set that the present analysis used.  
4 The criterion of one second for the short interval is chosen by two reasons.  First, 
the number of cases with less than a one second interval is significantly greater than other 
intervals (the number of cases with the interval greater than one but less than two seconds
is three; the number of cases with the interval greater than two but less than three seconds
is one; the number of cases with the interval greater than three but less than four seconds
is two; the number of cases with the interval greater than four but less than five seconds
is four).  Secondly, the length of intervals of the cases with less than one second is 
equally distributed in general.
5 A computer program was written in the C computer language to extract key 
points from each trajectory.  This program allows the use of different values for the 
maximum position difference and the minimum stay length.  Appendix A provides the 
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flow chart of the algorithm of the computer program.  In the flow chart, P_start is the 
starting point of a stay; P_end is the end point of a stay; StayLength is a time length; 
MAX_DIFF is the prescribed maximum position difference; MIN_STAY is the 
prescribed minimum time length for a stay (also see Appendix B for the code of the 
computer program)
6 There are several studies that have multiple successive measurements (Brehm, & 
Wicklund, 1970; Fink et al., 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Vallacher et al., 1994; Wang, 1993).  
However, the validity of this kind of measurement has not been systematically 
investigated.  One possible threat is the effect of previous measurements on later 
measurements.  Research has shown that the desire for consistency is one motivator of 
our judgment and behavior (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1953).  
Baumeister (1982) and Tedeschi and Rosenfeld (1981) found that the desire to appear 
consistent influences our behavior.  If the consistency motivation affects the 
measurement process, participants may not report belief change or report less subsequent 
belief change after reporting their initial beliefs. This problem causes non-reporting error.  
Non-reporting error basically works against our hypotheses.
Instructions of the computer mouse technique may give participants a cue that 
participants should indicate belief reversals as good participants (demand characteristics; 
Orne, 1962; Orne & Whitehouse, 2000).  However, in studies using the computer mouse 
technique (Fink et al., 2002; McGreevy, 1996; Wang, 1993) participants were placed in 
different experimental conditions that were unknown to them.  Therefore, any systematic 
differences in belief trajectories between experimental conditions are hardly attributable 
to demand characteristics.
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7 Participants were also asked to indicate their final decision in a different 
question after completing the computer mouse measurement. However, participants’ 
responses to the question were not found in the data set that the present analysis used.
8 The average number of micro movements per macro movement is another 
indicator of oscillatory pattern.  The greater the average number of micro movement per 
macro movement, the lesser oscillation in belief trajectories.  The average number of 
micro movements per macro movement is 2.10 in the McGreevy data (SD = 1.11, N = 
72), 1.27 in the Wang data (SD = .60, N = 66), 1.56 in the criminal-sentencing data (SD = 
.89, N = 79), and 1.82 in the tuition-increase data (SD = .75, N = 90).  These results 
suggest that once individuals have one or two attitudinally consistent thoughts (one or 
two positive thoughts or one or two negative thoughts), they are more likely to have 
thoughts that are attitudinally inconsistent with previous thoughts.
147
Table 1.1
Position Movement for the First Half of the Message-Receipt Phase of the Trajectory in 













1st Move 50.00 10.35 49.00 -1.00 13.89
2nd Move 49.00 3.41 46.30 -2.70 1.66
3rd Move 46.30 4.61 43.70 -2.60 1.36
4th Move 43.70 9.20 39.30 -4.40 2.42
5th Move 39.30 12.12 37.20 -2.10 1.89
6th Move 37.20 8.67 33.80 -3.40 1.30
7th Move 33.80 19.15 30.70 -3.10 1.54
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Table 1.2
Position Movement for the Second Half of the Message-Receipt Phase of the Trajectory 













1st Move 30.70 13.56 49.00 18.30 2.04
2nd Move 49.00 6.41 51.80 2.80 1.36
3rd Move 51.80 6.12 58.80 7.00 1.62
4th Move 58.80 1.01 60.70 1.90 0.60
5th Move 60.70 1.08 65.20 4.50 1.14
6th Move 65.20 3.62 67.50 2.30 0.93
7th Move 67.50 3.29 N/A N/A N/A
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Table 1.3




















Sample size 99 91 31 36 50-51 47-51
Percentage changing 
direction at least once




1.33 0.91 1.66 5.04 0.89 1.60
25th
percentile
0 0 1 3 0 1
Median 1 1 2 5.5 1 2
75th
percentile






Maximumd 7 11 14 14 12 18
 a This table is part of Table 2.1 of Fink, Kaplowitz, and Hubbard (2002, p. 23). 
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b For McGreevy, the results reported in the table are only form the post-message phase. 
c Let log(x + c) be the transformation used to create a functional form whose skew was approximately zero, where x is the variables of 
interest and c is a constant.  Adjusted geometric mean = (antilog of the mean of transformed variable) – c. If c were zero, the adjusted 
geometric mean would equal the geometric mean.   
d For this variable, the minimum was zero in all experiment.
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Table 2.1
R-square and Adjusted R-square Statistics for the Number of Movements by Candidate 
Similarity and Distraction, with Different Parameters of the Minimum Stay Length and 
























Regression Analysis for Initial Belief Change by Individual Message Discrepancy and 
Source Credibility, with Different Values of the Maximum Belief Change, Criminal-




N R2 Adj. R2
C D C x D D2 C x D2
.3 year 89 .13 .08 2.17 .16** .17 -.005 -.008
1 year 86 .16 .11 3.17* .15 ** .13 -.01^ -.01
2 year 85 .17 .12 3.33 .13* .14 -.01* -.01
2.3 year 83 .22 .17 4.27** .16** .21^ -.01^ -.005
2.5 year 81 .23 .18 4.3* .17** .24* -.009^ -.004
2.7 year 81 .23 .18 4.41** .18** .23^ -.01^ -.005
3 year 79 .22 .17 4.74** .17** .21^ -.008 -.003
3.5 year 78 .24 .18 4.85** .18** .22^ -.007 -.003
4 year 76 .23 .17 4.28* .17** .25* -.006 -.002
5 year .69 .24 .18 3.95* .17** .26* -.005 -.001
Note. In the regression analysis, initial belief change was regressed on linear and 
quadratic individual message discrepancy, D and D2, source credibility, C, the interaction 
between the linear individual message discrepancy and source credibility, C x D, and the 
interaction between the quadratic individual message discrepancy and source credibility, 
C x D2. 
^p < .10. *p≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 2.3
Statistics in the ANOVA for Initial Belief Change by Source Credibility and Message 
Discrepancy, with Different Values of the Maximum Belief Change, Tuition-Increase 




N R2 Adj. R2
C D C x D
.3 % 93 .09 .03 2.35 2.45^ .16
1% 92 .04 -.02 .32 1.45 .11
2% 91 .08 .02 .12 1.21 2.24
2.3% 91 .10 .04 .38 1.65 2.75^
2.5% 91 .10 .05 .68 1.67 2.97^
2.7% 91 .11 .06 .83 1.60 3.37*
3% 90 .14 .08 1.46 1.78 4.40*
4% 90 .13 .08 2.77 1.24 4.01*
5% 83 .10 .04 3.00 2.24 .81
Note. In the ANOVA, initial belief change was explained by source credibility, C, 
message discrepancy, D, and the interaction between source credibility and message 
discrepancy, C x D. 
^p < .10. *p≤ .05.
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Table 3.1
Data Sets for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Data Set
H1.1
Sequence of information and sequence of 




Message type and the ratio of the number of 
positive local movements to the number of 




Weights of information in the message and 
belief trajectories
McGreevy (1996)
H2.1.1 The oscillatory pattern for local movements
McGreevy (1996)
Wang (1993)
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H2.1.2 The damping pattern for local movements
McGreevy (1996)
Wang (1993)
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H2.2





Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H3.1.1









Mediating role of the number of local 





Cognitive responses and the number of local 
movements
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H3.2.2
Effects of cognitive responses and local 
movements on beliefs
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.1.1 Message discrepancy and local movements
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.1.2.
Message discrepancy and initial belief 
change
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.1.3
Message discrepancy and final belief 
change
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.1.4
Change of effect of message discrepancy on 
beliefs
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
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H4.2.1
Source credibility and the ratio of local 
movements
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
and Fink et al. (2002): 
Tuition
H4.2.2 Source credibility and initial belief change
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.2.3 Source credibility and final belief change
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
and  Fink et al. (2002): 
Tuition
H4.2.4
The moderating role of source credibility on 
the effect of message discrepancy on final 
beliefs
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
H4.2.5
Change of effect of source credibility on 
beliefs
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
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Table 3.2
Belief Change from the Initial Position by Ordinal Time of Local Movements, Candidate 








Distraction -9.72 18.63 15
Similar
No Distraction -11.57 18.48 14
Distraction -6.03 8.1 19
The first local 
movement
Different
No Distraction -0.81 14.4 14
Distraction -27.11 13.63 15
Similar
No Distraction -22.15 18.65 14




No Distraction -2.5 24.4 14
Distraction -17.62 25.92 15
Similar
No Distraction -20.85 16.75 14




No Distraction 1.7 19.01 14
Distraction 5.96 19.84 15
Similar
No Distraction -0.54 20.86 14




No Distraction 14.86 26.78 14
Distraction 7.09 25.86 15Final movement
Similar
No Distraction 11.06 24.71 14
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Distraction 28.42 12.34 19
Different
No Distraction 19.35 35.46 14
Note. N = 62. Only cases that have at least 5 movements were used.  
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Table 3.3
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for Belief Change from the Initial Position by 
Ordinal Time of Local Movements, Candidate Similarity, and Distraction in the 







Candidate Similarity (S) 1 23.21** .29 1.00
Distraction (D) 1 .05 <  .01 .06
S x D 1 < .01 < .01 .05
Between-group error 58 (791.34)
Within participants
Time(T) (Linear) 1 58.96** .50 1.00
T (Quadratic) 1 31.25** .35 1.00
T (Cubic) 1 26.85** .32 1.00
T (Quartic) 1 3.39^ .06 .44
Error 58 (568.32)
T(Linear) x S 1 .57 .01 .12
T (Quadratic) x S 1 4.40* .07 .54
T (Cubic) x S 1 .54 .01 .11
T (Quartic) x S 1 .01 < .01 .05
Error 58 (241.77)
T(Linear) x D 1 1.50 .03 .23
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T (Quadratic) x D 1 .01 < .01 .05
T (Cubic) x D 1 4.87* .08 .58
T (Quartic) x D 1 .03 < .01 .05
Error 58 (213.32)
T(Linear) x S x D 1 1.53 .03 .23
T (Quadratic) x S x D 1 .53 .01 .11
T (Cubic) x S x D 1 .05 < .01 .06
T (Quartic) x S x D 1 .25 < .01 .08
Error 58 (239.43)
Note. N = 62. Time factor consists of five variables: Position after the first movement, 1st
quartile-point position, mid-point position, 3rd quartile-point position and final position.  
The parenthesized values represent mean square error. . Observed power was computed 
using alpha = .05.  
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.4
Effects of Ordinal Time of Local Movements for the Similar-Candidate and the Different 







Linear 1 19.97** .42 .99
Quadratic 1 32.95** .54 1.00
Cubic 1 13.62** .33 .95
Quartic 1 1.78 .06 .25
Error (Linear) 28 (647.59)
Error (Quadratic) 28 (204.53)
Error (Cubic) 28 (267.67)
Error (Quartic) 28 (196.97)
Different candidate
Linear 1 45.83** .59 1.00
Quadratic 1 6.40* .17 .69
Cubic 1 14.07** .31 .95
Quartic 1 2.00 .06 .28
Error (Linear) 32 (520.20)
Error (Quadratic) 32 (263.25)
Error (Cubic) 32 (184.99)
Error (Quartic) 32 (263.78)
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Note. N = 62. The time factor consists of five variables: Position after the first movement, 
1st quartile-point position, mid-point position, 3rd quartile-point position and final 
position.  The parenthesized values represent mean square error. .  Observed power was 
computed using alpha = .05.  
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.5








Distraction -.07 .71 20
Similar
No Distraction .03 .55 21
Distraction .44 .55 21
Different
No Distraction .45 .69 16
Note. N = 78. Positivity of movements is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is 
the number of positive movements and q is the number of negative movements.
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Table 3.6
Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Movements by Candidate Similarity and Distraction 
in the Message-Receipt Phase, McGreevy Data
Source df F Partial η2 Observed 
Power
 Similarity (S) 1 10.71** .13 .90
Distraction (D) 1 .14 < .01 .07




Note. N = 78. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square error. Observed 




Importance Level for Hobbies and Personality Characteristics of Those Individuals 
Thought to be Successful in College (McGreevy, 1996, Pilot Data 1C)
Hobby/Personality Characteristic Mean SD
Candidate 1 in the similar-candidate condition
Intelligent (Impressive academic record and SAT) [2] 8.75 1.07
Debate Team [4] 7.57 1.43
Student government [6] 7.71 1.38
Captain of a sports team [8] 7.05 1.32
Hardworking [10] 9.05 0.92
Determined [10] 8.48 1.33
Volunteers [12] [15] 7.24 1.14
Disciplined [16] 8.38 1.24
Average Mean 8.03
Candidate 2 in the similar-candidate condition
Intelligent [2] 8.75 1.07
Captain of a sports team [4] 7.05 1.32
Debate Team [4] 7.57 1.43
Student government [6] 7.71 1.38
Volunteers [10][11] 7.24 1.14
Confident [14] 8.19 1.03
Motivated [14] 8.86 0.85
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Responsible [14] 8.90 1.22
Disciplined [16] 8.38 1.24
            Average Mean 8.07
Candidate 1 in the different-candidate condition
Average GPA and SAT [2]
Skis [4] 5.19 1.08
Snow boards [4] 4.90 1.18
Skateboards [5] 4.90 1.34
Tennis [7] 5.48 0.98
Mountain bikes [7] 5.71 0.90
Shy [8] 4.33 1.24
Is artistic [8] 5.57 1.08
Plays electric guitar [9] 5.33 0.97
Plays acoustic guitars [9] 5.48 0.98
Rock band  [10] 4.14 1.35
Three part-time jobs [12] 4.57 1.69
Average Mean 5.05
N = 21. The data were from Table 3 and Table 4 in McGreevy (1996).
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Table 3.8
Belief Change by Time Period of Local Movements, Candidate Similarity, and 








Distraction -17.60 23.17 19
No Distraction -19.13 15.77 16Similar
Total -18.30 19.86 35
Distraction -3.44 21.01 20
No Distraction 4.88 22.07 15Different
Total .12 21.55 35
Distraction -10.34 22.94 39
No Distraction -7.51 22.37 31
Belief change by 
the first half of 
local movements
Total
Total -9.09 22.57 70
Distraction 26.95 19.95 19
No Distraction 29.23 25.46 16Similar
Total 27.99 22.31 35
Distraction 33.32 23.49 20
No Distraction 13.52 41.52 15Different
Total 24.83 33.42 35
Distraction 30.21 21.79 39
No Distraction 21.63 34.53 31
Belief change by 
the second half of 
local movements
Total
Total 26.41 28.25 70
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Table 3.9
MANOVA for Belief Change by Time Period, Candidate Similarity, and Distraction in 






Belief change by the first half of local movements
Candidate similarity, C 1 14.50** .18 .96
Distraction, D 1 .46 .01 .10
C x D 1 1.70 .03 .25
Between-group error 66 (433.26)
Belief change by the second half of local movements
Candidate similarity, C 1 .48 .01 .11
Distraction, D 1 1.70 .03 .25
C x D 1 .97 .01 .16




Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Micro Movement on the 








54 -.18 .15 -.17 .03 (.01) 
 3rd micro movement
2nd micro 
movement
43 -.27 .23 -.18 .03 (.01) 
 4th micro movement
3rd micro 
movement




32 -.03 .23 .03 .001 (-.03) 
 6th micro movement
5th micro 
movement
27 -.96** .19 -.72 .51 (.49) 
 7th micro movement
6th micro 
movement




Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Micro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Micro Movement, Wang Data
Independent 
Variable




















Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Micro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Micro Movement, Criminal-Sentencing Data 
(Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Independent 
Variable








33 .22 .17 .22 .05(.02)
^p < .10. **p < .01.
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Table 3.13 
Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Micro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Micro Movement, Tuition-Increase Data (Fink, 
Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Independent 
Variable








29 -.37^ .19 -.35 .12 (.09)
^p < .10. **p < .01.
173
Table 3.14 
Absolute Amount of Belief Change from the Previous Movement, by the Last Two 









Distraction 19.02 17.06 16
No Distraction 15.70 26.76 18Similar
Total 17.26 22.45 34
Distraction 8.42 12.18 12
No Distraction 10.79 10.96 8Different
Total 9.37 11.47 20
Distraction 14.48 15.84 28
No Distraction 14.19 22.93 26
Belief change by 
the movement
before the final 
movement
Total
Total 14.34 19.38 54
Distraction 41.80 21.31 16
No Distraction 37.58 32.92 18Similar
Total 39.57 27.74 34
Distraction 27.42 29.65 12
No Distraction 26.09 21.12 8Different
Total 26.89 25.96 20
Distraction 35.64 25.75 28




No Distraction 34.05 29.86 26
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Total 34.87 27.55 54
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Table 3.15 
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Absolute Amount of Belief Change from 
the Previous Belief, by the Last Two Movements, Candidate Similarity, and Distraction in 







Candidate Similarity (S) 1 3.32^ .06 .43
Distraction (D) 1 .16 .00 .07
S x D 1 .14 .00 .07
Between-group error 50 (834.22)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 37.12** .43 1.00
M x S 1 .51 .01 .11
M x D 1 .08 .00 .06
M x S x D 1 .04 .00 .05
Error (M) 50 (306.61)
Note. N = 54. Movement consists of the movement before the final movement and the 
final movement.  The parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power 
was computed using alpha = .05.  
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.16
Absolute Amount of Belief Change from the Previous Belief, by the Last Two Movements, 
Individuation, and Distraction, Wang Data




Distraction 29.81 30.88 16
No Distraction 19.58 18.83 13Individuation
Total 25.22 26.26 29
Distraction 28.71 29.83 9
No Distraction 26.56 25.41 6
No 
individuation
Total 27.85 27.21 15
Distraction 29.41 29.89 25
No Distraction 21.78 20.66 19
Belief change by 
the movement
before the final 
movement
Total
Total 26.12 26.30 44
Distraction 38.50 35.48 16
No Distraction 29.80 36.85 13Individuation
Total 34.60 35.71 29
Distraction 11.94 17.10 9
No Distraction 37.89 37.30 6
No 
individuation
Total 22.32 28.93 15
Distraction 28.94 32.45 25
No Distraction 32.35 36.15 19 




Total 30.41 33.73 44
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Table 3.17
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Absolute Amount of Belief Change from 








Individuation (I) 1 .415 .010 .096
Distraction (D) 1 .101 .003 .061
I x D 1 1.887 .045 .268
Between-group error 40 (1160.13)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 .60 .01 .12
M x I 1 1.52 .04 .22
M x D 1 .87 .02 .15
M x I x D 1 1.25 .03 .19
Error (M) 40 (674.29)
Note. N = 44. Movement consists of the movement before the final movement and the 
final movement. The parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power 
was computed using alpha = .05.  
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.18
Absolute Amount of Belief Change from the Previous Belief, by the Last Two Movements,
Source Credibility, and Individual Message Discrepancy, Criminal-Sentencing Data 











Small 4.17 3.06 6
Moderate 3.10 .54 6
Extreme 3.54 3.51 8
Low
Total 3.60 2.69 20
Small 3.84 2.77 8
Moderate 5.05 4.18 11
Extreme 5.19 6.12 9
High
Total 4.75 4.46 28
Small 3.98 2.78 14
Moderate 4.36 3.46 17
Extreme 4.41 4.98 17
Belief change by 
the movement 
before the final 
movement
Total
Total 4.27 3.83 48
Small 2.25 1.06 6
Moderate 1.92 .99 6
Extreme 1.88 1.09 8
Low
Total 2.00 1.01 20
Belief change by 
the final 
movement
High Small 3.51 2.30 8
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Moderate 2.92 3.55 11
Extreme 2.79 2.21 9
Total 3.05 2.76 28
Small 2.97 1.93 14
Moderate 2.57 2.91 17
Extreme 2.36 1.78 17
Total
Total 2.61 2.25 48
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Table 3.19
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Absolute Amount of Belief Change from 
the Previous Belief, by the Last Two Movements, Source Credibility, and Individual 







Source credibility (C) 1 112.43 .73 .36
Discrepancy (linear, D) 1 2.68 .06 .05
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .00 < .01 .05
C x D 1 .01 < .01 .08
C x D2 1 .25 .01 .07
Between-group error 42 (9.90)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 5.46* .12 .63
M x C                  1 .00 < .01 .05
M  x D                  1 .37 .01 .09
M x D2 1 .03 < .01 .05
M  x C x D                  1 .46 .01 .10
M  x C x D2 1 .22 .01 .07
Error (M) 42 (11.14)
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Note. N = 48. Movement consists of the movement before the final movement and the 
final movement. The parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power 
was computed using alpha = .05.  
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.20
Absolute Amount of Belief Change from the Previous Belief, by the Last Two Movements, 












9 % 3.77 1.53 13
15 % 6.11 3.45 8
30 % 7.80 4.14 11
Low
Total 5.74 3.50 32
9 % 6.36 2.58 8
15 % 6.64 3.83 13
30 % 6.99 2.43 12
High
Total 6.70 3.01 33
9 % 4.76 2.32 21
15 % 6.43 3.61 21
30 % 7.38 3.30 23
Belief change by 
the movement 
before the final 
movement
Total
Total 6.23 3.27 65
9 % 6.39 2.22 13
15 % 6.52 2.50 8
30 % 8.94 2.87 11




Total 7.30 2.73 32
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9 % 8.08 2.24 8
15 % 9.11 2.54 13
30 % 8.68 3.11 12
High
Total 8.71 2.64 33
9 % 7.03 2.33 21
15 % 8.13 2.78 21
30 % 8.80 2.93 23
Total
Total 8.01 2.76 65
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Table 3.21
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Absolute Amount of Belief Change from 
the Previous Belief by the Last Two Movements, Source Credibility, and Individual 







Source credibility (C) 1 2.50 .04 .34
Discrepancy (linear, D) 1 6.82* .10 .73
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .00 .00 .05
C x D 1 2.75 .04 .37
C x D2 1 .28 .00 .08
Between-group error 59 (13.85)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 33.22** .36 1.00
M x C                  1 .96 .02 .16
M x D                  1 1.40 .02 .21
M x D2 1 .11 < .01 .06
M  x C x D                  1 1.02 .02 .17
M  x C x D2 1 3.19^ .05 .42
Error (M) 59 (2.65)
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Note. N = 65. Movement consists of the movement before the final movement and the 
final movement. The parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power 
was computed using alpha = .05.
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.22
Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Macro Movement on the 
















Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Macro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Macro Movement, Wang Data
Independent 
Variable
















Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Macro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Macro Movement, Criminal-Sentencing Data 
(Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Independent 
Variable








Regression Analysis for the Amount of Belief Change by a Macro Movement on the 
Amount of Belief Change by the Previous Macro Movement, Tuition-Increase Data (Fink, 
Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Independent 
Variable




18 -.16 .18 -.22 .05 (-.01)
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Table 3.26








Distraction -.18 .75 20
Similar
No Distraction .07 .62 21
Distraction .49 .59 21
Different
No Distraction .09 .77 16
Note. N = 78. 
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Table 3.27
Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Movements, by Candidate Similarity and 
Distraction in the Post-Message Phase, McGreevy Data
Source df F Partial η2 Observed 
Power
 Similarity (S) 1 4.88* .13 .59
Distraction (D) 1 .26 < .01 .08




Note. N = 78. Parenthesized value represents mean square error. Observed power was 










Distraction -.30 .38 20
Individuation
No Distraction -.25 .44 17
Distraction .45 .60 15
Stereotype
No Distraction .65 .29 14
Note. N = 66.
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Table 3.29
Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Movements by Individuation and Distraction, Wang 
Data
df F Partial η2 Observed 
Power
Individuation (I) 1 56.97** .48 1.00
Distraction (D) 1 1.38 .02 .21
I x D 1 .49 .01 .11
Within-group error 62 (.19)
Note. N = 66. Parenthesized value represents mean square error.  Observed power was 













Distraction 2.70 .50 20
Similar
No Distraction 2.49 .57 21




No Distraction 2.74 .41 16
Distraction 2.28 .44 20
Similar
No Distraction 2.46 .41 21




No Distraction 2.03 .40 16
Note. N = 78. 
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Table 3.31
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Total Number of Micro Local 







Candidate Similarity (S) 1 2.17 .03 .31
Distraction (D) 1 < .01 < .01 .05
S x D 1 .09 < .01 .06
Between-group error 74 (.23)
Within participants
Phase (P) 1 50.71** .41 1.00
P x S 1 12.49** .14 .94
P x D 1 1.43 .02 .22
P x S x D 1 3.38 .04 .44




Final Decision by Candidate Similarity, McGreevy Data
Preferred Candidate
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Neutral
Similar 16 23 2
Candidate 
Similarity
Different 7 29 1
Total 23 52 3
Note. N = 78.  χ2(2) = 4.36, ns.  Without neutral cases, N = 75, χ2(1) = 4.01, 
p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3.33
Logistic Regression Analysis for Final Decision by Candidate Similarity, the Number of 
Positive Movements and the Number of Negative Movements in the Post-Message Phase, 
McGreevy Data
Variable B SE B Exp (Β)
Step 1
      Constant .70 .76 .50
      Candidate similarity 1.06* .53 2.88
Step 2
      Constant -.17 1.23 .84
      Candidate similarity .72 .64 2.06
The number of positive     
movements
1.16** .45 3.19
The number of negative 
movements
-1.18** .36 .31
Note. N = 78. –2 Log likelihood = 88.27, Cox-Snell R2 = 0.05, and Nagelkerke R2 = .08 
for Step 1; –2 Log likelihood = 74.00, Cox-Snell R2 = .22, and Nagelkerke R2 =  .31 for 
Step 2.
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01.  
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Table 3.34
Final Decision by Individuation, Wang Data
Preferred Candidate
Black White Neutral
Individuation 33 4 0
Individuation 
Stereotype 2 26 1
Total 35 30 1 
N = 66.  χ2 (1) = 44.27, p < .01.
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Table 3.35
Logistic Regression Analysis for Final Decision by Individuation, the Number of Positive 
Movements, and the Number of Negative Movements, Wang Data
Variable B SE B Exp (Β)
Step 1
Constant -.10 .44 .91
Individuation 2.33 ** .45 10.31
Step 2
Constant -.13 1.40 .88
Individuation 1.73** .54 5.64
The number of positive 
movements
3.30* 1.47 27.09
The number of negative 
movements
-3.42* 1.55 .03
Note. N = 66. –2 Log likelihood = 39.76, Cox-Snell R2 = 0.54, and Nagelkerke R2 = .72 
for Step 1; –2 Log likelihood = 31.56, Cox-Snell R2 = 0.59, and Nagelkerke R2 = .79 for 
Step 2. 
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.36
Regression Analysis for Final Belief Change by the Number of Positive Movements and 
the Number of Negative Movements, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & 
Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Predicted by numbers of movements
The number of positive 
movements
8.24** 1.53 .53 
The number of negative 
movements
-1.71 1.46 -.12
Predicted by numbers of thoughts
The number of positive 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing
2.23^ 1.71 .14
The number of negative 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing
-1.90 1.75 -.12
Note. N = 93.  The first model’s R2 = 0.25 (Adjusted R2 = 0.23); the second model’s R2 = 
0.05 (Adjusted R2 = 0.03).  Independent variables were transformed to the same power 
(see Appendix C). 
^p < .10, one-tailed. **p < .01, one-tailed. 
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Table 3.37
Covariance among Variables  in the Structural Equation Model to Test H3.2.2, Criminal-





























Note. N =93. All variables except final belief change were transformed to the same 
power (see Appendix C). 
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Table 3.38
Structural Equation Modeling Analysis for Final Belief Change by the Number of 
Positive Movements and the Number of Negative Movements, Constrained Model, 






The number of positive 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing
2.87* 1.48 .18
The number of negative 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing
-.60* 0.31 -.04
Note. N = 93. The endogenous variable is final belief change. χ2 = .58, df = 1, ns. Root 
mean square error of approximation < .01; normed fit index = .96; comparative fit index 
= 1.00.    
*p ≤ .05, one-tailed.  
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Table 3.39 
Regression Analysis for Final Belief Change by the Number of Positive Movements and 
the Number of Negative Movements, Tuition-Increase Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 
2002)
Variable B SE B β
Predicted by numbers of movements
The number of positive 
movements
6.47** .67 .72
The number of negative 
movements
-1.13^ .73 -.12
Predicted by numbers of thoughts
The number of positive 
thoughts about tuition increase
2.00* .92 .24
The number of negative 
thoughts about tuition increase
-.70 .73 -.11
Note. N = 97.  The first model’s R2 = 0.50 (Adjusted R2 = 0.49); the second model’s R2 = 
0.10 (Adjusted R2 = 0.08). Independent variables were transformed to the same power 
(see Appendix C).  
^p < .10, one-tailed. *p ≤ .05, one-tailed. **p < .01, one-tailed. 
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Table 3.40
Covariances among Variables in the Structural Equation Model to Test H3.2.2, Tuition-





























Note. N = 97. All variables except final belief change were transformed by taking its 
square root.  
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Table 3.41
Structural Equation Modeling Analysis for Final Belief Change by the Number of 
Positive Movements and the Number of Negative Movements, Constrained Model, 






The number of positive 
thoughts about tuition 
increase
2.24** .72 .27
The number of negative 
thoughts about tuition 
increase
-.39** .13 -.05
Note. N = 97. The endogenous variable is final belief change. χ2 = .18, df = 1, ns. Root 
mean square error of approximation < .01; normed fit index = .99; comparative fit index 
= 1.00.    
*p < .01, one-tailed.  
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Table 3.42
Regression Analysis for Positivity of Movements on Individual Message Discrepancy and 
Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Constant .36 .05




C x D .01 .01 .12
Note. N = 93. The model’s R2 = .01 (Adjusted R2 = -.03). Positivity of movements is 
computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is the number of positive movements and q
is the number of negative movements. All exogenous variables are mean corrected. The 
interaction term was created as the product of mean-corrected exogenous variables.
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Table 3.43
Regression Analysis for Positivity of Thoughts on Individual Message Discrepancy and 
Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Constant .29 .08




C x D -.0004 .01 -.03
Note. N = 93.  The model’s R2 = .07 (Adjusted R2 = .04). Positivity of thoughts is 
computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is the number of positive thoughts and q is 
the number of negative thoughts. All exogenous variables are mean corrected. The 




Positivity of Movements by Source Credibility and Message Discrepancy, Tuition-









9 % .88 .40 18
15 % .47 .51 15
30 % .81 .50 16
Low
Total .73 .49 49
9 % .69 .44 15
15 % .98 .38 17
30 % .96 .47 16
High
Total .88 .44 48
9 % .79 .42 33
15 % .74 .51 32
30 % .88 .49 32
Total
Total .81 .47 97
Note. N = 97. Positivity of movements is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is 




Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Movements by Source Credibility and Message 






Source credibility (C) 1 2.82^ .03 .38
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 .76 .01 .14
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 1.21 .01 .19
C x D 1 2.27 .02 .32
C x D2 1 7.26** .07 .76
Between-group error 91 (.20)
Note. N = 97. Positivity of movements is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is 
the number of positive movements and q is the number of negative movements. The 
model’s R2 = 0.13 (Adjusted R2 = 0.09). The parenthesized value represents mean square 
error. . Observed power was computed using alpha = .05. 
^p < .10. **p < .01.
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Table 3.46 
Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Movements for Low and High Source Credibility, 






Low source credibility 
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 .19 < .01 .07
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 6.42* .12 .70
Between-group error 46 (.22)
High source credibility
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 2.98^ .06 .39
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 1.44 .03 .22
Between-group error 45 (.18)
Note. N = 49 for the first model and N = 48 for the second model. Positivity of 
movements is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is the number of positive 
movements and q is the number of negative movements. The first model’s R2 = 0.13
(Adjusted R2 = 0.09). The second model’s R2 = 0.09 (Adjusted R2 = 0.05). The 
parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power was computed using 
alpha = .05. 
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05.
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Table 3.47 
Positivity of Thoughts by Source Credibility and Message Discrepancy, Tuition-Increase 









9 % -.27 .80 18
15 % -.25 1.01 15
30 % -.36 .62 16
Low
Total -.29 .80 49
9 % -.40 .78 15
15 % -.42 .93 17
30 % -.58 .84 16
High
Total -.47 .84 48
9 % -.33 .78 33
15 % -.34 .95 32
30 % -.47 .73 32
Total
Total -.38 .82 97
Note. N = 97. Positivity of thoughts is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is the 
number of positive thoughts and q is the number of negative thoughts.
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Table 3.48 
Analysis of Variance for Positivity of Thoughts by Source Credibility and Message 






Source credibility (C) 1 1.07 .01 .18
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 .45 < .01 .10
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .13 < .01 .07
C x D 1 .05 < .01 .06
C x D2 1 <  .01 < .01 .05
Between-group error 91 (.70)
Note. N = 97. Positivity of thoughts is computed as )1log()1log( +−+ qp , where p is the 
number of positive thoughts and q is the number of negative thoughts. The model’s R2 = 
0.02 (Adjusted R2 = -0.04).  The parenthesized value represents the mean square error. 
Observed power was computed using alpha = .05.  
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Table 3.49
Correlation Matrix of Exogenous Variables in H4.1.2, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, 














C x D -.01 -.12 1.00
D2 -.16 .24* -.12 1.00
C x D2 .04 -.12 -.23* -.08 1.00





Regression Analysis for Initial Belief Change by Individual Message Discrepancy and 
Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Constant 7.19** .83
Source Credibility (C) 4.41* 1.66 .27
Message Discrepancy (Linear, 
D)
.18** .06 .32




C x D2 .00 .01 -.05
Note. N = 81. The model’s R2 = .23 (Adjusted R2 = .18).  All exogenous variables are 
mean corrected. 
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.51
Regression Analysis for Initial Belief Change by Individual Message Discrepancy for 
Low and High Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & 
Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Low source credibility
Constant 5.03 .53
Message Discrepancy (Linear, D) .07^ .04 .30
Message Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) -.01* .003 -.35
High source credibility
Constant 9.44 1.58
Message Discrepancy (Linear, D) .29* .12 .38
Message Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) -.01 .01 -.18
Note. n = 41 for the low source credibility condition; n = 40 for the high source 
credibility condition. The first model’s R2 = .14 (Adjusted R2 = .10) and the second 
model’s R2 = .16 (Adjusted R2 = .11). 
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3.52
Initial Belief Change by Source Credibility and Message Discrepancy, Tuition-Increase 









9 % 3.54 .91 18
15 % 6.64 4.13 12
30 % 5.29 3.61 15
Low
Total 4.95 3.22 45
9 % 5.00 2.03 14
15 % 4.35 1.57 16
30 % 4.21 1.82 15
High
Total 4.50 1.80 45
9 % 4.18 1.65 32
15 % 5.33 3.11 28
30 % 4.75 2.86 30
Total
Total 4.73 2.60 90
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Table 3.53
Analysis of Variance for Initial Belief Change by Source Credibility and Message 






Source credibility (C) 1 1.46 .02 .22
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 .58 .01 .12
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 2.94^ .03 .40
C x D 1 4.00 .05 .51
C x D2 1 4.68* .05 .57
Between-group error 84 (6.20)
Note. N = 90. The model’s R2 = 0.14 (Adjusted R2 = 0.08). The parenthesized value  
represents the mean square error. Observed power was computed using alpha = .05.
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3.54 
Analysis of Variance for Initial Belief Change and Message Discrepancy for Low and 






Low source credibility 
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 2.75^ .06 .37
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 4.73* .10 .57
Between-group error 42 (9.14)
High source credibility
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 1.38 .03 .21
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .21 < .01 .07
Between-group error 42 (3.26)
Note. N = 45 for the first model and N = 45 for the second model.  The first model’s R2 = 
0.16 (Adjusted R2 = 0.12). The second model’s R2 = 0.04 (Adjusted R2 = 0.01). The 
parenthesized values represent the mean square error. Observed power was computed 
using alpha = .05. 
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05.
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Table 3.55 
Regression Analysis for Final Belief Change by Individual Message Discrepancy and 
Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Variable B SE B β
Constant 7.95** .76
Source Credibility (C) 4.31** 1.52 .28
Message Discrepancy (Linear, 
D)
.20** .05 .37




C x D2 .01 .01 .08
Note. N = 81.  The model’s R2 = 0.30 (Adjusted R2 = 0.26). The quadratic term is mean
corrected after squaring mean-corrected individual message discrepancy. 
^p < .10. **p < .01.
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Table 3.56 
Regression Analysis for Final Belief Change by Individual Message Discrepancy for Low 
and High Source Credibility, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 
2002)
Variable B SE B β
Low source credibility
Constant 5.84** .66














Note. N = 81.  The fist model’s R2 = 0.20 (Adjusted R2 = 0.15) and the second model’s 
R2 = 0.24 (Adjusted R2 = 0.20). The quadratic term is mean corrected after squaring 




Final Belief Change by Source Credibility and Message Discrepancy, Tuition-Increase 









9 % 5.59 2.32 18
15 % 6.39 3.25 12
30 % 7.77 3.24 15
Low
Total 6.53 2.99 45
9 % 6.64 2.75 14
15 % 8.38 2.89 16
30 % 8.02 3.25 15
High
Total 7.72 3.00 45
9 % 6.05 2.53 32
15 % 7.53 3.16 28
30 % 7.90 3.19 30
Total
Total 7.13 3.04 90
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Table 3.58
Analysis of Variance for Final Belief Change by Source Credibility and Message 






Source credibility (C) 1 3.10^ .04 .41
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 5.65* .06 .65
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .31 .00 .09
C x D 1 .28 .00 .08
C x D2 1 1.00 .01 .17
Between-group error 84 (8.64)
Note. N = 90. The model’s R2 = 0.12 (Adjusted R2 = 0.06). The parenthesized value 
represents the mean square error. Observed power was computed using alpha = .05.
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3.59
Initial and Final Belief Change by Source Credibility and Individual Message 










Small 3.97 3.02 15
Moderate 5.40 4.80 11
Extreme 5.20 2.91 15
Low
Total 4.80 3.51 41
Small 4.28 5.02 13
Moderate 10.56 7.41 15
Extreme 14.04 15.51 12
High
Total 9.56 10.55 40
Small 4.11 3.99 28
Moderate 8.38 6.84 26




Total 7.15 8.13 81
Small 4.92 4.88 15
Moderate 6.82 5.69 11
Extreme 4.95 3.03 15
Low
Total 5.44 4.51 41




Moderate 9.09 6.86 15
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Extreme 16.58 12.38 12
Total 10.10 9.66 40
Small 5.09 5.46 28
Moderate 8.13 6.37 26
Extreme 10.12 10.22 27
Total
Total 7.74 7.82 81
Note. For individual message discrepancy, the grouped individual message discrepancy
was used. 
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 Table 3.60 
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Amount of Belief Change by Movement, 
Source Credibility, and Individual Message Discrepancy, Criminal-Sentencing Data 







Source credibility (C) 1 12.87** .15 .94
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 5.96** .07 .67
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 3.63* .05 .47
C x D 1 .03^ .00 .05
C x D2 1 8.52 .10 .82
Between-group error 75 (87.82)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 .05 < .01 .06
M x C                  1 .01 < .01 .05
M x D                  1 .33 < .01 .09
M x D2 1 .75 .01 .14
M  x C x D                  1 .09 < .01 .06
M x C x D2 1 3.29^ .04 .43
Error (M) 75 (11.86)
Note. N = 81. Movement consists of the first movement and the final movement. The 
parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power was computed using 
alpha = .05.  
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.61 
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Amount of Belief Change by Movement, 








Source credibility (C) 1 .23 <.01 .08
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 3.81 .04 .49
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 1.69 .02 .25
C x D 1 2.07 .02 .30
C x D2 1 .29 <.01 .08
Between-group error 84 (10.35)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 51.99** .38 1.00
M x C           1 7.45* .08 .77
M x D 1 2.89^ .03 .39
M x D2 1 .77 .01 .14
M x C x D                  1 1.30 .02 .20
M x C x D2 1 7.71* .08 .78
Error (M) 84 (4.49)
Note. N = 90. Movement consists of the first movement and the final movement. The 
parenthesized values represent mean square error. The parenthesized values represent 
mean square error. Observed power was computed using alpha = .05.  
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.62 
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance for the Amount of Belief Change by Movement
and Message Discrepancy for Low and High Source Credibility, Tuition-Increase Data 








Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 5.00* .11 .59
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 1.28 .03 .20
Between-group error 42 (12.65)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 9.05** .18 .84
M x D 1 .15 < .01 .07
M x D2 1 5.63* .12 .64
Error (M) 42 (4.92)
High source credibility
Between participants
Discrepancy (Linear, D) 1 .16 < .01 .07
Discrepancy (Quadratic, D2) 1 .41 .01 .10
Between-group error 42 (8.05)
Within participants
Movement (M) 1 55.33** .57 1.00
M x D 1 4.21* .09 .52
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M x D2 1 2.17 .05 .30
Error (M) 42 (4.06)
Note. N = 90. Movement consists of the first movement and the final movement. The 
parenthesized values represent mean square error. Observed power was computed using 
alpha = .05. 
^p < .10. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01.
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Table 3.63
Summary of Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Data Set Results
H1.1
For a sequential mixed-valence messages, a U-
shaped or inverted U-shaped pattern of local 
movements (or a series of such patterns) occurs; for 
a univalent message, a unidirectional (monotonic) 
pattern of local movement occurs.
McGreevy (1996) Supported.
H1.2.
During the message-receipt phase, the ratio of the 
number of positive local movements to the number 
of negative local movements in belief trajectories is
greater for positively univalent messages than for 
mixed-valence messages.
McGreevy (1996) Supported.
H1.3 Belief trajectories in the message-receipt phase will McGreevy (1996) Supported.
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reflect the weights of the pieces of information in 
the message.
McGreevy (1996) Not supported.
Wang (1993) Supported.
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Not supported.
H2.1.1
During judgment, a local movement is more likely 
to be followed by a local movement whose 
direction is opposite to the direction of the 
preceding one.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition Supported.
McGreevy (1996) Not supported.
Wang (1993) Not supported
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Supported.H2.1.2
During judgment, the absolute amount of belief 
change by a local movement is smaller than the 
absolute amount of belief change of the proceeding 
local movement.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (opposite 
pattern found).
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McGreevy (1996) Not supported.
Wang (1993)
Partially supported (supported 
in two cases out of three).
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Supported.
H2.2
During judgment, the amount of belief change of a 
macro local movement will be smaller than the 
amount of belief change of the proceeding macro of 
local movement.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition Not supported.
McGreevy (1996) Supported.
H3.1.1
During the post-message phase, the ratio of the 
number of positive local movements to the number 
of negative local movements is greater for 
positively univalent messages than for mixed-
valence messages. Wang (1993) Supported.
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H3.1.2
During the post-message phase, the number of local 
movements is greater for mixed-valence messages




The effect of message type (univalent versus mixed-
valence) on the final decision is mediated by the 
number of positive and the number of negative local 
movements.
Wang (1993) Partially supported.
H3.2.1
There will be a positive relationship between the 
number of positive local movements and the 
number of positive thoughts, and between the 
number of negative local movements and the 
number of negative thoughts.
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Partially supported (only for 
positive thoughts and positive 
movements).
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number of negative thoughts. Fink et al. (2002): Tuition Not supported.
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Supported.
H3.2.2
The ratio of the effect of the number of positive 
thoughts on beliefs to the effect of the number of 
negative thoughts on beliefs will be the same as the 
ratio of the effect of the number of positive local 
movements on beliefs to the effect of the number of 
negative local movements on beliefs.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition Supported.
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Not supported.
H4.1.1
Assuming the message discrepancy is positive, as 
message discrepancy increases, the ratio of the 
number of positive local movements to the number 
of negative local movements will decrease.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Partially supported (The 
pattern was found in the low 
source credibility condition).
234
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Partially supported (linear 
increase pattern in the high 
source credibility condition; 




The greater the message discrepancy, the greater the 
belief change of the first micro local movement.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (no significant 
effect of message discrepancy 
in the high source credibility
condition; nonmonotonic 
pattern in the low source 
credibility condition).
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Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Partially supported (the pattern 
was found in the low source 
credibility condition).H4.1.3
As message discrepancy increases, the amount of 
final belief change will increase up to a certain 
point and then decrease.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (linear increase 
pattern was found).
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Partially supported (Expected 
pattern found in the low 
credibility condition).H4.1.4
Assuming message discrepancy is positive, the 
effect of message discrepancy on beliefs decreases 
over time during judgment in the direction 
advocated by the message. Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (opposite 
pattern found).
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Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Not supported.
H4.2.1
Assuming that message discrepancy is positive, for 
less involving issues, the ratio of positive local 
movements to the number of negative local 
movements will be greater in a message from a high 
than a low credibility source.  However, for highly 
involving issues, the ratio of positive local 
movements to the number of negative local 
movements will not differ between messages from a 
high and a low credibility source.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (marginally 
significant effect of source 
credibility on positivity of 
movements).
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Fink et al. (2002): Criminal
Not supported (significant 
effect of source credibility on 
the amount of initial belief 
change; interaction effect with 
message discrepancy on initial 
belief change).
H4.2.2
Controlling for message discrepancy, the amount of 
belief change by the first local movement from a 
message with a high credibility source will not 
differ from the same message from a low credibility 
source.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition




For less involving issues, the amount of final belief 
change will be greater for a message from a high 
than a low credibility source.  However, for highly 
involving issues, there will be no difference in the 
amount of final belief change between messages 
from a high and a low credibility source.
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Supported.
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Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (opposite 
pattern was found: significant 
effect of source credibility on 
final belief change).
Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Supported.
H4.2.4
As source credibility increases, the effect of 
message discrepancy on final beliefs increases. Fink et al. (2002): Tuition Not supported. 
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Fink et al. (2002): Criminal Not supported.
H4.2.5
For less involving issues, the effect of source 
credibility on beliefs increases over time during 
judgment. However, for highly involving issues, no 
significant change in the effect of source credibility 
is expected.
Fink et al. (2002): Tuition
Not supported (linear effect 
increased). 
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Note. This belief trajectory was found in the high source credibility and moderate 
message discrepancy condition.   
Figure 2. A belief trajectory during judgment obtained by a computer mouse technique 


















Note. Belief trajectory of Participant No. 65 (1 to 139.08 s.) in McGreevy (1996). 




















Note. Y-axis is attitude toward the target person (unit = pixel of the screen). X-axis is 
time (unit = 100 milliseconds).
Figure 4. Distance from target by time for subject judging positive target (Experiment 
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Figure 7. A belief trajectory and key points in the criminal-sentencing data (Fink, 


















Note. N = 62. Only cases that have at least 5 movements were used. Values are 
averages for each condition at each time point.
Figure 8. Belief change from the initial position in 5 ordinal time points by candidate 
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Figure 9. Initial belief change by source credibility and individual message discrepancy 

























Figure 10. Initial belief change by source credibility and message discrepancy in the 


























Figure 11. Final belief change by source credibility and message discrepancy in the 

























Figure 12. Final belief change by source credibility and message discrepancy in the 

















































{max (P[k+j],P[i]) – min 
(P[k+j],P[i])} < 
MAX_DIFF
Set  P[k+j] as a new 
potential P_start
i = i + 1
j = j + 1











int MIN_STAY = 25;
float MAX_DIFF = 1;
const int MCGREEVY = 0;
const int MCGREEVY_READ = 4;
const int MCGREEVY_THINK = 5;
const int STAN = 1;
const int WANG = 2;
const int NEW_WANG = 3;
// How to print boolean tags
bool TIME_PRINT = false;
bool PRINT_START_ONLY = false;
bool PRINT_PEAK_BOT_ONLY = false;
int FILE_TYPE = WANG;
bool firstPrinted = false;
bool isReading = true;
int phaseSep = -1;
void printUsage()
{
cerr << "sec [-h] [-t] [-1] [-2] [-s #] [-d #] [-f <str>] 
<filename>" << endl;
cerr << "    [-h]       : help" << endl;
cerr << "    [-t]       : print time (instead of position value)" 
<< endl;
cerr << "    [-1]       : print only starting values" << endl;
cerr << "    [-2]       : print only peak/bottom starting values" 
<< endl;
cerr << "    [-s #]     : set minimum staylength [25]" << endl;
cerr << "    [-d #]     : set maximum difference [1]" << endl;
cerr << "    [-f <str>] : file format" << endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"m\"  --> McGreevy" << endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"mr\" --> Reading phase of McGreevy" 
<< endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"mt\" --> Thinking phase of 
McGreevy" << endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"s\"  --> Stan" << endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"w\"  --> Wang (DEFAULT)" << endl;
cerr << "             <str>=\"wn\" --> Wang : new format" << 
endl;
cerr << endl;
cerr << "---------------------------------------------" << endl;
cerr << "When you use \"mr\" as format, the last printed value is 
"<< endl;
cerr << "the finishing value of the reading phase. It is 
printed"<< endl;




const int MAX_OUTPUT = 1024;
int nOut = 0;
float posOut[ MAX_OUTPUT ];
int tmOut[ MAX_OUTPUT ];
void store_output( float pos, int tm )
{
posOut[ nOut ] = pos;






if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << posOut[0] << " ";
else
cout << tmOut[0] << " ";
N = nOut;
if ( FILE_TYPE == MCGREEVY_READ )
N = nOut-1;
for ( i=1; i<N; i++ )
{
if ( PRINT_START_ONLY && (i%2==0) ) continue;
if ( PRINT_PEAK_BOT_ONLY )
{
if ( i==1 ) continue;
if ( i != N-2 )
{
if ( ((posOut[i]-posOut[i-2])*(posOut[i+2]-




if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << posOut[i] << " ";
else
cout << tmOut[i] << " ";
}
if ( FILE_TYPE == MCGREEVY_READ )
{
if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << posOut[nOut-1] << " ";
else





main (int argc, char* argv[])
{
int i, j, tag;
float ftag;
int T_start = -1;
float P_start = -1;
int StayLength = 0;
float minP, maxP, oldMinP, oldMaxP;
FILE* fp; 
char line[1024];
int t; // Time - incremented by one each 
line
float P[50000];
bool StartPrinted = false;
char tm[32];
for ( i=1; i<argc; i++ )
{
if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-s" ) == 0 )
sscanf( argv[++i], "%d", &MIN_STAY );
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-d" ) == 0 )
sscanf( argv[++i], "%f", &MAX_DIFF );
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-t" ) == 0 )
TIME_PRINT = true;
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-1" ) == 0 )
PRINT_START_ONLY = true;





else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-f" ) == 0 )
{
i++;
if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "m" ) == 0 )
FILE_TYPE = MCGREEVY;
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "mr" ) == 0 )
FILE_TYPE = MCGREEVY_READ;
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "mt" ) == 0 )
FILE_TYPE = MCGREEVY_THINK;
else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "s" ) == 0 )
FILE_TYPE = STAN;





else if ( strcasecmp( argv[i], "-h" ) == 0 )
printUsage();
}
// argv[++i] should be a filename to be opened
fp = fopen( argv[i-1], "r" );
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// cout << "stay length = " << MIN_STAY << endl;
// cout << "diff = " << MAX_DIFF<< endl;
// cout << "filename = " << argv[i] << endl;
// cout << "filetype = " << FILE_TYPE << endl;
cout << argv[i-1] << " ";
// Read data line by line
t = 0; // Initialize time
while ( fgets( line, 1024, fp ) )
{
if ( strlen( line ) <= 1 ) break;





sscanf( &line[11], "%f%d", &P[t], &tag );
break;
case STAN :
sscanf( line, "%f", &P[t] );
break;
case WANG :
sscanf( line, "%f", &P[t] );
break;
case NEW_WANG :
sscanf( &line[9], "%f%d", &P[t], &ftag );
tag = (int) ftag;
break;
}
if ( tag == 1 ) 
{
if ( phaseSep < 0 )
phaseSep = t;















// Output the first position




if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << P[t] << " ";
else
cout << t << " ";
*/
store_output( P[t], t );
firstPrinted = true;
}
// cout << P[t] << endl;
// Should decide INITIAL variables, P_start, StayLength, 
minP, maxP
// Executed only once









if ( (minP <= P[t]) && (P[t] <= maxP) )
{
StayLength++;
if (StayLength >= MIN_STAY)
{




if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << P_start << " ";
else
cout << T_start << " ";
*/









// Update [min, max] with P[i];
// cout << "UPDATE\n";
if ( P[t] < minP ) minP = P[t];
else if ( P[t] > maxP ) maxP = P[t];
else cerr << "STARNGE " << endl;
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if ( (maxP-minP) <= MAX_DIFF )
{
StayLength++;
if ( StayLength >= MIN_STAY )
{




if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << P_start << " ";
else
cout << T_start << " ";
*/







else    // max-min > MAX_DIFF
{
// cout << t << " " << T_start << "   1\n";
if ( ((t-1) - T_start) >= MIN_STAY )
{
// cout << t << " " << T_start << "   2\n";
if ( StartPrinted )
{
// cout << "E-" << P[t-1] << "at(" 
<< t-1 << ")" << "\n";
// Ending data
/*
if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << P[t-1] << " ";
else
cout << t-1 << " ";
*/
store_output( P[t-1], t-1 );
StartPrinted = false; // I 
printed END pt, so I need to initialize vars
T_start = t;
P_start = P[t];






// P_start is NOT a starting pt
// Check the next points if it is ok as a 
starting pt
minP = P[t]; maxP = P[t];
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// Trying to find P_start back from 
current time
for ( j = t-1; j>=T_start; j-- ) // 
decreasing by -1 
{
oldMinP = minP; oldMaxP = maxP;
// Calculate [min, max] for [j .. 
i];
if ( P[j] < minP ) minP = P[j];
else if ( P[j] > maxP ) maxP = 
P[j];
if ( maxP-minP > MAX_DIFF )
{


















if ( !TIME_PRINT )
cout << P[t-1] << " ";
else
cout << t-1 << " ";
*/
if ( FILE_TYPE != MCGREEVY_READ )
store_output( P[t-1], t-1 );
else
store_output( P[phaseSep-1], phaseSep-1 );
}
if ( FILE_TYPE == MCGREEVY_READ )




















The number of movements in the 
message-receipt phase
( )5log +x .46 (.27)
-.44 (0.27)
The number of movements 
in the post-message phase
( )5log +x 1.13** (.27)
.53 (0.27)
The number of positive 
movements in the message-
receipt phase
x .80** (.27) -.49 (0.27)
The number of negative 
movements in the message-
receipt phase
x .73** (.27) -.50 (0.27)
The number of positive 
movements in the post-message 
phase
x 1.27** (.27) -.02 (0.27)
The number of negative 
movements in the post-message 
phase
x 1.35 ** (.27) .35 (0.27)
Number of micro movement per 
macro movement in the post-
message phase
( )5log +x 1.90** (.28) .59* (.28)















The number of positive 
movements 
( )1log +x 1.42** (.29) .08 (.29)
The number of negative 
movements 
( )1log +x 1.58** (.29) -.02 (.29)
Note. x in the transformation equation is the untransformed target variable. 
**p < .01. 
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Table C.3.
Skewness Before and After Data Transformations, Criminal-Sentencing Data (Fink, 









The number of positive 
movements 
( )1log +x
1.30** (.25) .09 (.25)
The number of negative 
movements 
( )1log +x
1.99** (.25) 1.14** (.25)
The number of positive thoughts 
about severe sentencing 
( )1log +x
.49 (.25) -.35 (.24)
The number of negative thoughts 
about severe sentencing
( )1log +x
.94** (.25) .14 (.24)
Note. x in the transformation equation is the untransformed target variable.  
**p < .01. 
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Table C.4.
Skewness Before and After Data Transformations, Tuition-Increase Data (Fink, 








The number of positive 
movements 
( )1log +x
.21 (.24) -.81** (.24)
The number of negative 
movements 
( )1log +x
4.10** (.24) 2.38** (.24)
The number of positive 
thoughts about tuition 
increase 
( )1log +x
.93** (.24) .27 (.24)
The number of negative 
thoughts about tuition 
increase
( )1log +x
.76** (.24) -.19 (.24)




Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of the Transformed Variables
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Table D.1
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range of Transformed Variables, McGreevy Data
Range
Variable M SD 
Min Max
   N
The number of movements in 
the message-receipt phase
2.69 .45 1.79 3.58 78
The number of movements 
in the post-message phase
2.31 .40 1.79 3.30 78
Belief Change after the first 
movement in the message-
receipt phase
-6.99 15.22 -49.50 32.00 62
Belief Change at 1st quartile-
point in the message-receipt 
phase 
-15.33 20.34 -49.33 34.67 62
Belief Change at the mid-point 
in the message-receipt phase
-8.78 22.97 -48.67 50.00 62
Belief Change 3rd quartile-point 
in the message-receipt phase
12.58 22.23 -49.00 49.00 62
Belief Change at the final point 
in the message-receipt phase
17.29 25.89 -50.00 50.00 62
The number of positive 
movements in the message-
receipt phase
2.22 1.05 0.00 4.47 78
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The number of negative 
movements in the message-
receipt phase
1.92 .92 0.00 3.87 78
The number of positive 
movements in the post-message 
phase
1.37 .79 0.00 3.32 78
The number of negative 
movements in the post-message
phase
1.20 1.07 0.00 3.46 78
Positivity of movements in the 
message-receipt phase
.20 .66 -1.95 2.08 78
Positivity of movements in the 
post-message phase
.12 .71 -1.61 1.39 78
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Table D.2
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range of Transformed Variables, Wang Data
Range
Variable M SD 
Min Max
  N
Positivity of movements to the 
number of negative movements 
.08 .60
-1.10 1.79 66
The number of positive 
movements
.93 .56 0.00 2.20 66
The number of negative 
movements
.85 .61 0.00 2.30 66
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Table D.3
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range of Transformed Variables, Criminal-Sentencing 
Data (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Range
Variable M SD 
Min Max
  N
Individual message discrepancy 23.24 14.3 .00 48.0 93
The number of positive 
movements
.82 .50 .00 1.95 93
The number of negative 
movements
.37 .52 .00 1.79 93
The number of positive 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing 
.84 .50 .00 1.61 93
The number of negative 
thoughts about severe 
sentencing
.55 .48 .00 1.61 93
Initial belief change -3.30 40.80 7.15 8.1 81
Final belief change -12.70 38.6 7.74 7.8 81
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Table D.4
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range of Transformed Variables, Tuition-Increase Data
(Fink, Kaplowitz, & Hubbard, 2002)
Range
Variable M SD 
Min Max
  N
The number of positive 
movements
.96 .38 .00 1.61 97
The number of negative 
movements
.16 .35 .00 1.79 97
The number of positive 
thoughts about tuition increase 
.42 .42 .00 1.39 97
The number of negative 
thoughts about tuition increase
.80 .53 .00 1.79 97
Initial belief change 2.87 15.79 4.73 2.60 90
Final belief change 1.21 15.17 7.13 3.04 90
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APPENDIX E
Instructions for Participants and Decision Scenarios in McGreevy (1996)
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Directions:
The admissions office at the University of Maryland is considering adding a 
student member to its admissions committee and would like to get some input from 
students currently attending this campus.  It is believed that current students will have the 
knowledge an insight necessary to make a decision about what makes a successful 
student here at UMCP.  Since current students are functioning in the environment in 
which new students will soon enter, it is thought that current students can provide the 
committee with invaluable information.
Below is information about two out of state candidates for admission into UMCP.  
We will refer to these candidates ad Candidate 1 and Candidate 2.  An admissions 
decision must be made on the basis of each candidate’s relative grade point averages and 
SAT scores as well as on the information provided in each candidate’s application.  
Below is summary data about each candidate put together by the admissions office. 
Please take some time and decide which candidate you would be willing to accept 
into college.  You must choose one of the candidates.  Your decision process will be 
recorded on the computer.  After you have decided which candidate is more suitable to 
college, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire.  Please record your choice in the 
space provided and answer the remaining questions in the questionnaire.  Information 
from the questionnaires will be summarized and forwarded to the Admissions office at 
the University of Maryland.
All responses will be anonymous and kept confidential.
We appreciate your time and participation. 
276
Similar Candidates Condition
Candidate 1 is a high school senior from New England.  He has an impressive academic 
record and SAT scores.  In addition to his academic achievements, he enjoys many 
activities.  He is captain of the schools’ debate team, and has won several debate and 
public speaking competitions.  Candidate 1 is also active in school politics.  He is 
currently President of the student government association (SGA).  His junior year he 
served as Vice President of SBA and his freshman and sophomore he sat on his class 
council.  Candidate 1 is co-captain of his high school’s varsity soccer team.  Candidate 
1 claims that debate and student government have helped him develop his leadership and 
analytical reasoning skills.  He credits sports with teaching him the value of hard work 
and determination.  Outside of school, Candidate 1 is active in the community.  Each 
year he volunteers for his state’s Special Olympics program.  Through the special 
Olympics, he serves as an assistant soccer coach for a team of mentally retarded children.  
Candidate 1 is also active in his church’s youth group. This group serves the community 
by getting involved in projects such as feeding the homeless, visiting nursing homes, and 
cleaning up the environment. Candidate 1 considers himself a well rounded individual 
who manages his time will.  He is extremely excited about starting college and meeting 
the challenges that await him.
Candidate 2 is also a high school senior from New England.  He, too, has an impressive 
academic record and SAT scores.  In addition to excelling in his studies, Candidate 2 is 
involved in many activities both within and outside of school.  In school, he is captain of 
his high school lacrosse team and member of the debate team.  He has served on student 
government boards all four years of high school.  This year his classmates voted him 
Vice President of SGA (student government association) for the second year in a row.  
His freshman year he served on the class council, and his sophomore year he was his 
class treasurer.  Candidate 2 enjoys combining sports, debate and student government.  
He claims that these three activities have helped him with his critical thinking, arguing, 
and leadership skills.  Outside of school, Candidate 2 volunteers for his community’s 
Big Brother/Big Sister program.  In addition to serving as a mentor to a child in the 
community, Candidate 2 also volunteers as a peer tutor at the local middle school.  
Candidate 2 enjoys students of all ages and is looking forward to returning to his 
summer job as a camp counselor.  This will be his third year working for the camp (his 
freshman year he was a counselor in training).  Candidate 2 describes himself as 
confident, motivated, and responsible.  He is eager to start college and meet the 
challenges that lay ahead.
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Different Candidates Condition
Candidate 1 is a high school senior from New England.  He has an average grade point 
average and average SAT scores.  In addition to his academic achievements, he enjoys 
many activities.  While he hasn’t participated in sports clubs at school, he is an avid skier 
and has recently become proficient at snow boarding.  He also enjoys skateboarding.  He 
has been a skateboarder since the age of 10 and has won some local skateboarding 
competitions.  In the summer he likes to play tennis and mountain bike.  Candidate 1
describes himself as a shy individual who likes to express himself through art and poetry.  
In keeping with his artistic nature, he is a proficient musician and plays the drums and 
both the electric and acoustic guitars.  Recently he took his love for poetry and music and 
started a rock band with a few close friends.  They entered their high school talent show 
and won third place.  When not at school or enjoying his extracurricular activities, 
Candidate 1 can be found at his part time job.  He works as a busboy in a local 
restaurant.   This is his third, and favorite, job he has had since entering high school.  
Candidate 1 considers himself well rounded and a good candidate for college.  
Candidate 2 is also a high school senior from New England.  He, too, has an impressive 
academic record and SAT scores.  In addition to excelling in his studies, Candidate 2 is 
involved in many activities both within and outside of school.  In school, he is captain of 
his high school lacrosse team and member of the debate team.  He has served on student 
government boards all four years of high school.  This year his classmates voted him 
Vice President of SGA (student government association) for the second year in a row.  
His freshman year he served on the class council, and his sophomore year he was his 
class treasurer.  Candidate 2 enjoys combining sports, debate and student government.  
He claims that these three activities have helped him with his critical thinking, arguing, 
and leadership skills.  Outside of school, Candidate 2 volunteers for his community’s 
Big Brother/Big Sister program.  In addition to serving as a mentor to a child in the 
community, Candidate 2 also volunteers as a peer tutor at the local middle school.  
Candidate 2 enjoys students of all ages and is looking forward to returning to his 
summer job as a camp counselor.  This will be his third year working for the camp (his 
freshman year he was a counselor in training).  Candidate 2 describes himself as 
confident, motivated, and responsible.  He is eager to start college and meet the 
challenges that lay ahead.
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APPENDIX F
Instructions for Participants and Decision Scenarios in Wang (1993)
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Hi, we are doing a study concerning opinions about the college admission process.  
Your responses will be anonymous and confidential.  Before we start the study, we would 
also like you to be familiar with the use of a computer mouse to indicate your thinking 
process and be familiar with the scales we will use to answer the questions in the last part 
of the study.  After that, you will be hearing a message from the headphone.  Please listen 
to the message carefully (In distraction condition, subjects were told “Please listen to the 
message carefully and try to decipher the subliminal message in the static.”) After the 
message is finished, please answer the questions on the following page. 
[Message for Individuated Condition]
John Roberts is a Caucasian.  He is currently a high school senior living in 
Washington, D. C. His GPA is 2.96 on a scale of 4.  His SAT score is 1020.  Just like 
most  high school students, he hangs out with his own group of friends.  He is easy-going 
and has fun.  His classmates voted him as one of the most interesting people in the class.  
Most of his teachers regard him as caring and generous.  He also likes to participate in 
extracurricular activities, such as playing baseball and performing in a school paly.  He 
has many different hobbies and interests.  One of them is going to the beach.  When he 
has time, he likes to be involved with community services.  
Eric Washington is a senior high school student living in Washington D. C.   He 
is an African American.  He is also the photographer for the school yearbook.  He has 
many hobbies.  He likes music and photography.  He can also play some musical 
instruments.  He does not see himself as very athletic and does not play much sports 
except lacrosse. He and his friends enjoy going to museums and going to concerts during 
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the weekends.  He is also involved with volunteer work when he has time.  He has served 
in some of the soup kitchens in the area and feels it was a very positive and rewarding 
experience.  He also has worked part time as a sales person in a local department store 
during the summer break.  He believes this experience has helped his interpersonal skills 
greatly.  He is friendly and has a good sense of humor.  He likes to make friends of 
different cultural backgrounds.  He also enjoys different kinds of ethnic food.  He is well 
liked by his friends and teacher.  
[Message for No Individuated Condition]
John Roberts is a Caucasian.  He is currently a high school senior living in 
Washington, D. C. His GPA is 2.96 on a scale of 4.  His SAT score is 1020.  Just like 
most  high school students, he hangs out with his own group of friends.  He is easy-going 
and has fun.  His classmates voted him as one of the most interesting people in the class.  
Most of his teachers regard him as caring and generous.  He also likes to participate in 
extracurricular activities, such as playing baseball and performing in a school paly.  He 
has many different hobbies and interests.  One of them is going to the beach.  When he 
has time, he likes to be involved with community services.  
Eric Washington is a senior high school student living in Washington D. C.  He is 
an African American.  He has many hobbies.  He likes rap dance.  He likes to play 
basketball.  One of his hobbies is shopping for shoes.  During the weekends, he likes to 
invite his friends to hang out in the shopping mall.  
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Now we are going to measure your view on the first public issue: Sentencing for 
Criminals.  But first we will give you some information about this topic.
Sentencing Guidelines
The State of Michigan, along with many other states, has issued a Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual.  These Guidelines, which are based on a consensus of legal 
experts, are to assist judges and provide some degree of consistency in sentencing.  
Below is a copy of the cover of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual of the State of 
Michigan. 
The sentence you will be examining was for the crime of armed robbery.  The Michigan 
Sentencing Guideline for the crime of armed robbery is 10 years imprisonment.  The 
sentence for this crime is not only a consensus of legal experts, but has also been found 
to be supported by a large majority of the public.  
These Guidelines, however, are recommendations, not laws.  Because many people feel 
that a judge must be able to take into account the special features of each case, the law 
permits a judge to pass a sentence which is considerable greater or considerably less 
than the Guideline.
[Questions for participants’ understanding of the Guideline]
While the State of Michigan has Sentencing Guidelines, the State still allows Judges to 
make up their own minds in passing sentences.  Therefore, a sentence may deviate 
considerably from the Guidelines, for a variety of reasons. 
We will now give you some information about a particular judge, whom we shall call 
Judge Walters.  The following are excerpts from a report on various Michigan Judges, 
which was released one year ago.
[High credibility condition]
Judge Walters is a judge in one of the larger metropolitan areas in Michigan.  He is in his 
fifties, has gray hair, is married, and has grown children.  He has had many years of 
experience as a judge in criminal cases.
In imposing sentences, he sometimes imposes the sentence recommended by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  However, he places the greatest weight on his own judgment.  
He is however, one of the MOST respected judges in Michigan.
[Low credibility condition]
Judge Walters is a judge in one of the larger metropolitan areas in Michigan.  He is in his 
fifties, has gray hair, is married, and has grown children.  He has had many years of 
experience as a judge in criminal cases.
In imposing sentences, he sometimes imposes the sentence recommended by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  However, he places the greatest weight on his own judgment.  
He is however, NOT one of the more respected judges in Michigan.
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2. How expert is Judge Walters? (col 16) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
After the release of the report which we quoted, Judge Waters had to again sentence 
someone for armed robbery.  We will refer to this person as Convict X.  We will shortly 
present the statement Judge Walters made as he sentenced Convict X and after doing 
so, we will ask you the appropriate sentence for Convict X.
The statement
By threat of force and violence, you gained access to money which was not rightfully 
yours.  You brandished a lethal weapon and made quite clear that you would not 
hesitate to use it if your crime were in any way resisted.  Since there was no resistance, 
you did not  fire your weapon, but the terror you instilled in all of those present will be 
with them for a very long time.  Clearly, you played a major role in the planning and 
execution of this crime.  Finally, your record shows that this is not the first time that you 
have violated the laws which create a civilized society. . .  Therefore, I sentence you to 
[17 years for the small message discrepancy; 30 years for the moderate message 
discrepancy; 50 years for the extreme message discrepancy] in the penitentiary.  
As you decide the proper sentence of Convict X, please keep in mind
1) the sentencing guideline
2) what you know about Judge Walters and
3) the reasons he gave for his decision.
When the mouse program is turned on, please think about the proper sentence for 
Convict X (in years) and move the mouse to reflect any changes in your opinion. 
When you have made your final decision, and will not move the mouse any further, 
please press the mouse button.  Take your time.
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We would now like to ask you to think about another issue: tuition rates at this 
university.  The MSU Board of Trustees has recently voted to increase the 
undergraduate tuition by 7%, effective Fall 1993.  There is however, further discussion 
within the university and the legislature about the appropriate tuition for next year.   
 
You will be given a message to consider on tuition.  After you read the message, we will 
want you to think about the appropriate percentage increase in the tuition rate at 
MSU.  On the screen will be a scale.  The numbers represent percentage increases in 
the tuition rate. 
 
[High source credibility condition] 
 
The message you will read is from a member of the State Legislature.  This legislator, 
whom we shall call T. L., who has been highly involved in the issue of higher education.  
However, student groups have often praised TL’s knowledge of these issues 
and his willingness to be fair to students. 
 
[Low source credibility condition] 
 
The message you will read is from a member of the State Legislature.  This legislator, 
whom we shall call T. L., who has been highly involved in the issue of higher education.  
However, student groups have often questioned TL’s knowledge of these 
issues and his willingness to be fair to students. 
 
[Questions for participants’ understanding of the Guideline] 
 
Here is TL’s recent statement: 
 
Our colleges and universities are badly in need of more money.  Because of this, 
they have had to reduce their number of faculty, causing students to have bigger 
classes and less choice of classes.  The best faculty are leaving because their 
salaries are no longer competitive.  The libraries are able to buy very little.  All of 
these things threaten the education of the young people of this state.  The 7% 
increase approved by the Board of Trustees is not sufficient to solve these 
problems. 
 
I wish we could get a much bigger state appropriation, so that students could pay 
less of the cost of college, but this is not possible unless the public is willing to pay 
higher taxes. 
 
So all that can save our student’s education an meet MSU’s great needs is another 
tuition increase.  I hate to do this to our students once again.  But I think being 
well trained and having good job prospects tomorrow is worth a sacrifice today.  I 
therefore recommend a further tuition increase to take place in January 1994.  
In order for this university to give the kind of quality education our 
students deserve, the total increase (including the 7% already approved) 
must be [9% for the small message discrepancy; 15% for the moderate 
message discrepancy; 22% for the extreme message discrepancy].  
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As you decide the proper tuition increase, please keep in mind 
 
1) your own view 
2) what you know about T. L. and  
3) the reasons he gave for his decision. 
 
When the mouse program is turned on, please think about the appropriate total
percentage increase in tuition and move the mouse to reflect any changes in 
your opinion.  When you have made your final decision, and will not move the 
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